The realist case for balancing a new beginning for Turkey in a changing world
by Necmettin Özdin
Sep 17, 2016 - 12:00 am GMT+3
by Necmettin Özdin
Sep 17, 2016 12:00 am
What the evening of Friday July 15 shows is that something was revealed, and in this new era Turkey should adopt a realist strategy of deep relationships with rising challengers in the new world, taking a strategic position as a leading actor
On the evening of Friday July 15, the Turkish nation uniquely took to the streets against a coup attempt perpetrated by a terrorist organization and sent a message to the international community by defending their independence and the country's future. As noted by Al Jazeera Turk,: "Many in the Western media and their analyses failed to show respect and extend credit to Turkish society, undermining the critical fact that these people will not accept a regime change by force anymore." The Western countries' dissembling toward the coup attempt in which 241 people were killed and over 2,000 injured raised some critical questions as to whether Turkey should re-contextualize its relationships with the West, especially with the U.S. Since then, Turkey has taken some remarkable steps: President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's visit to St. Petersburg, the cross-border military Operation Euphrates Shield, continued discussion between Erdoğan and Vladimir Putin during the G20 summit and nuclear energy agreements between Turkey and China. The western media said there was "no red carpet treatment for Obama at the G20" and a Chinese official shouted, "This is our country, our airport." The headlines should not overshadow the arguments that China's G20 Hangzhou Summit is a game changer in emerging global governance. There is nothing wrong with the argument that America is still the world's leading economic, military and political power. America is still well ahead in terms of military capabilities, and the U.S. dollar is the only international currency widely used in both financial and commercial markets. America could remain the world's number one super power militarily, economically and technologically in the coming years. But, this does not change the reality that China is rising as a rival to the U.S in terms of GDP - the vital indicator that drove the U.S. forward in the 20th century as the leading actor and separated it from the previous one, the British Empire.
A BENIGN HEGEMON?
The G20 summit and other global summits in recent years indicate that America cannot sustain its hegemonic role and primacy globally and that the changing structure of the international system from unipolarity under American preeminence to multipolarity with the rise of other global actors. That the post-Cold War era of American hegemony is in decline is not a new argument. The end of the Cold War transformed the structure of the international system from bipolarity to unipolarity. And then, unipolarity became the main agenda item for scholars, strategists and policy makers. The popular assumption during the 1990s was that the U.S. was the ultimate winner of the Cold War thanks to its economic and military capabilities and should maintain the unipolar position by preventing the emergence of any threat to its hegemonic role. The strategy to preserve the unipolar position and prevent the rise of any great power as a rival did not differ much from the Clinton administration to the Bush administration. The only difference between Republicans and Democrats is who is concerned about whether the U.S. should use its military capabilities to run the world or not. The crucial point for U.S. administrations in the 1990s was how to preserve its exceptional position by preventing the rise of Japan and Western Europe as new challenges. Since they were already allied in the American-led security and economic order, it was not a surprise that no balance from both emerged. The theory says that in the international system any great power like the U.S. is most likely to be balanced by other rising powers. In the case of the U.S., it depends on the strategy preference adopted by American administrations and the rise of new great powers that are not content to live under the American-led global order. No matter what happens, and when and how, balance is today's strategy for shaping the nature of the changing international system.
Whether the U.S. experiences the same fate as past hegemons like Britain is not a simple question. Historical evidence gives us clues about whether any hegemon can sustain its primacy. The only reason to discuss the emergence of the multipolar world order is because of the emergence of new rising powers like China with their own economic, political and, most importantly, institutional architecture. America was perfectly successful managing the non-emergence of other great powers in the post-Cold war period by incorporating and forming highly dependable alliance networks with Western Europe and Japan. Bear in mind that Japan and Germany were regarded as counter-hegemons in the post-Cold War years by many scholars. What makes the '90s quite different from today is that China completely follows a similar path in a controlled manner just like the U.S. in the beginning of the 20th century. As noted before, "Under the leadership of Xi Jinping, who came to power in 2012, there has been a serious transformation in Chinese diplomacy in world affairs. This can be considered as the emergence of a new China with its changing role from being one of the participants in global affairs to taking a leading role in the international order. This is also reflected well in the latest official slogan - 'Asia for Asians,' signaling a tectonic shift in today's economic, political and security order and American-led international system. As a rising power on its own path, China, with its four significant and highly strategic projects, will continue to shape the nature of this century's power structure. Projects such as the New Development Bank, a new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the New Silk Road and a new 21st Century Maritime Silk Road deserve to be seen as an outcome of its self-confident foreign policy vision and major-power diplomacy." No doubt that American military capabilities and economic and political power is exceptional in the history of the great powers. The U.S. is still a leading global actor in several areas from technological innovations to economic and political affairs. But, this does not weaken the core assumptions of the realist view that unipolarity as an international structure is the least sustainable and more prone to balancing other rising powers. For some realist scholars (Layne, Waltz and Mearsheimer), the U.S. must adjust itself to the inevitable emergence of the multipolar system by adopting an alternative strategy of offshore balancing unlike American primacy and exceptionalism. The strategy adopted by American policy makers would be also significant for the rest since this will ultimately shape the power transition process in coming years.
THE GLASS LEAKING
The Cold War is over. Yet, institutions such as NATO, the IMF, the World Bank and the U.N. Security Council, which were established for realist ends, are still alive and utilized paradoxically by liberal U.S. administrations for the sake of American hegemony. The term, hegemony, belongs to the West conceptually and refers to the rise and fall of great powers in the Western hemisphere. The most crucial point this century is that the new challenge to the U.S. comes from non-Western powers that differ both geographically and culturally. Today's international political and economic indicators and distribution of power capabilities show that the world we live in is just one step behind the multipolar world system as evidence indicates that a rising China allied with other major (Russia and India) and regional powers (Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia) would be a subject of fear for the coming American administrations. Furthermore, during the Obama presidency, China and the U.S. could never speak the same language on global affairs unlike the pre-established strategies of the G20 relationship with China (more cooperation, less confrontation) and pivot to Asia (the unfinished legacy). No sign exists, however, in the coming administration - Clinton or Trump - that the U.S. would adopt such a realist strategy based on the view - knowing its limits to run the world. The American-led world order and its institutional frameworks created in the post-war era are being shaken by emerging great and regional powers' attempts. Rising great powers - Russia, China and India - and regional ones - Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia - all enjoy their own agenda and interests that are largely clashing with those of the U.S. During the Cold War years, Turkey's foreign policy approach can be best described by the term of bandwagoning. The term - leash slipping - is likely to define Turkey's role as a game changer in the international system during the last decade under the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) governments. What the evening of Friday July 15 above all shows is that something was revealed, and in this new era Turkey should adopt a realist strategy of deep relationships with rising challengers in the new world, taking a strategic position as a leading actor. This will be a brand-new future for Turkey as opposed to the narrative of being an "outlander" in the Atlantic alliance's Cold War conditions.
* Ph.D. candidate at the Dept. of Political Science and International Relations, Bahçeşehir University
Keep up to date with what’s happening in Turkey,
it’s region and the world.
You can unsubscribe at any time. By signing up you are agreeing to our Terms of Use and Privacy Policy.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.