Former Hungarian Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsany apologized to the Hungarian public in 2006, saying, "We lied to the public. For many years, we have said that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other international institutions' economic policies were the only way out and practiced them. However, we cannot continue like this anymore." As such, the Hungarian government rejected the IMF's request for cutting down on social spending.Gyurcsany remained in power until 2009. Turkey experienced a similar tragedy for nearly half of the previous century. We stepped into the new century in the midst of a great crisis. In fact, the 2001 crisis was the end result of monetary and financial policies that had been imposed on Turkey for nearly half a century. However, the 2001 crisis brought an opportunity for Turkey to have a new kind of politics. Having come to power in 2002, the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) was essentially the consequence of the public's reaction to the colonial economic policies that became clearer with the 2001 crisis.Frankly speaking, however, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was the only figure who initially had this awareness within the AK Party. Just like Gyurcsany's defiance of the IMF in Hungary, Erdoğan did not sign the 20th standby agreement with the fund in 2008 despite intraparty objection. In fact, in the same years, the IMF also realized that orthodox monetary and financial polices did not work and stopped preaching to developing countries like a superior power. In this regard, Hungary was one of the last clients of the IMF. In the same era, governments that criticized neoliberal economic policies began coming to power in Latin American countries, especially in Brazil.Just like Turkey, Latin America has seen reformist governments reject the tradition of military coups, fighting them on every level since the early 2000s. These governments started revising the neoliberal economic policies that plundered the resources of the continent during the 1970s and 1980s, and maintained the economic approach of the pro-coup politics that confined their industries to a vicious debt cycle.Former Brazilian President Lula da Silva, former Argentinean President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, Chilean President Michelle Bachelet, Ecuador President Rafael Correa and Bolivian President Evo Morales ushered in a new period in Latin America at the beginning of the 21st century and signified an escape from the darkness of the previous century. This escape, as well as the presidents and political leaders who represented it, faced a lynching attempt and a wave of disinformation, firstly from the U.S. and U.K. media outlets and then from the local media. So, they failed to carry out many of the reforms they wanted. Nevertheless, these leaders abandoned the exploitative privatization practices and took steps for a more efficient evaluation of basic export resources such as oil and natural gas. They also put new social policies in place, albeit partially.Even though these governments hailed from a leftist background, their policies matched those of Erdoğan, who seems to be on the right wing.The common characteristics of these economic paths was that they objected to the IMF's impoverishing policies that were imposed on them in the 1970s and 1980s. These policies forced the countries to transfer funds outside and have a debt and import-oriented economy. Instead, they defended an uncompromising and production-oriented economic policy that highlighted their own resources and that was open to competition with the outside world. Nowadays, however, there are attempts to suffocate this new economic policy that is rising in Latin America and Turkey. Leftist governments that upheld these policies were undermined with arguments that their policies would lead to an intense crisis, and they were removed from power before they could achieve what they wanted. Likewise, there are efforts to create a perception of the existence of a new crisis in Turkey and to suffocate Erdoğan's production-oriented economic policy that highlights inclusive growth and open-market economy.So, there is an approach in Turkey arguing that the Turkish economy is going through a crisis due to the rise in the dollar exchange rate. I think that the depreciation of the national currency against the dollar, which is considered to be a basic currency, is not an indicator of crisis in an economy where market entry is absolutely free and where a floating exchange rate regime is practiced.The idea that the rise of exchange rates (devaluation) in developing countries like Turkey meant a crisis was true before 2002, but it is wrong at the moment. The current relative fluctuation in the Turkish economy is not because of the rise in exchange rates, but of economic policies that are imposed by those saying that the rise in exchange rates inevitably brings a crisis.

The Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CRBT) is still officially practicing the inflation targeting program, which it must actually abandon. This is not a monetary policy program on its own, but is a paradigm that enjoyed the highest level of domination in the Washington Consensus of the early 1990s. Initially, this paradigm was explained with technical and non-ideological concepts such as the independence of central banks, transparency and accountability and was practiced in developing countries under the name of fighting inflation. However, it could not be implemented by the central banks of developed countries.

Both the European Central Bank (ECB) and the U.S. Federal Reserve (Fed) interpreted the concept of price stability in a broader perspective than the central banks of developing countries. The ECB has never used the concept of inflation targeting, but understood price stability as the stable growth of different countries by using the same currency.

Turkey's existing inflation targeting program is based on an inflation limit that was previously determined as an ultimate target. To this end, the CRBT practices short-term interest rates both as a short-term indicator and basic policy instrument. The most critical point is that the CRBT does not have the task of ensuring external balance within its mission. Interest rates, which can automatically ensure external balance with exchange rates when released to the market, are used by the CRBT to maintain internal price stability.

This program created a different internal interest balance from the external balance and created interest rates well above the critical interest rate limit that would ensure external balance. The reason for such a high current account deficit despite the floating exchange rate regime is the contradiction between the inflation targeting program and the floating exchange rate regime. Certainly, coupled with this monetary policy, the system that is solely based on primary surplus and impoverishing and high indirect taxes in financial policies, has become a major obstacle to production-oriented inclusive growth.

In this respect, the CBRT and other central banks in developing countries cannot implement merely inflation-oriented stabilization programs today. And if they practice a floating exchange rate regime, they cannot try to control exchange rates by keeping interest rates high. Today, the pressure of the CBRT to keep interest rates high is a result of an outdated approach that has no scientific aspect in terms of monetary policies.