Following the step it took yesterday, I think the "independence" issue of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CRBT) has been greatly clarified.

From the beginning, we have been reiterating that the CBRT's instrument independence is endless, hence emphasizing that everyone should follow it in light of recent developments.

Let me repeat that the statements made by the political sphere underline that the CBRT's goals should ultimately match up with the government's economic policy objectives. To paraphrase, as a general rule, central banks should have instrument independence, but they cannot have goal independence. Just like the other institutions of the state, central banks also observe the basic objectives that elected governments promise to people in all democratic countries.

The goal of the government or politics about economic policy is generally an inclusive growth, which also improves income distribution, and the concomitant enhanced general welfare level.

In line with this basic objective, the framework of monetary and fiscal policies is drawn first. It is also essential that monetary and fiscal policies, which are the two basic pillars of the economic policy, are compatible with and complement each other in this framework. Apart from this, however, monetary and fiscal policy paths help develop tools to protect the country from external crisis shocks and take measures against this in fully open economies such as Turkey.

For instance, the reduction of private consumption tax, which is a kind of sliding sale system application, developed by the finance ministry regarding fuel in order to avoid reflecting the impact of exchange rate and oil prices on consumers is such a measure. We should also note that this measure will make a positive contribution to inflation expectations.

The timing of the Central Bank's last step is also important. With this step, the CRBT has increased visibility in monetary policy. I hope the fact that the funding channels of the Central Bank have returned to normal will also end discussions about the uncertainty of the monetary policy.

I would like to underline once again that there is no ambiguity of Turkey's economic policy in the post-election period. On the contrary, both the EU and the U.S. have very serious economic policy ambiguity and Turkey is also taking rapid measures that will least reflect this ambiguity.

Italy, which has been expecting a financial crisis until very recently, has also shouldered a risk of political crisis as of this week. On the other hand, Germany's so-called efforts to turn the European Central Bank (ECB) into the Bundesbank continue, but no one is able to ask Germany if the ECB is independent or not.

At this very point, we have to ask the following question: Have the unprecedented monetary expansions that both the ECB and the U.S. Federal Reserve (Fed) have introduced since 2008 eliminated the risk of financial crisis and recession? Definitely not!

However, just the opposite case is also true for emerging economies that always have the danger of inflation and stagflation (due to the bad economic policies they pursue). With monetary measures, you can suppress the structural problem of inflation risk to a certain extent. In other words, you can continue to smooth over the cracks to a certain extent.

In fact, the current account deficit problem, which is one of the basic dynamics of this "fragility," is also a chronic mistake. This is because, with monetary measures, you would not prevent inflation in any real sense, but you ensure an artificial domestic and foreign price inequality - which will make you a debt and import economy and keep current deficit high primarily stemming from foreign trade, and make it chronic.

So, the country does not attract foreign direct investment, (FDI) but the current deficit is financed by "hot money" inflows. That is the basis of fragility.

In the new era, Turkey will stage a real fight against both inflation and current account deficit in this context and will accelerate the necessary reforms in this area. Breaking the vicious cycle of inflation and current account deficit will be the basis of the reform program.

I must note that the presidential system is an opportunity to carry out basic and fundamental reforms that will break this vicious cycle. In this sense, those saying that there will be uncertainty of economic policy in Turkey after the June 24 elections, to put it mildly, are acting on impulse.

On the contrary, since the political regime in Turkey has not enabled a comprehensive and long-term economic policy so far, there has been economic policy uncertainty in structural sense.

Following the June 24 elections, Turkey will never have uncertainty about its economic policy under a renewed Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's rule, while monetary and fiscal policies, growth targets and investment environment will become more apparent.

In brief, the "simplification" we talk about for the monetary policy now will also go for the economy administration after June 24. Decision-making mechanisms will be strengthened and simplified, and there will be an investment and private sector-friendly bureaucracy. The harmonization of monetary and fiscal policies will be at the highest level and there will be no slight uncertainty in economic policy.

We have to admit that even today there are so many and specific job descriptions of ministries in relation to the economy - which is a question of ambiguity in economic policy in itself. This will be eliminated. As such, Turkey will further deepen the gains it has developed since 2002.

For instance, the floating exchange rate and foreign exchange regime, which are the basis of a competitive and fully open economy, the financial markets that are regulated by independent regulatory and supervisory agencies, and a dynamic, up-to-date and continuous reform strategy that improves the investment environment are the main achievements that will be maintained and deepened in Turkey's road map in the new period.