The past 10 years in Turkey


The last 10 years were not bad in Turkey, thanks. It is customary to make an assessment of the past 12 months every new year. Not that it is very interesting, but it saves most writers and columnists from having to find a new story. Even if the article is redundant there is always something to remember when a perusal of the main events of the past year is carried out.Perhaps a better idea would be to make an assessment of the past 10 years, which has been largely forgotten by almost everyone reading daily papers. The period between 2002 and 2008 was a "first" in modern human history, when practically all regions in the world experienced high growth. This gave a huge boost to investments and increased or initiated new bilateral or multilateral trade between countries. Turkey was just under a very tight and strict economic recovery program initiated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and controlled by Kemal Derviş, nominated by the World Bank and accepted by the coalition government in place in Turkey as the head of economic affairs, with very large powers. The long-awaited public spending reform coupled with a deep overhaul of the banking system in Turkey was initiated by the IMF and international financial circles. It had to be accepted out of despair by the weak coalition government in place headed by Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, whose health was seriously ailing. This bold step did not help the coalition parties survive, and the newly founded Justice and Development Party (AK Party) handsomely won the elections by the end of 2002, where all conventional political parties except the Republican People's Party (CHP) were dilapidated.The new government had the presence of mind to keep sticking to the economic recovery program, together with the harmonization program with the EU "acquis communautaire," the body of EU law. That helped Turkey to secure a long period of economic growth and stability interrupted only by the international financial crisis in 2008. But together with sticking to international reform programs, the AK party also initiated simple, but extremely efficient, reforms for public administration and health services in Turkey. In doing so it has given, perhaps for the first time, a sense of belonging to state governance to a large part of society, traditionally left over by modernization. In that sense, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's political movement has identified itself with the large "plebeian" masses of society together with securing the indefectible support of the newly emerging entrepreneurial middle class. The level of popular support he still enjoys has deep leanings in society, which have been forged throughout a decade of reforms and growth.The problem has been the opposition to this government and political power. The totally derelict establishment, using the Armed Forces, judicial authorities and Supreme Court has staged a very sorry performance regarding their understanding of democracy. Up until 2007 and the presidential election, savagely sabotaged by the bureaucratic establishment in order to stop the election of Abdullah Gül, the AK Party had everything to win by sticking to the EU's harmonization policy and democratic standards. It has been extremely instrumental and efficient and gave the government deep running legitimacy especially in foreign relations. But once the weight of patronizing institutions like the Armed Forces on the government was neutralized, raising the democratic standard ceased to be a vital challenge for the government.The reform process continued willy-nilly up until 2010. Since then, there has been no tangible development. Relations with the EU came to a virtual halt between 2010 and 2013 and have had immense difficulties to take off again ever since. The great economic development, due partly to the particular state of affairs in the world and partly to government reforms, has stopped. Since 2011 the per capita gross domestic product has ceased to increase noticeably. However, the government still enjoys very large support after 13 years of unshared power. Why?First, due to decades of political instability, the Turkish public still savors a long and calm political situation despite the 2008 crisis. The economy does not deliver enough to take Turkey above the $10,000 per capita threshold, but it still floats nicely and does not sink. Second, the eternally badly managed Kurdish policy has at last come to a "dialogue" level and a very probable solution to Turkey's never-ending problem is in sight. Third, and perhaps in a determining way, the political opposition has still not found a way to overcome its very visible disdain for the "plebeian" masses of Turkish society. Until then, the actual government will take advantage of very favorable terms and support in elections.