There is a unique type of secularization at the core of the Islamic segment of society's adventure of change in Turkey. People personalized their religiosity while they protected it. Thus, different religiosities had a chance to coexist in the Islamic community. While pluralism created the Justice and Development Party (AK Party), it was also naturally encouraged by the party. Thanks to this, the AK Party's voter base expanded and many different Islamic groups came to be represented under the umbrella of the AK Party.It cannot be argued that the secularization in question led to a theoretical debate. It would be more precise to suggest that Turkey's Sunni Muslims "unwittingly" became secular, they, however, embraced the concomitant area of freedom. Two incidents, though, caused the AK Party base, and particularly young generations, to discuss secularization on a theoretical ground. One of them is the brutality of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and the other is that Gülenists embarked on a quest for de facto power through the bureaucracy.Before these two incidents, the Islamic section of Turkish society deemed their own pluralism normal, assuming that all individual differences remained within the outlines of religiosity. This was a "natural" assumption for them, because that Islam stipulated the same red lines for all was an expected and unquestioned norm.From this standpoint, ISIS still has a great shocking impact on Turkey's ordinary Muslims. It is inconceivable that those who call themselves Muslims behead and burn people, including women and children. It is impossible to explain this brutality with any interpretation of Islam or any sectarian behavior. Actually, this is because ISIS denies the state of being human, escapes its humanitarian responsibility and thus comes to have no reasonable ties to what is divine. On the other hand, however, these people describe themselves as Islamists, they pursue a discourse where they prioritize verses from the Quran and the hadith, and furthermore, they assert that what they do is all for the sake of a divine purpose. The Islamic section of society was quick to learn that ISIS's origin goes back to the army officers of Iraq's former Baath Party and joins hands with the regime of President Bashar Assad in Syria. In other words, it was obvious that religion was used as a manipulative instrument. Yet still they had to shoulder the "murder in the name of Islam" as a heavy burden and to normalize a non-religious view in their inner world.The relation with the Gülenist community was even more traumatic. This was because, during the first years of AK Party power, this community seemed to be the only political and social group with which the AK Party could act in unison. They came from similar families and environments and were also religious people and had a well-educated generation. The AK Party was completely unfamiliar with the bureaucracy and it would take it many years to raise its own people. Thus, a feature of ISIS, confidence, which had not been there since the beginning, formed the basis of this relation. It was a compulsory situation, however people from the AK Party assumed it to be mutual and true cooperation. This is why they had difficulty in believing for a long time when Gülenists' intention came to the surface step by step. When they realized the Gülenist conspiracies, they felt great anger. However, this emotional reaction also implied a process of estrangement among Muslims.These two incidents did not only imprint the required distance between politics and religion in their minds, they also showed that the mentality implied a more fundamental nature than religion. Religiosity took form in line with mentality and led to the production of all kinds of politics. Secularization was needed to protect the religion. Today, the AK Party's electorate has such an understanding, and this is an irreversible situation.