Should the HDP exceed the election threshold?
The critical question before the June 7 elections was whether the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) would exceed the 10 percent national election threshold. However, no one attributed an existential meaning to the question except for the Kurds. For the anti-Justice and Development Party (AK Party) front, the HDP exceeding the threshold had only one function, to prevent the AK Party coming to power alone. In the run up to the Nov. 1 elections, this picture has become reversed. The apparent discussions are currently revolving around whether the AK Party will obtain a vote share large enough to allow it to once again form a single-party government. The majority of society thinks that the HDP will exceed the threshold, but despite that, the AK Party will have the majority in Parliament. Meanwhile, another discussion is taking place in the background; Should the HDP exceed the threshold?
It is obvious that the outlawed PKK's so-called revolutionary people's war is responsible for the current situation. The fact that the PKK turned young urban Kurds into gangs, made them revolt and committed inexcusable murders, has tarnished the HDP's public image. The HDP and its Co-Chair Selahattin Demirtaş have an undeniable responsibility for that, since Demirtaş sided with the PKK at almost every critical decision point and embraced the language used by the PKK. Had he really wished to broaden his own limited sphere and turn into a real political agent, he would not have been so insistent in his decision to join the anti-AK Party front. Along with rejecting all kinds of political cooperation possibilities with the AK Party, Demirtaş also took the easy way out by using the metaphors of "sultan" and the "palace," all of which downgraded him as a politician. Although the claim suggesting that the ongoing conflicts were triggered by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's desire to stay in power is nothing but ridiculous, Demirtaş still insists on defending this argument.
This has a simple political deduction, as unfortunately neither the HDP nor Demirtaş are active agents in the resolution of the Kurdish question. When the region is viewed, one can see the terrorist organization's proponents say Demirtaş was subdued when he went to Europe. When one asks a question assuming that Demirtaş is an actor, the organization members are disturbed and say that they brought him to the fore and they can take him back anytime if they wish.
This is definitely a grave picture for the non-Kurdish majority in Turkey. All these developments imply that the possibility to resolve the Kurdish question in a peaceful atmosphere and through political means is quite low. This majority started to think that the votes the HDP received were manipulated by the PKK, and the HDP is depersonalized within this relation. So we turn to the above-mentioned question again: Does the HDP's exceeding the threshold set an advantage or a disadvantage in the resolution of the Kurdish question?
The majority might still defend that the HDP should be supported and its survival should be helped even if it aligns with the PKK. However, the number of those who are averse to that view is rapidly increasing. If the elections are held in the midst of the conflict created by the PKK's violent acts, it might be inevitable for the AK Party to adopt a more conservative political position. During a recent rally, interim prime minister and the AK Party's chairman, Ahmet Davutoğlu, indicated that HDP remaining below the threshold might be required if a resolution is demanded.
Nonetheless, Turkey has to preserve its common sense. The HDP is really an unreliable addressee and it does not have strong bargaining power in the face of the PKK. However, if the process has a positive direction, the HDP will be needed at that point. On the other hand, the weakness of legitimacy for Parliament without the HDP breaking the 10 percent election threshold would be an extra burden on the AK Party's shoulders and play into the hands of those who want the country to be ungovernable.
It is not imperative to attach importance to the HDP, but its survival and inclusion in the equation will be useful.
It is obvious that the outlawed PKK's so-called revolutionary people's war is responsible for the current situation. The fact that the PKK turned young urban Kurds into gangs, made them revolt and committed inexcusable murders, has tarnished the HDP's public image. The HDP and its Co-Chair Selahattin Demirtaş have an undeniable responsibility for that, since Demirtaş sided with the PKK at almost every critical decision point and embraced the language used by the PKK. Had he really wished to broaden his own limited sphere and turn into a real political agent, he would not have been so insistent in his decision to join the anti-AK Party front. Along with rejecting all kinds of political cooperation possibilities with the AK Party, Demirtaş also took the easy way out by using the metaphors of "sultan" and the "palace," all of which downgraded him as a politician. Although the claim suggesting that the ongoing conflicts were triggered by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's desire to stay in power is nothing but ridiculous, Demirtaş still insists on defending this argument.
This has a simple political deduction, as unfortunately neither the HDP nor Demirtaş are active agents in the resolution of the Kurdish question. When the region is viewed, one can see the terrorist organization's proponents say Demirtaş was subdued when he went to Europe. When one asks a question assuming that Demirtaş is an actor, the organization members are disturbed and say that they brought him to the fore and they can take him back anytime if they wish.
This is definitely a grave picture for the non-Kurdish majority in Turkey. All these developments imply that the possibility to resolve the Kurdish question in a peaceful atmosphere and through political means is quite low. This majority started to think that the votes the HDP received were manipulated by the PKK, and the HDP is depersonalized within this relation. So we turn to the above-mentioned question again: Does the HDP's exceeding the threshold set an advantage or a disadvantage in the resolution of the Kurdish question?
The majority might still defend that the HDP should be supported and its survival should be helped even if it aligns with the PKK. However, the number of those who are averse to that view is rapidly increasing. If the elections are held in the midst of the conflict created by the PKK's violent acts, it might be inevitable for the AK Party to adopt a more conservative political position. During a recent rally, interim prime minister and the AK Party's chairman, Ahmet Davutoğlu, indicated that HDP remaining below the threshold might be required if a resolution is demanded.
Nonetheless, Turkey has to preserve its common sense. The HDP is really an unreliable addressee and it does not have strong bargaining power in the face of the PKK. However, if the process has a positive direction, the HDP will be needed at that point. On the other hand, the weakness of legitimacy for Parliament without the HDP breaking the 10 percent election threshold would be an extra burden on the AK Party's shoulders and play into the hands of those who want the country to be ungovernable.
It is not imperative to attach importance to the HDP, but its survival and inclusion in the equation will be useful.
Last Update: October 09, 2015 02:18