The Syrian civil war has been an iconoclastic war, which has turned theories of foreign policy upside down: An ever-changing balance of power, short-lived alliances, the diminishing weight of Europe in world politics, the irresolute and volatile foreign policy behavior of the U.S administration, which put its long-standing allies into trouble, the Iranian influence over the former Obama administration and the concluding rise of Iran as an uncontrolled regional power, the resurrection of Russia in world politics thanks to the crooked policies of its archrival the U.S. through its military consolidation in the regional line from the Caspian to the Mediterranean seas, the fall of the countries belonging to the Friends of Syria Group, including Turkey, behind Russia and Iran due to the lack of leadership of the U.S., Turkey's eventual setting out on its own since the exposition of the American political agenda in Syria, and the total failure of the U.N. and other international organizations in resolving the Syrian refugee crisis. In addition, as the Daesh terrorist organization has eventually turned out to be a Western innovation, terrorist organizations change shape every day in their pursuit of new allies. Finally, the principle of rightfulness and legitimacy that had been valid during the Cold War era has lost its primacy in world politics, since states no longer care to convince the international public opinion about the merit of their foreign policies.

When the member states of the Friends of Syria Group decided to support the Syrian opposition, the Syrian regime was in great trouble. Through the intervention of Iran, the Syrian regime left the north of the country to the control of the PKK and its Syrian affliate the Democratic Union Party (PYD). As they did not fight against the Syrian regime, the PKK/PYD acted in accordance with the strategic expectations of Iran. While the Syrian regime retreated from the rural regions to the center of the country, most notably to Damascus, the Iranian leadership together with Bashar Assad aimed at getting Turkey into a permanent trouble with the PKK. It seems that their plan has succeeded as we are now at war with the PKK in Syria.

When northern Syria was abandoned to the PKK, Turkey had been in a resolution process of its Kurdish problem. While the PKK promised to lay down arms in its negotiation process with the Turkish State, Iranian state officials convinced the leadership of the PKK about their future as a regional power through the channel of Jalal Talabani. Thus, the resolution process ended with the PKK's assassination of two police officers in their bed. Inciting the explosion of urban riots in Turkey, Turkey's rivals aimed to create chaos in the country at the end of which they expected to annex lands from Turkey. Yet, while Turkey defeated the PKK, the Kurdish people did not respond to the PKK's calls for rebellion. Today, the Kurdish people's rejection of giving support to the PKK goes on.

Due to the failure of Obama's policies in Syria, the U.S. could have formed a solid partnership with its allies Turkey, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Instead, the U.S. decided to embrace the PKK/PYD as its principal ally in Syria, which had been patronized by Iran and the Syrian regime. The so-called war between the PYD and Daesh turned the PKK into a sympathetic organization for the Western public opinion. Yet, the awkward cooperation between the Marixist-Leninist PKK and the U.S. has been questioned in the U.S. Senate. The military operation in Afrin that was launched to eliminate the threats against the security of Turkey is opposed by Iran and the U.S. alike, the patrons of the PYD. This is the present ordeal of the U.S. and Iran with the PKK. The American and Iranian public opinion should question such a pernicious partnership.