In the constitutional referendum held on April 16, 2017, Turkey's parliamentary system was replaced with a system of executive presidency or a presidential system. As opposed to the former electoral system, it is required to take 50.1 percent of the votes to win the upcoming presidential elections in 2019.
The ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) has already begun work on winning the elections. The AK Party and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) have decided to join forces for the 2019 elections after the MHP's leadership offered the AK Party a surprising electoral alliance. At present, the voting rates of the AK Party and the MHP respectively appear to be around 48 percent and 11 percent.
After these two political parties decided to join forces, the Republican People's Party (CHP) – which could have by no means developed a higher political vision than overthrowing President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan – finds itself in a tight situation. As the CHP's voting rate appears to be around 23 percent, it is reasonable to argue that the main opposition political party has been tightened up in a sociological deadlock.
Unable to overthrow the president through an electoral victory, the CHP's leadership has already begun to complain about the structure and security of the present electoral system. Looking for counter-electoral alliances, the CHP's leadership has not yet made a public statement about making an alliance with the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP). While the voting rate of the oppositional electoral bloc reaches 40 percent, it is still early to rightfully predict the electoral strategy of the opposition.
In the last general elections, the HDP succeeded in entering the assembly by barely passing the electoral threshold of 10 percent. When the ruling AK Party was carrying out a resolution process together with the HDP, the latter purported to become "a political party of Turkey".
Yet, when the PKK began to realize terrorist attacks, the HDP's leadership could not adopt an independent political attitude. Indeed, the HDP could not even oppose the public statements of the PKK's spokesmen who appropriated the HDP's electoral success as their own.
After their dealings with Iranian leadership and Jalal Talabani, the PKK decided to terminate the ongoing resolution process in Turkey. Digging ditches in the cities of southeastern Turkey, the PKK attempted to announce its autonomy in the regions populated by poor people. Yet, the local people did not support the PKK, who illegitimately occupied their cities and houses.
What's more, the Kurdish people at large did not even participate in the meetings and protests held by the HDP. For instance, when the HDP's Diyarbakır mayor was dismissed from office, only 135 people participated in a protest held by the HDP in front of the municipality.
In the last year, the PKK has been widely narrowed down not only in Turkey but also in Syria, as its newly established system in Syria was heavily wounded by their defeat in Afrin. Yet, the HDP's voting rate still appears to be around 9 percent. Thus, their chance of becoming a political party which represents Turkey as a whole seems to still exist.
On the other hand, the İyi Party (Good Party) that parted from the MHP has not found a significant place in the political spectrum. Instead of dividing the MHP, the İyi Party looks like it will take only 3 percent of Turkey's nationalist votes. Supporting the İyi Party in its founding phase, the CHP's leadership ceases to promote it after their realization of the votes moving from the latter to the former.
In conclusion, while the AK Party and the MHP aims at winning the elections through their 60 percent voting rate, the oppositional political parties struggle to win the elections by relying on their 40 percent voting rate. Thus, the electoral challenge appears to be tougher for the oppositional political parties, as the total voting rate of minor political parties appear to only be 2.2 percent.