In 1984, the outlawed PKK became the singular force in the Kurdish uprising against the state. The PKK imposed its weapon-based hegemony not only on the state, but also on other opposing Kurdish groups in southeast and eastern Turkey, where Kurds constitute the majority. The state violently suppressed the Kurds following the 1980 military coup, increasing their aggression even further in the mid-1990s. The Gendarmerie Intelligence and Counterterrorism unit, or JİTEM, which consists of the gendarmerie and the police force, was allegedly involved in thousands of unidentified murders during this period. At the height of this crackdown, around 40,000 people, most of whom were Kurdish, were killed. Innumerable people were wounded and disabled. Thousands of villages were set on fire and millions of Kurds flooded into the slums of metropolises.Violence turned into a legitimate method of doing political business in the country. Under these circumstances, it would have been a surprise if the PKK, which was the only organized armed group, had not dominated the region. What made the PKK legitimate was the routine mafiaesque and unlawfully violent methods of the state. The violence of the PKK empowered the main military and civilian groups in the country. The army was dealing with the problem instead of political organisms so the reputation and authority of the army was naturally superior to that of politicians.A radical change took place in this situation during the period of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) governments. The AK Party knew that it had to resolve this problem both for ethical reasons and to remain the ruling party. The first comprehensive negotiations began with talks in Oslo. Although this process was interrupted due to the PKK's insistence on democratic autonomy and the exclusion of the PKK's imprisoned leader Abdullah Öcalan, a meaningful period commenced with the reconciliation process, the foundations of which were laid in 2012, and on which the National Intelligence Organization (MİT) has had a crucial role, backed by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.This process, which became public knowledge with the first delegation of the Peace and Democracy Party's (BDP) visit to Öcalan in İmralı prison on Jan. 3, 2013, has been planned since its very beginning. The assassination of Sakine Cansız and two other women who were members of the PKK in Paris was a warning by intelligence agencies to call Öcalan to account. The subsequent Gezi Park crisis was misused to trigger Kurdish protests and clashes on the streets. And the PKK suspended its decision to draw back from the Turkish borders during the Gezi crisis. Meanwhile, the ground was laid for the Kobani incidents that took place in October 2014, when 51 citizens were killed. The PKK and foreign and domestic media outlets constantly fabricated false news reports and conducted a propaganda campaign, suggesting that the AK Party supported the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) against the People's Protection Units (YPG). The incidents on Oct. 6 and Oct. 7 were street protests instigated by calls from the pro-Kurdish party and the Kurdish Communities Union (KCK). The losses were devastating. It seemed obvious that the peace process would come to an end.Except that it did not end.While the government displayed a determined attitude against the PKK's violent practices that threatened public order, it also managed to protect the peace. Actually these incidents constituted a coup attempt aimed at Öcalan. Öcalan has not stepped back so far.In the phase we are in now, peace is so close you can almost touch it. However, the PKK's stance is not reassuring. It appears that the interest shown in them by the West with regards to the fight for Kobani has caused a certain amount of hubris. And, of course, there is a sense of insecurity caused by the fact that they feel they lack the political skills to appeal to a Kurdish public used to more violent means. Consequently, because they see a chance to form a Kurdish state in Kobani, they are not inclined to lay down their arms in Turkey. Also, the so-called liberal and left-wing elite Turks who hate the government, have a strong influence over the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) and the PKK's headquarters on Mount Qandil.However, both Öcalan, the incontestable leader of the organization, and the Kurdish people long for peace. Now separatist Kurdish nationalism does not find many subscribers in society. Therefore, it seems that any party who restarts the war without any real reason will be rejected by the public. The provocation of the Kobani-related incidents, which lead to 51 casualties, was a tactic to inflict damage on the government. But it did not achieve its goal.Actually the reconciliation process is counting down the days to finalization. A general framework has already been agreed. However, the organization is aware that there is no return from peace after taking a positive step. And the government is waiting for the decision of Qandil in order to succeed. The rest consists of technical issues. There is no step that cannot be taken. All the barriers have already been overcome.