FETÖ's ByLock ploy
FETÖ members who are competent in disguising, infiltrating and hiding could not dispose of ByLock
The militants of the Gülenist Terror Group (FETÖ), led by former imam Fethullah Gülen, caused more than 240 deaths and hundreds of injuries in Turkey with the military coup attempt on July 15. It is impossible to accurately measure the dimensions of the societal trauma and economic damage caused by this insurrection.
On the night of July 15, most FETÖ members, who targeted civilians with jets, helicopters or tanks, were caught in the act. Camera footage, confessions and statements of injured parties are also evident. In addition, there is proof that refutes all the objections of FETÖ members who do not admit that they acted in an organized way.
This proof is a messaging application, ByLock, which enables communication between group members.
This web-based application, which was developed by FETÖ affiliates, has around 200,000 users. The application can be used on both Android and IOS devices.
The National Intelligence Organization (MİT) infiltrated ByLock's server in Lithuania in 2014. But it was decrypted, and the users were identified only in May. Around 18 million conversations and 4 million emails were identified in the first phase.
Launched by a company in the U.S., which is affiliated with FETÖ, ByLock can be downloaded to desktop computers via websites containing jailbreak applications. It is not available in Apple Store and Google Play, and it is not possible to download it directly to smartphones. To activate the program, an invitation code sent by a FETÖ member is required. The program could only be downloaded and activated on desktop computers and then transmitted to smartphones.
Since ByLock could not be directly downloaded to smartphones, and it takes time to activate the application, membership is impossible without a personal invitation. For this reason, it is valid evidence with regard to charges of FETÖ membership if one has ByLock on a phone. The actual person can be identified through numbers even though a fake id was used. Also, IP numbers of computers that downloaded ByLock can be traced. A distinction can also be made among users and downloader's of ByLock. Consequently, people identified this way are inferred to be affiliated with FETÖ.
FETÖ disciples cannot get rid of the legal evidence provided by ByLock. However, they do not give up on some desperate attempts, such as putting second hand smartphones with ByLock applications on the market. In doing so, they intend to confuse international public opinion and media outlets.
But all their efforts are futile. FETÖ members who are competent in disguising, infiltrating and hiding could not dispose of ByLock, which is one of the most significant pieces of evidence pertinent to the night of July 15. And it is too late now.
On the night of July 15, most FETÖ members, who targeted civilians with jets, helicopters or tanks, were caught in the act. Camera footage, confessions and statements of injured parties are also evident. In addition, there is proof that refutes all the objections of FETÖ members who do not admit that they acted in an organized way.
This proof is a messaging application, ByLock, which enables communication between group members.
This web-based application, which was developed by FETÖ affiliates, has around 200,000 users. The application can be used on both Android and IOS devices.
The National Intelligence Organization (MİT) infiltrated ByLock's server in Lithuania in 2014. But it was decrypted, and the users were identified only in May. Around 18 million conversations and 4 million emails were identified in the first phase.
Launched by a company in the U.S., which is affiliated with FETÖ, ByLock can be downloaded to desktop computers via websites containing jailbreak applications. It is not available in Apple Store and Google Play, and it is not possible to download it directly to smartphones. To activate the program, an invitation code sent by a FETÖ member is required. The program could only be downloaded and activated on desktop computers and then transmitted to smartphones.
Since ByLock could not be directly downloaded to smartphones, and it takes time to activate the application, membership is impossible without a personal invitation. For this reason, it is valid evidence with regard to charges of FETÖ membership if one has ByLock on a phone. The actual person can be identified through numbers even though a fake id was used. Also, IP numbers of computers that downloaded ByLock can be traced. A distinction can also be made among users and downloader's of ByLock. Consequently, people identified this way are inferred to be affiliated with FETÖ.
FETÖ disciples cannot get rid of the legal evidence provided by ByLock. However, they do not give up on some desperate attempts, such as putting second hand smartphones with ByLock applications on the market. In doing so, they intend to confuse international public opinion and media outlets.
But all their efforts are futile. FETÖ members who are competent in disguising, infiltrating and hiding could not dispose of ByLock, which is one of the most significant pieces of evidence pertinent to the night of July 15. And it is too late now.