ByLock passwords
ByLock presents a significant source not only to obtain data pertinent to the night of July 15, but also to decode FETÖ members and the organization's hierarchy
Many discussions have been ongoing with regard to the investigations of the Gülenist Terror Group (FETÖ), which was allegedly behind the atrocious coup attempt on July 15. Today, I would like to remind people of some facts about the ByLock application, which is one of the crucial points of the investigation.
The ByLock application was developed in August 2014. Its license holder was identified as Alparslan Demir, who changed his name to David Keynes. The Turkish state had already discovered ByLock and identified the license holder before July 15. As far as I know, the Guardian newspaper referred to this name in a report it published in early August based on a source within the Turkish state. In other words, Turkish intelligence has been engaging in serious efforts on the subject since then.
Let me briefly mention the key findings of the ByLock investigation. This application can only be activated with the references of two members and through a quadruple-phase code system. So far, the National Intelligence Organization (MİT) has detected 185,000 ByLock users, while it is estimated that the total number of users is around 215,000. The identified 185,000 users fall into three categories:
1) Red list: Frequent users. It is predicted that they are the critical members of the organization.
2) Orange list: Random users. They are accepted as names whose affiliation with the organization cannot be underestimated.
3) Blue list: Those downloading but not activating the system. Keeping a close eye on this group is also recommended.
In brief, the red list members are undergoing both administrative and judicial proceedings. The members of the orange list face only administrative proceedings but some of them are undergoing judicial proceedings depending on their activities. Also, administrative proceedings are being conducted for some of the blue list members. Some mistakes have been made in this regard, which is the main reason for complaints. But the committees founded for compensation are endeavoring to make up for the mistakes.
Considering the data the state has about ByLock, it is thought that 100 percent of the users have affiliations with FETÖ. It is also known that the 98 percent of users reside in Turkey, while the rest are located in the U.S., the U.K., Germany and Kyrgyzstan. It is also noted that 99 percent of the contact messages were written in Turkish.
As already known, the terrorist group found out that MİT deciphered ByLock and after that started to communicate via another program before July 15, called Eagle. Consequently, ByLock presents a significant source not only to obtain data pertinent to the night of July 15, but also to decode FETÖ members and the organization's hierarchy.
The investigations are ongoing and involves adding up other concrete evidence. However, Turkey is confronted with a group, which has been involved in very intricate and different methods. The group members are also very skilled in disguising themselves. For this reason, it is important to note that by emphasizing a few mistakes, a certain perception is trying to be created to represent the investigations as completely unfair. It is natural for such complex investigations to make some mistakes. Such mistakes must definitely be prevented, but due to this, we should not gloss over the importance of the FETÖ investigations for Turkey's safety.
The ByLock application was developed in August 2014. Its license holder was identified as Alparslan Demir, who changed his name to David Keynes. The Turkish state had already discovered ByLock and identified the license holder before July 15. As far as I know, the Guardian newspaper referred to this name in a report it published in early August based on a source within the Turkish state. In other words, Turkish intelligence has been engaging in serious efforts on the subject since then.
Let me briefly mention the key findings of the ByLock investigation. This application can only be activated with the references of two members and through a quadruple-phase code system. So far, the National Intelligence Organization (MİT) has detected 185,000 ByLock users, while it is estimated that the total number of users is around 215,000. The identified 185,000 users fall into three categories:
1) Red list: Frequent users. It is predicted that they are the critical members of the organization.
2) Orange list: Random users. They are accepted as names whose affiliation with the organization cannot be underestimated.
3) Blue list: Those downloading but not activating the system. Keeping a close eye on this group is also recommended.
In brief, the red list members are undergoing both administrative and judicial proceedings. The members of the orange list face only administrative proceedings but some of them are undergoing judicial proceedings depending on their activities. Also, administrative proceedings are being conducted for some of the blue list members. Some mistakes have been made in this regard, which is the main reason for complaints. But the committees founded for compensation are endeavoring to make up for the mistakes.
Considering the data the state has about ByLock, it is thought that 100 percent of the users have affiliations with FETÖ. It is also known that the 98 percent of users reside in Turkey, while the rest are located in the U.S., the U.K., Germany and Kyrgyzstan. It is also noted that 99 percent of the contact messages were written in Turkish.
As already known, the terrorist group found out that MİT deciphered ByLock and after that started to communicate via another program before July 15, called Eagle. Consequently, ByLock presents a significant source not only to obtain data pertinent to the night of July 15, but also to decode FETÖ members and the organization's hierarchy.
The investigations are ongoing and involves adding up other concrete evidence. However, Turkey is confronted with a group, which has been involved in very intricate and different methods. The group members are also very skilled in disguising themselves. For this reason, it is important to note that by emphasizing a few mistakes, a certain perception is trying to be created to represent the investigations as completely unfair. It is natural for such complex investigations to make some mistakes. Such mistakes must definitely be prevented, but due to this, we should not gloss over the importance of the FETÖ investigations for Turkey's safety.