An array of significant developments lately followed each other regarding the Afrin operation and the situation of the Democratic Union Party (PYD). On Sunday, it was announced that the first phase of Operation Olive Branch was completed. The areas surrounding the city center have been successfully cleared. Subsequently, former PYD co-chair Salih Muslum was detained in the Czech capital Prague. Of course, this does not necessarily mean that Muslum will be immediately extradited to Turkey.

No matter what happens, Muslum's detainment is a critical development. After this point, we are going to see how far politics will intervene and what kind of a stance the EU will take with regard to the PYD.

These details are important in the process of extraditing Muslum: It was revealed that the PYD and PKK are responsible for the Ankara attack that took place on Feb. 17, 2016. And Muslum was sought in connection to this. Turkey had issued arrest warrants and red notices for him in 2016, while a new red notice was issued for Muslum on Feb. 13.

Turkey and the Czech Republic do not have an extradition agreement, so the proceedings will operate in accordance with the EU's acquis. But given that the Czech Republic offers a backyard to the policies of France and Germany, it can be predicted that the proceedings will be parallel to these countries' PYD policy. Of course, Muslum's detention is of vital importance; it means a major psychological blow to the organization. But his extradition is not likely to be achieved very easily in the current phase.

Also, considering the other developments in field including the Afrin operation, it seems that the Assad regime is merely capable of surviving in Damascus and Aleppo, let alone capturing Afrin. If the regime had more power, it would certainly target other zones with rich oil reserves before Afrin.

Is it possible for a militia group to change the balances in Afrin as opposed to the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) and the Free Syria Army (FSA) forces commanded by the TSK? Of course not. But since what we have been witnessing in Syria is a proxy war, they regard planting a flag for the Assad regime by proxy as an acquisition. Therefore, the regime welcomes such steps although they are not controlled or planned.

So, who is planting a flag for the regime and what is the relation between Assad and the PYD? Such questions do not have definite answers. It is known that various militia groups answerable to Hezbollah, including the Shiite militia in the north of Idlib, entered Afrin in the name of the regime. Meanwhile, the PYD is waving Assad's flag.

What will favor the regime in this equation? Whoever obtains more influence and land in Syria will sit on the table with an upper hand. Consequently, although they occasionally form an alliance based on their interests, the PYD's decline favors the empowerment of the regime in the final analysis. Therefore, Operation Olive Branch favors the regime as well.

Can Russia, which is the only reason for the Assad regime's survival so far, be left out of this equation? Of course not. The proxy war in Syria has some interwoven aspects. Just as various militia groups act for Assad, Assad acts for Russia and Iran.

Considering this multi-equational picture, Russia will evidently wish to see the regime flag in Afrin as a result of an agreement between the PYD and the regime. Maybe the things that have been done so far constituted an experiment in this respect.