What went wrong?
This was the question asked by Ottoman elites following the horrendous defeat in Vienna in the 1680s. The Ottoman Empire was in shambles. The military, the education system and the system of governance were all obsolete.
"When things go wrong in a society, a way and degree that can no longer be denied or concealed, there are various questions that one can ask. A common one, particularly in continental Europe yesterday and in the Middle East today, is: ‘Who did this to us?' The answer to a question thus formulated is usually to place the blame on external or domestic scapegoats - foreigners abroad or minorities at home," Bernard Lewis wrote, a former British intelligence officer and renowned historian, in his book, "What Went Wrong?"
Continuing: "The Ottomans, faced with the major crisis in their history asked a different question: ‘What did we do wrong?' The question was not only ‘what are we doing wrong?' but also ‘what are they doing right?' "
Believe it or not, the Ottomans were able to ask these harsh questions and deal with the consequences of their decisions despite foreign powers who exercised extremely antagonist policies against the empire.
Today, Turkey is at a somewhat similar crossroads. Pundits are at the bottom of the existential threats surrounding the country and every journalist in Turkey, due to deep anxiety, has written something about U.S. support for the Syrian Kurdish militia, which Ankara considers a terrorist organization.
The Turkish government has been officially bemoaning the U.S., Iran, Russia, the EU and all other major regional powers for a multitude of reasons with which I agree almost fully. Regrettably, complaining neither solves problems nor presents good policy options, so the question still stands: What went wrong?
For one, we know that the U.S. has preferred to work with the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the Syrian affiliate of the terrorist PKK. It is highly probable that it has resulted in a domino effect that in turn will undermine Turkey's territorial integrity, but what options has Turkey had to counter this erroneous move when it had a chance?
It is quite easy, I admit, to criticize a policy retrospectively, but it is important to accept two facts. First, that equating Turkey, a regional power, with the U.S, a super power, is a mistake, and so is thinking that the U.S. had no other option than to work with Turkey. In an effort to convince U.S. President Barack Obama's administration to change its course in Syria and make toppling Syria's Bashar Assad and his regime a priority along with countering DAESH, Ankara offered use of its air bases as a bargaining chip. It seemed logical to think that the U.S. should have been focusing on Assad, but it became clear that Washington did not share this thinking.
Instead, a furious U.S. has sparked a well-orchestrated media campaign against Turkey that wrongly accused Ankara of buying DAESH oil and turning a blind eye to the flow of extremists across the Turkish-Syrian border. Almost simultaneously, despite Turkish protests, the U.S. decided to work with the PYD in the fall of 2014 and provided them with their first pallets of ammunition.
Washington also clearly said that it would not send ground forces to either Syria or Iraq. When the U.S. began to treat Syrian Kurdish militia as the anti-DAESH coalition's ground forces, Ankara failed to offer a viable option that could serve U.S. aims inside Syria in this regard. While it is true that the train-and-equip program for the Syrian opposition died quickly due to the U.S.'s unwillingness to support the former's goal of fighting Assad, it is also true that Ankara failed to come up with alternate solutions to the U.S. strategies it opposed.
Turkey has every right to be angry with the Obama administration for countless reasons. More importantly, it also has a duty to derive lessons from the Syrian quagmire for the benefit of its own people and their future. We should cease playing the blame game and start asking the hard questions about ourselves and our choices as our forefathers were courageous enough to do.
"When things go wrong in a society, a way and degree that can no longer be denied or concealed, there are various questions that one can ask. A common one, particularly in continental Europe yesterday and in the Middle East today, is: ‘Who did this to us?' The answer to a question thus formulated is usually to place the blame on external or domestic scapegoats - foreigners abroad or minorities at home," Bernard Lewis wrote, a former British intelligence officer and renowned historian, in his book, "What Went Wrong?"
Continuing: "The Ottomans, faced with the major crisis in their history asked a different question: ‘What did we do wrong?' The question was not only ‘what are we doing wrong?' but also ‘what are they doing right?' "
Believe it or not, the Ottomans were able to ask these harsh questions and deal with the consequences of their decisions despite foreign powers who exercised extremely antagonist policies against the empire.
Today, Turkey is at a somewhat similar crossroads. Pundits are at the bottom of the existential threats surrounding the country and every journalist in Turkey, due to deep anxiety, has written something about U.S. support for the Syrian Kurdish militia, which Ankara considers a terrorist organization.
The Turkish government has been officially bemoaning the U.S., Iran, Russia, the EU and all other major regional powers for a multitude of reasons with which I agree almost fully. Regrettably, complaining neither solves problems nor presents good policy options, so the question still stands: What went wrong?
For one, we know that the U.S. has preferred to work with the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the Syrian affiliate of the terrorist PKK. It is highly probable that it has resulted in a domino effect that in turn will undermine Turkey's territorial integrity, but what options has Turkey had to counter this erroneous move when it had a chance?
It is quite easy, I admit, to criticize a policy retrospectively, but it is important to accept two facts. First, that equating Turkey, a regional power, with the U.S, a super power, is a mistake, and so is thinking that the U.S. had no other option than to work with Turkey. In an effort to convince U.S. President Barack Obama's administration to change its course in Syria and make toppling Syria's Bashar Assad and his regime a priority along with countering DAESH, Ankara offered use of its air bases as a bargaining chip. It seemed logical to think that the U.S. should have been focusing on Assad, but it became clear that Washington did not share this thinking.
Instead, a furious U.S. has sparked a well-orchestrated media campaign against Turkey that wrongly accused Ankara of buying DAESH oil and turning a blind eye to the flow of extremists across the Turkish-Syrian border. Almost simultaneously, despite Turkish protests, the U.S. decided to work with the PYD in the fall of 2014 and provided them with their first pallets of ammunition.
Washington also clearly said that it would not send ground forces to either Syria or Iraq. When the U.S. began to treat Syrian Kurdish militia as the anti-DAESH coalition's ground forces, Ankara failed to offer a viable option that could serve U.S. aims inside Syria in this regard. While it is true that the train-and-equip program for the Syrian opposition died quickly due to the U.S.'s unwillingness to support the former's goal of fighting Assad, it is also true that Ankara failed to come up with alternate solutions to the U.S. strategies it opposed.
Turkey has every right to be angry with the Obama administration for countless reasons. More importantly, it also has a duty to derive lessons from the Syrian quagmire for the benefit of its own people and their future. We should cease playing the blame game and start asking the hard questions about ourselves and our choices as our forefathers were courageous enough to do.
Last Update: February 24, 2016 22:42