US's schizophrenic YPG policy in Syria
Many Turkish journalists expected President Tayyip Erdoğan's visit to New York for the U.N. General Assembly meetings to be anything other than silent, and clearly he was not. Erdoğan's bilateral meeting with U.S. Vice President Joe Biden and some other timely official statements coincided with U.S. media reporting on the direct armament of the armed Syrian Kurdish group the People's Protection Units (YPG). Everything wasn't gloomy, though. Both countries seem to have reached an understanding over the Pennsylvania-based cult leader Fetullah Gülen's extradition process. Gülen is the mastermind the July 15 failed coup in Turkey with its followers in the Turkish institutions and armed forces. However it seems, at least for Turks, like currently the elephant in the room is Syria, rather than Fetullah Gülen.
The U.S. partnership with the YPG, which is functioning as a U.S.-designated terror group as well as the PKK's Syrian arm, has been a matter of trouble for Turkey over the last two years. The U.S. was tolerating Turkey's concerns by "indirectly" arming the group, mostly through a shell organization called the Syrian Arab Coalition, which is incorporated in the YPG-led umbrella group the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Local news reports repeatedly proved that Americans were airdropping weapons, ammunition and equipment to the YPG and they were distributing those to their Arab allies. But on official levels and to the press, the U.S. continued to maintain its misleading talking point: We, directly or indirectly, don't arm the YPG.
When Erdoğan arrived in New York in the early days of last week, the New York Times reported that CENTCOM plans to directly arm the YPG. Turkish journalists made fun of the report since it was a publicity stunt, but anyway, if true, it was also a sign of a policy shift since the U.S. has avoided accepting publically that it was giving weapons to its designated friends. Turkish officials brought up this issue with Biden and his top aides. They didn't verify the report. Then Erdoğan asked Biden about U.S. shipments of weapons to the YPG. Biden denied it, even though Turkey had intelligence on two airplane deliveries to the YPG-held Kobani three days prior to the meeting in New York.
Later that day, following Biden's denial of arming the YPG, U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter confessed that the U.S. has been and, still is, providing weapons to the YPG, during a hearing held by U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee on Sept. 22.
This is why we have some seriously angry Turkish officials who distrust their American counterparts while conducting joint operations in Syria. I don't see any silver lining in military-to-military relations either because the Turkish military does not differ from the Turkish political leadership when it comes to national security threats.
Some say the U.S. decided to formalize its armament of the YPG to alleviate the latter's grievances over the Turkey-backed FSA's seizure of Jarablus and basically ending the YPG's dream of connecting its cantons. Turkish officials are trying to challenge the American belief that the YPG is the only effective force against Daish. They are mostly right but there are also some negative aspects to this Arab force. The FSA has been very successful in preserving the territory along the Turkish border but its rapid seizures of southern towns were blocked by new Daish offensives. The FSA had to re-capture the villages it lost for a couple of days this week and we still don't see any signs of plans for the liberation of Dabiq and al-Bab. Dabiq is already encircled by three sides and very close to Mara, and could be decisive in destroying Daish's mythology over the judgement day, which has been very effective in recruiting many.
American officials told Ankara that they would not oppose Turkey's operations in al-Bab, which, for sure, would be facing violent Daish resistance. If Turkey proves the FSA's capabilities in al-Bab, then the YPG's role in the Raqqa operation would be diminished. Until then Americans, especially Special Envoy Bret McGurk and his peers, would want to support the YPG project and the schizophrenic American YPG policy of self-denial, untruths and imaginary policy making, will continue.
This is why the Mosul operation presents itself more imminently than the Raqqa operation, and day by day Turkish participation is becoming more likely.
The U.S. partnership with the YPG, which is functioning as a U.S.-designated terror group as well as the PKK's Syrian arm, has been a matter of trouble for Turkey over the last two years. The U.S. was tolerating Turkey's concerns by "indirectly" arming the group, mostly through a shell organization called the Syrian Arab Coalition, which is incorporated in the YPG-led umbrella group the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Local news reports repeatedly proved that Americans were airdropping weapons, ammunition and equipment to the YPG and they were distributing those to their Arab allies. But on official levels and to the press, the U.S. continued to maintain its misleading talking point: We, directly or indirectly, don't arm the YPG.
When Erdoğan arrived in New York in the early days of last week, the New York Times reported that CENTCOM plans to directly arm the YPG. Turkish journalists made fun of the report since it was a publicity stunt, but anyway, if true, it was also a sign of a policy shift since the U.S. has avoided accepting publically that it was giving weapons to its designated friends. Turkish officials brought up this issue with Biden and his top aides. They didn't verify the report. Then Erdoğan asked Biden about U.S. shipments of weapons to the YPG. Biden denied it, even though Turkey had intelligence on two airplane deliveries to the YPG-held Kobani three days prior to the meeting in New York.
Later that day, following Biden's denial of arming the YPG, U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter confessed that the U.S. has been and, still is, providing weapons to the YPG, during a hearing held by U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee on Sept. 22.
This is why we have some seriously angry Turkish officials who distrust their American counterparts while conducting joint operations in Syria. I don't see any silver lining in military-to-military relations either because the Turkish military does not differ from the Turkish political leadership when it comes to national security threats.
Some say the U.S. decided to formalize its armament of the YPG to alleviate the latter's grievances over the Turkey-backed FSA's seizure of Jarablus and basically ending the YPG's dream of connecting its cantons. Turkish officials are trying to challenge the American belief that the YPG is the only effective force against Daish. They are mostly right but there are also some negative aspects to this Arab force. The FSA has been very successful in preserving the territory along the Turkish border but its rapid seizures of southern towns were blocked by new Daish offensives. The FSA had to re-capture the villages it lost for a couple of days this week and we still don't see any signs of plans for the liberation of Dabiq and al-Bab. Dabiq is already encircled by three sides and very close to Mara, and could be decisive in destroying Daish's mythology over the judgement day, which has been very effective in recruiting many.
American officials told Ankara that they would not oppose Turkey's operations in al-Bab, which, for sure, would be facing violent Daish resistance. If Turkey proves the FSA's capabilities in al-Bab, then the YPG's role in the Raqqa operation would be diminished. Until then Americans, especially Special Envoy Bret McGurk and his peers, would want to support the YPG project and the schizophrenic American YPG policy of self-denial, untruths and imaginary policy making, will continue.
This is why the Mosul operation presents itself more imminently than the Raqqa operation, and day by day Turkish participation is becoming more likely.