Fethullah Gülen and his followers, whom many observers expect to become the subject of an Interpol Red Notice in the foreseeable future, have long had trouble with secularists, nationalists and the Kurdish political movement. The secularists, in particular, had been concerned since the 1990s that the Gülen Movement's infiltration of bureaucratic ranks would eventually hurt the country. In the aftermath of the Justice and Development Party's (AK Party) 2002 election victory, the secularists became even more agitated while the nation's conservatives, having barely survived the post-modern coup of February 1997, mistook the secularist reaction for a categorical opposition to religion. It was therefore obvious to se why, for a long time, Turkish conservatives did not share the secularists' concerns.The secularist anger toward the Gülenists grew notably stronger due to the movement's indiscreet involvement in controversial affairs, including the Ergenekon case and the Sledgehammer trials. The arrests of some of Gülen's most vocal critics, including investigative journalists Nedim Şener, Ahmet Şık and Soner Yalçın, further alienated secular-minded citizens. At this point, public prosecutors had grown so confident that they dared to question detainees about their motives for criticizing Gülen.Although not nearly as skeptical as the secularists, Turkish nationalists had no lack of concerns over the Gülen Movement's agenda. The group's overseas activities, in particular, raised eyebrows among supporters of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), whose leadership acknowledged that their party was under the threat of infiltration by Gülenist operatives. By 2009, the situation had become so alarming that MHP Chairman Devlet Bahçeli publicly acknowledged the movement's efforts to infiltrate his party – which, he said, had proved futile thanks to the determination of fellow nationalists. Therefore two years later when an anonymous source posted intimate footage of MHP elites on a website, the party's supporters unanimously believed the scandal to be an effort by the Gülen Movement, which had a strong presence in law enforcement, to strong-arm the nationalists into submission.The Kurds, too, have had their fair share of problems with the Gülenists, whose opposition to the peace process has been coupled with their concentration of power within the National Police. In recent years, the Gülen Movement has dealt some of the heaviest blows to disarmament talks by orchestrating mass arrests of Kurdish activists on terrorism charges and leaking pictures of handcuffed politicians, standing in a line, to the press.Briefly put, Turkey's secularists, nationalists and Kurds had long suspected the Gülen Movement of pursuing a secret agenda. Meanwhile, Gülenists, enjoying support from the nation's conservatives as well as protection of the AK Party, accumulated more power. This trend, however, began to change as early as 2012.It was when a series of blatantly unlawful arrests were made, as part of the Ergenekon case and the Sledgehammer trials, which most government officials first came to the realization that the group sought to impose its own agenda on the Turkish government. Although the ruling party remained supportive of investigations into pro-coup supporters within the bureaucracy, the Gülenist vendetta against their critics was becoming a serious liability. Around this time, an Istanbul court put Gen. İlker Başbuğ, a former commander of the Armed Forces, into pre-trial detention just one day after then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had publicly spoken against his arrest. When Gülenist operatives inside the justice system moved against journalists Şık and Şener, the authorities responded by reassigning prosecutor Zekeriya Öz, the poster boy for the Gülenist crusade, to a significantly less influential position.Although differences of opinion over the aforementioned arrests created tensions between the government and the Gülen Movement, it was the group's opposition to the peace process that proved to be the deal breaker. Unable to stomach the AK Party's participation in disarmament talks with the PKK, the movement was believed to have leaked sound recordings of preliminary talks that took place in Oslo, Norway, perpetuating the KCK operations. As a matter of fact, the first major crisis between the government and Gülenists took place when prosecutors affiliated with the movement attempted to arrest intelligence chief Hakan Fidan, just a month after General Başbuğ's detention for terrorism charges. While most conservatives did not welcome the Gülenists' aggressive demeanor, their attempt to imprison Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on Dec. 17, 2013 put the final coffin in the partnership's coffin.Finally, let us take a look at the post-Dec. 17 situation. Turkey's conservatives joined secularists, nationalists and the Kurds in their deep suspicion of the Gülenist campaign. In the words of liberal thinker Atilla Yayla, the conservatives believe that the Gülen Movement has been deprived of all democratic, social and moral legitimacy. The Gülenists, in other words, find themselves completely isolated – which does not amount to loneliness - thanks to the unlawful arrests, operations and conspiracies that led them here. Next week, I will attempt to shed some light on the ways in which the Gülen Movement's worthless solitude has factored into the Dec. 14 operation and discuss how the United States can contribute to the Gülen Movement's disarmament.