Operation Shah Euphrates and its aftermath
Last week on Saturday night, Turkish Armed Forces conducted a large-scale operation in Syria's Karakozak village, which is 37 kilometers away from the Turkish border. About 500 specialized personnel equipped with armored vehicles and heavy weapons participated in the operation. The Tomb of Süleyman Shah, one of the important historical figures for Turks, and a military unit comprising 38 officers guarding the tomb were located in the village. The 10 acres of land the tomb occupied is recognized as Turkish territory as a requirement of an agreement made with France.In March, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) seized the region where the tomb was located, and since then Ankara closely monitored the tomb and the military outpost guarding it to prevent a possible attack. They took action when the activities of ISIS around the tomb and the conflicts between Kurdish units and ISIS intensified. The operation conducted on Saturday night, relocated the tomb to a safer place in Syria close to the Turkish border, and the 38 military personnel were transferred to Turkey. The operation was named Shah Euphrates. The tomb was relocated by passing through regions where ISIS and the Democratic Union Party (PYD), which are recognized as terrorist organizations by the Turkish government, were dominant. It was the first large-scale operation by the Turkish Armed Forces conducted in Syria. And because of that it stirred many debates.
However, Operation Shah Euphrates is being discussed on futile ground in Turkey. The discussions focus on the questions of whether the operation was successful or not and whether it was a victory or a defeat. This is because political parties try to manipulate Operation Shah Euphrates as a domestic politics tool and raise their vote rates as a result of these polemics on the eve of the upcoming general elections on June 7.
When the case is rationally viewed leaving domestic policies aside, it is seen that we are facing an interesting picture that foretells the near future. Operation Shah Euphrates is not an operation that was conducted as a political maneuver to increase vote rates, change the domestic agenda or win the hearts of Turkish voters. It was a military operation designed by Ankara to prevent the impending dangers in the region. The government had to conduct it.
Let's turn back to my previous column in order to explain its causes. In my previous column, I highlighted that the region bears two kinds of ambiguities for Turkey. The first was the fact that it is not known how long Syrian President Bashar Assad will preserve his seat and when the civil war in Syria wil end. The second was the unknown future targets of ISIS, which recently failed in Kobani, and to whom it would attribute the losses in Kobani. ISIS reacted to the arrival of peshmerga forces in Kobani through a diplomatic maneuver by Turkey. The Turkish bases located in Iraq and Syria might have been targeted. The column also emphasized that Turkey would sign a train-and-equip agreement with the U.S. That agreement was signed on the day the column was published.
This is a crucial point since it gives an idea on the timing of the operation. Turkey organized Operation Shah Euphrates when ISIS's possibility to target Turkey after its defeat in Kobani was realized. The operation was also conducted two days after the train-and-equip agreement was signed with the U.S., which means Ankara wished to acquire a tactical superiority and take initiative for future incidents, in a sense. A source I have reached asserted that Turkey held this operation to "take initiative" and "prevent provocations," reminiscent of the crisis of the 49 Turkish consular staff taken hostage by ISIS in Mosul.
It would be useful to bring up that crisis. On June 11, 2014, ISIS took 49 officers at the Turkish Consulate in Mosul hostage and held them for months. Within this period, Ankara could not overtly support the steps against ISIS having 49 hostages to think of. When ISIS attacked northern Iraq, Turkish aid was confidentially sent to Irbil. Therefore, Ankara was accused of not openly reacting to ISIS.
Operation Shah Euphrates bears importance in this sense. Turkey did not want to have a second Mosul crisis in the face of new developments in the region. It desired to take initiative in the steps that are to be taken against ISIS, or maybe against Assad. It prevented the manipulation of the Tomb of Süleyman Shah. Speaking of Mosul, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu lately had a telephone conversation. During the conversation, Iraq's work to clear off ISIS from Mosul was also on the agenda.
However, Operation Shah Euphrates is being discussed on futile ground in Turkey. The discussions focus on the questions of whether the operation was successful or not and whether it was a victory or a defeat. This is because political parties try to manipulate Operation Shah Euphrates as a domestic politics tool and raise their vote rates as a result of these polemics on the eve of the upcoming general elections on June 7.
When the case is rationally viewed leaving domestic policies aside, it is seen that we are facing an interesting picture that foretells the near future. Operation Shah Euphrates is not an operation that was conducted as a political maneuver to increase vote rates, change the domestic agenda or win the hearts of Turkish voters. It was a military operation designed by Ankara to prevent the impending dangers in the region. The government had to conduct it.
Let's turn back to my previous column in order to explain its causes. In my previous column, I highlighted that the region bears two kinds of ambiguities for Turkey. The first was the fact that it is not known how long Syrian President Bashar Assad will preserve his seat and when the civil war in Syria wil end. The second was the unknown future targets of ISIS, which recently failed in Kobani, and to whom it would attribute the losses in Kobani. ISIS reacted to the arrival of peshmerga forces in Kobani through a diplomatic maneuver by Turkey. The Turkish bases located in Iraq and Syria might have been targeted. The column also emphasized that Turkey would sign a train-and-equip agreement with the U.S. That agreement was signed on the day the column was published.
This is a crucial point since it gives an idea on the timing of the operation. Turkey organized Operation Shah Euphrates when ISIS's possibility to target Turkey after its defeat in Kobani was realized. The operation was also conducted two days after the train-and-equip agreement was signed with the U.S., which means Ankara wished to acquire a tactical superiority and take initiative for future incidents, in a sense. A source I have reached asserted that Turkey held this operation to "take initiative" and "prevent provocations," reminiscent of the crisis of the 49 Turkish consular staff taken hostage by ISIS in Mosul.
It would be useful to bring up that crisis. On June 11, 2014, ISIS took 49 officers at the Turkish Consulate in Mosul hostage and held them for months. Within this period, Ankara could not overtly support the steps against ISIS having 49 hostages to think of. When ISIS attacked northern Iraq, Turkish aid was confidentially sent to Irbil. Therefore, Ankara was accused of not openly reacting to ISIS.
Operation Shah Euphrates bears importance in this sense. Turkey did not want to have a second Mosul crisis in the face of new developments in the region. It desired to take initiative in the steps that are to be taken against ISIS, or maybe against Assad. It prevented the manipulation of the Tomb of Süleyman Shah. Speaking of Mosul, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu lately had a telephone conversation. During the conversation, Iraq's work to clear off ISIS from Mosul was also on the agenda.