Background of Turkey's war against ISIS and the PKK
In the wake of the lethal attacks, the government decided to move against the PKK alongside ISIS. Government sources indicate that the military effort aims to restore public order and force all PKK militants out of Turkey
Last week, Turkey launched a military operation against terrorist organizations threatening its national security at home and abroad to launch airstrikes against the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in Syria and the PKK in northern Iraq. At the same time, law enforcement agencies conducted comprehensive raids to arrest more than 1,000 individuals for their suspected ties to ISIS, the PKK or the Revolutionary People's Party-Front (DHKP-C). Turkey's bold move triggered a heated debate: Claiming that the government had attacked ISIS targets as a pretext to score points with disillusioned voters by bombing the PKK ahead of snap elections. It might make sense for opposition parties to make such accusations, but the claims, backed by no concrete evidence whatsoever, cannot help outside observers make sense of the situation.
The main reason behind Turkey's airstrikes against ISIS has been the organization's recent efforts to perpetrate atrocities inside the country. On July 20, an ISIS member blew himself up to claim 32 lives - to which the Turkish government retaliated four days later. It is a valid question why Turkey waited until now to attack ISIS and the answer closely relates to underlying tensions between the Turkish government and terrorists. It is no secret that Turkey's assistance to the Democratic Union Party (PYD), which the country views as a terrorist organization, during the siege of Kobani had angered ISIS leaders. The government not only provided medical treatment to wounded PYD fighters but also successfully executed its plan to move peshmerga forces from Iraq to Syria. Meanwhile, the country took additional steps to stop the influx of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) to the conflict zone and continued its support for moderate opposition forces, which have been competing with ISIS on the ground.
The key aspect of the Suruç massacre, however, was timing: ISIS did not target Turkey until the government revealed its interest in creating an ISIS-free safe zone in Northern Syria - which would push ISIS militants to the south while replacing them with the Free Syrian Army. When Turkey's allies showed no interest in the proposal, senior government officials indicated that the country was willing to take unilateral action. Over the past month, the military buildup across the Syrian border led many observers to believe that Turkey was about to launch a ground offensive to secure its borders. In an effort to discourage additional steps, ISIS perpetrated the Suruç massacre. The attack, however, led Ankara to step up efforts to create a safe zone in Syria: The airstrikes, therefore, represented not only Turkey's response to the suicide attack but also the first step toward an ISIS-free safe zone across the Syrian border. It will soon become clear that Turkey's involvement in Northern Syria entails a long-term commitment.
At the same time, Turkey has been launching airstrikes against the PKK in Iraq. Although the organization had agreed to withdraw its forces from Turkey by May 2013, a series of developments at home and abroad led the PKK to have second thoughts about the initial agreement. The idea that the Turkish state was too strong to beat had led the organization to consider negotiations. When the talks began, the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) had been running the country for 11 years and looked perfectly invincible. Then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had eliminated the military guardianship regime and won a series of elections. The Gezi Park protests, however, made the PKK think that the government was indeed not as strong as it appeared. Some of the organization's leaders believed that chaos across the country, along with the rise of a Kurdish presence in northern Syria, could serve their interests. Months later, the Gülen Movement's crusade against Erdoğan and his AK Party further deepened the PKK's doubts about the government's strength. The PKK, consequently, turned its back on the negotiations and proceeded to strengthen its presence inside the country - which led to a series of transgressions against public order that the government chose to ignore for the sake of continuing the talks.
The Kobani protests of October 2014, which claimed 52 lives, was a turning point for both the government and the PKK. With PKK militants killing civilians on the streets, the government pushed the Domestic Security Bill through Parliament. The PKK leadership, meanwhile, believed that their supporters rallied behind the military campaign in Kobani and the formation of autonomous areas in northern Syria. That the PYD, a sister organization, received praise from the international coalition was obviously a big positive.
To be clear, the PKK reached the conclusion that the Kurdish reconciliation process had come to an end on June 7. When the AK Party lost its parliamentary majority, the militants viewed the election results as a sign of the ruling party's declining popularity. Between June 7 and July 24, PKK militants perpetrated at least 281 attacks, including 121 armed assaults and 15 kidnappings. Moreover, the organization publicly announced on July 11 that it had unilaterally ended the two-year cease-fire citing development projects such as roads and water dams in the southeast - which marked the end of the Kurdish reconciliation process. Over the next weeks, the PKK stepped up efforts to destabilize the country. In retaliation to the Suruç massacre, the militants executed two police officers in their sleep by shooting them in the back of their heads. The organization then proceeded to target military officers. In the wake of the lethal attacks, the government decided to move against the PKK alongside ISIS. Government sources indicate that the military effort aims to restore public order and force all PKK militants out of Turkey. Let us hope that peace will come back to the country without delay.
The main reason behind Turkey's airstrikes against ISIS has been the organization's recent efforts to perpetrate atrocities inside the country. On July 20, an ISIS member blew himself up to claim 32 lives - to which the Turkish government retaliated four days later. It is a valid question why Turkey waited until now to attack ISIS and the answer closely relates to underlying tensions between the Turkish government and terrorists. It is no secret that Turkey's assistance to the Democratic Union Party (PYD), which the country views as a terrorist organization, during the siege of Kobani had angered ISIS leaders. The government not only provided medical treatment to wounded PYD fighters but also successfully executed its plan to move peshmerga forces from Iraq to Syria. Meanwhile, the country took additional steps to stop the influx of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) to the conflict zone and continued its support for moderate opposition forces, which have been competing with ISIS on the ground.
The key aspect of the Suruç massacre, however, was timing: ISIS did not target Turkey until the government revealed its interest in creating an ISIS-free safe zone in Northern Syria - which would push ISIS militants to the south while replacing them with the Free Syrian Army. When Turkey's allies showed no interest in the proposal, senior government officials indicated that the country was willing to take unilateral action. Over the past month, the military buildup across the Syrian border led many observers to believe that Turkey was about to launch a ground offensive to secure its borders. In an effort to discourage additional steps, ISIS perpetrated the Suruç massacre. The attack, however, led Ankara to step up efforts to create a safe zone in Syria: The airstrikes, therefore, represented not only Turkey's response to the suicide attack but also the first step toward an ISIS-free safe zone across the Syrian border. It will soon become clear that Turkey's involvement in Northern Syria entails a long-term commitment.
At the same time, Turkey has been launching airstrikes against the PKK in Iraq. Although the organization had agreed to withdraw its forces from Turkey by May 2013, a series of developments at home and abroad led the PKK to have second thoughts about the initial agreement. The idea that the Turkish state was too strong to beat had led the organization to consider negotiations. When the talks began, the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) had been running the country for 11 years and looked perfectly invincible. Then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had eliminated the military guardianship regime and won a series of elections. The Gezi Park protests, however, made the PKK think that the government was indeed not as strong as it appeared. Some of the organization's leaders believed that chaos across the country, along with the rise of a Kurdish presence in northern Syria, could serve their interests. Months later, the Gülen Movement's crusade against Erdoğan and his AK Party further deepened the PKK's doubts about the government's strength. The PKK, consequently, turned its back on the negotiations and proceeded to strengthen its presence inside the country - which led to a series of transgressions against public order that the government chose to ignore for the sake of continuing the talks.
The Kobani protests of October 2014, which claimed 52 lives, was a turning point for both the government and the PKK. With PKK militants killing civilians on the streets, the government pushed the Domestic Security Bill through Parliament. The PKK leadership, meanwhile, believed that their supporters rallied behind the military campaign in Kobani and the formation of autonomous areas in northern Syria. That the PYD, a sister organization, received praise from the international coalition was obviously a big positive.
To be clear, the PKK reached the conclusion that the Kurdish reconciliation process had come to an end on June 7. When the AK Party lost its parliamentary majority, the militants viewed the election results as a sign of the ruling party's declining popularity. Between June 7 and July 24, PKK militants perpetrated at least 281 attacks, including 121 armed assaults and 15 kidnappings. Moreover, the organization publicly announced on July 11 that it had unilaterally ended the two-year cease-fire citing development projects such as roads and water dams in the southeast - which marked the end of the Kurdish reconciliation process. Over the next weeks, the PKK stepped up efforts to destabilize the country. In retaliation to the Suruç massacre, the militants executed two police officers in their sleep by shooting them in the back of their heads. The organization then proceeded to target military officers. In the wake of the lethal attacks, the government decided to move against the PKK alongside ISIS. Government sources indicate that the military effort aims to restore public order and force all PKK militants out of Turkey. Let us hope that peace will come back to the country without delay.