Limits of the Erdoğan-Putin friendship
Turkey and Russia have learned valuable lessons from the jet crisis and would not be willing to go down the same path again
Turkey-Russia ties are rapidly improving, as Ankara and Moscow shape their foreign policy goals based on rational interests and strategic preferences as opposed to emotions.
Following the downing of a Russian jet last year, Turkey faced serious consequences. For months, Turkish jets could not enter Syrian airspace over fear of Russian retaliation. Those who benefitted from the crisis were obviously Daesh and the People's Protection Units (YPG) - terrorist groups that sought to consolidate their power in northern Syria. In retrospect, Turks supported rapprochement with Moscow to get back in the game. But Russia too had plenty of reasons to start cooperating with Turkey.
Imagine the map of Eastern Europe and Western Asia from a Russian policy-maker's perspective: Having annexed Crimea, Moscow currently experiences serious problems with the European Union in the country's southwestern flank. When their relations with Turkey took a turn for the worse, the Kremlin ended up with a line of hostile governments extending from Eastern Europe to Iran. In other words, President Vladimir Putin's gamble left Russia trapped in the northern Black Sea. In addition to geo-strategic disadvantages, the situation had negative effects on energy cooperation and trade among other areas. Fighting two wars in Ukraine and Syria and facing serious problems with NATO and the European Union, the Russians simply could not afford to stay on Turkey's bad side. Hence their eagerness to let bygones be bygones.
Another driving force behind the Turkey-Russia rapprochement has been Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's long-time friendship with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin, who famously likened the jet downing to being stabbed in the back. Russia's aggressive foreign policy, in turn, frustrated Mr. Erdoğan in the past.
Luckily, the two leaders have been able to overcome the rough patch and focus on the real issues. Last week, it was noteworthy that Erdoğan told the Russian media that he needed Putin's help in the fight against terrorism in Syria. The Russian leader, who was the first foreign president to call Mr. Erdoğan after the coup attempt and offer his support, reciprocated by accusing the United States of meddling in Turkey's domestic affairs, citing coup leader Fetullah Gülen's continued residence in rural Pennsylvania. It was noteworthy that the Kremlin's statement came at a time when the Americans prove unwilling to extradite the failed coup's mastermind.
As a regional power, Turkey has always benefited from close cooperation with Russia - which is why many Western observers are trying to discover what the limits of Erdoğan's friendship with Putin are. In recent months, official visits by the leaders to St. Petersburg and Istanbul resulted in an agreement over the Turkish Stream pipeline and joint nuclear projects. But the real question is whether ongoing clashes in Mosul and northern Syria could derail the normalization process.
To be clear, Mosul is the lesser problem since Russia has no intention to get involved in the operation. Focusing on the situation in Syria instead, the Russians have only one Mosul-related concern: They suspect that the Americans want to facilitate the escape of Daesh terrorists from Iraq to Raqqa and beyond. According to Turkish officials, Ankara shares the same concern. "If the terrorists make their way from Mosul to northern Syria," a senior official said, "Operation Euphrates Shield would face additional risks." Under the circumstances, the fight for Mosul is unlikely to put the two leaders' friendship to test.
Syria, however, is another story. The multi-layered civil war in the country is the perfect breeding ground for new diplomatic crises. Having liberated Dabiq from Daesh terrorists, the Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army (FSA) advances toward Al-Bab, while Bashar Assad's regime warned Turkey not to enter Syrian airspace. What we need to keep in mind is that once the moderates take control over Al-Bab and Manbij, their newfound momentum will put pressure on Aleppo - which is something that Assad doesn't want. While the regime does not want FSA forces to continue their southward advance, Turkey feels compelled to deepen the safe zone to prevent future attacks.
At this point, the main question is whether Putin is on the same page as the Assad regime. Since Moscow cares about Aleppo as much as the regime, the FSA campaign could spell trouble for Turkey-Russia relations in the future. However, it is important to remember that the two countries have learned valuable lessons from the jet crisis and would be unwilling to go down the same path again. As such, there will be no new confrontation between Turkey and Russia anytime soon.
Following the downing of a Russian jet last year, Turkey faced serious consequences. For months, Turkish jets could not enter Syrian airspace over fear of Russian retaliation. Those who benefitted from the crisis were obviously Daesh and the People's Protection Units (YPG) - terrorist groups that sought to consolidate their power in northern Syria. In retrospect, Turks supported rapprochement with Moscow to get back in the game. But Russia too had plenty of reasons to start cooperating with Turkey.
Imagine the map of Eastern Europe and Western Asia from a Russian policy-maker's perspective: Having annexed Crimea, Moscow currently experiences serious problems with the European Union in the country's southwestern flank. When their relations with Turkey took a turn for the worse, the Kremlin ended up with a line of hostile governments extending from Eastern Europe to Iran. In other words, President Vladimir Putin's gamble left Russia trapped in the northern Black Sea. In addition to geo-strategic disadvantages, the situation had negative effects on energy cooperation and trade among other areas. Fighting two wars in Ukraine and Syria and facing serious problems with NATO and the European Union, the Russians simply could not afford to stay on Turkey's bad side. Hence their eagerness to let bygones be bygones.
Another driving force behind the Turkey-Russia rapprochement has been Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's long-time friendship with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin, who famously likened the jet downing to being stabbed in the back. Russia's aggressive foreign policy, in turn, frustrated Mr. Erdoğan in the past.
Luckily, the two leaders have been able to overcome the rough patch and focus on the real issues. Last week, it was noteworthy that Erdoğan told the Russian media that he needed Putin's help in the fight against terrorism in Syria. The Russian leader, who was the first foreign president to call Mr. Erdoğan after the coup attempt and offer his support, reciprocated by accusing the United States of meddling in Turkey's domestic affairs, citing coup leader Fetullah Gülen's continued residence in rural Pennsylvania. It was noteworthy that the Kremlin's statement came at a time when the Americans prove unwilling to extradite the failed coup's mastermind.
As a regional power, Turkey has always benefited from close cooperation with Russia - which is why many Western observers are trying to discover what the limits of Erdoğan's friendship with Putin are. In recent months, official visits by the leaders to St. Petersburg and Istanbul resulted in an agreement over the Turkish Stream pipeline and joint nuclear projects. But the real question is whether ongoing clashes in Mosul and northern Syria could derail the normalization process.
To be clear, Mosul is the lesser problem since Russia has no intention to get involved in the operation. Focusing on the situation in Syria instead, the Russians have only one Mosul-related concern: They suspect that the Americans want to facilitate the escape of Daesh terrorists from Iraq to Raqqa and beyond. According to Turkish officials, Ankara shares the same concern. "If the terrorists make their way from Mosul to northern Syria," a senior official said, "Operation Euphrates Shield would face additional risks." Under the circumstances, the fight for Mosul is unlikely to put the two leaders' friendship to test.
Syria, however, is another story. The multi-layered civil war in the country is the perfect breeding ground for new diplomatic crises. Having liberated Dabiq from Daesh terrorists, the Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army (FSA) advances toward Al-Bab, while Bashar Assad's regime warned Turkey not to enter Syrian airspace. What we need to keep in mind is that once the moderates take control over Al-Bab and Manbij, their newfound momentum will put pressure on Aleppo - which is something that Assad doesn't want. While the regime does not want FSA forces to continue their southward advance, Turkey feels compelled to deepen the safe zone to prevent future attacks.
At this point, the main question is whether Putin is on the same page as the Assad regime. Since Moscow cares about Aleppo as much as the regime, the FSA campaign could spell trouble for Turkey-Russia relations in the future. However, it is important to remember that the two countries have learned valuable lessons from the jet crisis and would be unwilling to go down the same path again. As such, there will be no new confrontation between Turkey and Russia anytime soon.