Turkey would be a very strong country if continues strengthening ties with Asia while refraining from severing relations with the West, Professor Muhittin Ataman from Turkey's leading think tank, the Foundation for Political, Social and Economic Reseach {SETA Foundation), emphasized while commenting on Turkey's recent diplomatic trends.

On the sidelines of the NATO summit, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan also held meetings with top executives from the EU and leaders from European powerhouses. After the meetings both Turkish and EU leaders conveyed strong messages in support for overcoming obstacles and boosting ties. Despite the positive messages, Professor Ataman believes that the possibility of Turkey's full EU membership is off the table and both the EU and Turkish sides need to redefine their economic and political objectives rather than seeking full membership as they move foward in relations diplomatically. Ataman also stressed that the EU does not have right to intervene in Turkey's internal affairs since goals for full membership are off the table.

In addition, Professor Ataman believes that NATO's participation to the anti-Daesh coalition will not strengthen the coalition while underlining that the North Atlantic pact NATO has become fragmented due to U.S. President Donald Trump's lack of belief in the future of the pact.

Daily Sabah: What are your opinions about President Erdoğan's visit to India and China? Is Turkey turning toward the East now?

Muhittin Ataman: I believe an analysis of the political economy should be made in this matter. It has been said that politics follow the economy. Currently, the international platforms G7 and G20 are managing the global economy. While the G7 consists of Western countries, the G20 is under the heavy influence of these countries. An alternative platform designated as the E7 has emerged against the oligopolistic world led by the U.S. and the U.K. The E7 includes five Asian countries; namely, China, India, Indonesia, Russia and Turkey and two countries from North America and South America; Mexico and Brazil. The global economy has shifted towards Asia and the Pacific; this much is clear.

According to estimates, the E7 will surpass the G7 by the year 2050 and G7 countries are already trying to halt this shift. However, there are other alternative organizations similar to the E7 as well, like MINT and BRICS. I believe the chances of the West halting the progress and development in the non-Western world is minimal. Despite all attempts and fragility, non-Western countries are continuing to increase their area of influence.

Considering the situation, aiming to expand its market and diversify its economy and politics, Turkey will inevitably approach Asia. Moreover, the rise of xenophobia, Islamophobia and anti-Turkish notions will definitely propel Turkey towards Asia. Most of the substantial infrastructural projects of Turkey were done in cooperation with certain Asian countries. Naturally, Turkey's relation with the EU will be weakened in the coming years. On the other hand, I believe Turkey's approach towards Asia will prove effective; ranging from missile defense systems to increasing the trade volume, the fields of cooperation between Turkey and Asian countries will increase.

Western countries aren't willing to trade technology and know-how with Turkey, as they don't want the country to be self-reliant. However, this is not true for Asian countries; Turkey is able to acquire certain technologies from them and this makes up a prominent part of Turkey's economic relations. Turkey is stepping up its game in this matter, especially in the defense industry. For instance, when Austria didn't uphold its contract to provide engines for defense, Turkey procured these items from Ukraine. Turkey is always seeking for alternatives to overcome issues. Therefore, as a means to overcome its problems, Turkey will focus on Asia. Consolidating relations with Asia while keeping the relations with the West intact will definitely make Turkey stronger.

DS: During the NATO summit, it was decided that NATO is to directly support the fight against Daesh. What is your take on this decision?

M.A.: NATO's current situation is dramatic, to say the least; NATO has become fragmented. Trump doesn't believe in NATO and states that the organization has become obsolete. On the other hand, NATO's participation in the fight against international terrorism wouldn't bolster the coalition substantially. Secondly, Trump criticizes European countries for increasing their defense expenditures; the reason for this rise in defense expenditures is Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the threat it poses to eastern Europe. The Trump Administration, however, isn't making statements that target Russia and it seems that they don't regard Russia as a serious threat. Differences in the perception of threat between the U.S. and Europe will have an impact on political differentiation in the following years.

France had left the military wing of NATO in 1960s, in response to the U.S. transforming the organization as an extension of its own national interests. The U.S.'s military strategies were centered around its own interests, not Europe's. It's not definite for how much longer the European countries will tolerate the U.S.-dominated NATO. While Daesh is the priority of the U.S., Russia is Europe's priority. On the other hand, more than 60 countries have come together to fight against Daesh with only little success. While Turkey was able to fight effectively against Daesh by itself during Operation Euphrates Shield, the coalition failed to even put a dent into the Daesh influence. This situation cannot be explained through military, politics or diplomacy. The U.S. believes Daesh is the ultimate threat, while European countries beg to differ. As it was the case in Manchester, we see that Daesh is carrying out terrorist attacks in Europe; however, European countries, especially the eastern European and Baltic ones, believe that Russia is the real threat. For this reason, they are expecting NATO to create a strategy against Russia.

The fact that most NATO countries are continuing to support certain terrorist organizations in the Middle East is a discomfort for Turkey. They are recklessly supporting terrorism through the PKK's Syrian offshoot the Democratic Union Party (PYD's) armed wing the People's Protection Units (YPG), the Gülenist Terror Group (FETÖ) and the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front (DHKP-C). For instance, the known assassin of Özdemir Sabancı has been living comfortably in Brussels for decades – and NATO members are not taking Turkey's concerns regarding these matters into consideration. However, it's not possible for NATO to effectively fight against threats without Turkey.

Turkey isn't a dispensable country; withoutit, the success rate of a fight against terrorist organizations in the Middle East is minimal. Moreover, the refugee crisis that the European countries are terrified of was overcome with Turkey's interference. On the other hand, energy security is also one of the most prominent security issues for Europe. Being close to countries that produce sources of energy, Turkey is a key country for Europe's energy security. Therefore, Turkey is indispensible among fellow NATO members. Furthermore, Turkey previously helped Europe during the Cold War by thwarting conventional threats and could help Europe once again regarding unconventional issues.

DS: In your opinion, how will the U.K.'s foreign policy and strategy against Daesh change after the Manchester attack?

The U.K. made its policies clear with Brexit; even though it wasn't a shift, its relations with Turkey demonstrated a change. The U.K. was the only country to react decisively against the July 15 coup attempt in Turkey.

Today, the EU is in crisis. It has two distinct perspectives within itself: The Anglo-Saxon perspective of the U.K. and the continental-European perspective which is influenced by Germany. Similar to NATO's transformation into a national asset for the U.S., the EU has become a tool for Germany's domestic policies. This is the reason why the U.K. left; the EU is no longer a pan-European organization. The U.K., France and Italy became secondary to Germany. Merkel's meetings with leaders of other countries is almost like a vertical relation. And, because of its strong economic and political structure, Germany has become increasingly peremptory against other European countries.

Germany is the country that conflicts the most with Turkey in the policies about the Middle East and relations with the EU. This actually helps the U.K., as it makes Turkey more accessible for them. I believe the U.K., which is one of the most influential Western countries in the Middle East, will have closer relations with Turkey, one of the most important countries in the region.

Severing relations with Europe isn't a luxury Turkey can afford; 50 percent of Turkey's trade is with European countries. Moreover, the political relations between Turkey and Europe are deep. As Turkey can't sever these kinds of relations, it will make preferences among European countries. Due to continental Europe's anti-Turkish sentiments, the U.K. will become one of the preferred countries for fostering relations with.

DS: During the NATO Summit, President Erdoğan also met with European leaders. How do you evaluate the future of Turkish-EU relations after these talks?

M.A.: A change in rhetoric is also needed regarding Turkish-EU relations. Up until now, Turkey saw the EU as a means for democratization and economic development. Turkey had expectations that EU reforms would bring more democratization and economic development, and rightfully so. Therefore, Turkey's EU bid was in favor of Turkey. However, today the picture is completely different; Turkey now has the capacity to transform itself as a country that can take the initiative. The April 16 referendum demonstrated this capacity. Previously unable to prepare a constitution by itself, Turkey was able to change its system of government. This decreased Turkey's dependence on the EU and the need for instrumentalization is gone. Ten years ago, Turkey was shown as a model for Middle Eastern and African countries for two reasons: Economic development and achieving democratization without losing core values. Today, Turkey is able to stand on its two feet; despite the economic crises, Turkey is able to realize demanding infrastructural projects. On the other hand, even though the recent issues acted as a break on democratization, the deconstruction of traditional tutelage systems in Turkey is a major victory. In other words, Turkey has become more democratic today as it relies on the will of the elected, rather than appointed.

The EU, on the other hand, is facing a serious crisis; the global economic crisis of 2008 has shaken the foundation of EU members. This crisis also created a cultural crisis in EU, where rising xenophobia, Islamophobia and anti-Turkish notions in politics are the consequence of this crisis. Whenever the EU reverts to its emotional, sentimental perspective, Turkey is demonized. Today, we are seeing such a situation. We can easily say that Turkey's bid for full membership is impossible under such conditions. During the Brexit campaigns, political leaders were asserting that Turkey couldn't become a member of the EU at least until 3,000 C.E., due to differences in identities. Therefore, it could be argued that Turkey's full membership is impossible.

At meetings between President Erdoğan and EU leaders on May 25 in Brussels, Erdoğan expressed several issues. He called on EU leaders to leave aside their peremptory discourses towards Turkey. Secondly, he highlighted the current condition of Turkey-EU relations should be defined, while adding that the EU should provide a clear answer to Turkey's application which has been ongoing for almost 60 years. Trying to threaten and discipline a country that won't be allowed for membership is both politically and morally wrong. If Turkey is not to be a EU member, EU can't have a say in Turkey's domestic policy. Moreover, Turkey is calling for the renegotiation of terms with the EU; beside full membership, an ultimate economic and political aim must be designated by the two parties. In short, the parties of this partnership should compartmentalize their relations.

DS: How do you evaluate President Erdoğan's U.S. visit? Even though the U.S. decided to continue with the YPG in the Raqqa offensive, cooperation between Turkey and the U.S. was highlighted. In this respect, what is the future of U.S.-Turkey relations?

We had certain positive expectations about President Trump because of statements that were made before and after the inauguration. The Obama administration conducted a war of attrition against Turkey, especially in its last four years. As we believed that we had seen the worst of it, our expectations were for the better. However, there were a couple of problems. Firstly, Trump became the president, but he wasn't able to acquire the power. We anticipated that his views would permeate U.S. foreign policy; however, this hasn't yet been realized. Trump became the president by criticizing the establishment; yet, he has not shown the will to halt or reverse the processes commenced by the preceding administration.

Secondly, Trump and his Cabinet face many threats including impeachment because of their illegitimate relations with Russia. Trump's political future is in question and whether he can conclude his four-year term is being discussed. In such a situation, it is understandable that he couldn't focus on foreign policy. Moreover, he will use subjects of foreign policy as a means for negotiations in domestic policy and will be forced to make compromises to bureaucrats left from the Obama administration. The relations with YPG can be regarded in this respect. I believe these conjunctures should also be taken into consideration.

DS: Were Turkey and the U.S. able to start fresh after Erdoğan and Trump's meeting?

Yes, I do believe so. At least relations are on a more positive note and may continue this way. The U.S. doesn't have the luxury to disregard Turkey. The Obama administration wasn't aware of this; however, the Trump administration is well aware of Turkey's importance. Considering the issues and fragmentation of the West and, the EU, I believe that the cost of losing Turkey would be high for the West and therefore, I believe that Turkey's relations with the U.S. and the EU will continue on a more positive note.

DS: On the other hand, how are Turkey and the U.S. going to reach common ground about the YPG or will they even have a common ground in this matter?

Time will tell. Two factors should be highlighted. Firstly, the YPG is a temporary ally for the U.S. and can never become a permanent one. The U.S. can use the PYD/YPG only to interfere or disrupt certain processes, but can never use them as a constructive force. Turkey, on the other hand, has been a U.S. ally for almost 70 years. This alliance never progressed in a linear fashion; there were fluctuations. This alliance, especially in terms of security, continued to exist until the end of the Cold War. After the shift of balance following the Cold War, the U.S. was confused as to how to address Turkey; especially after the Justice and Development Party (AK Party's) rise to power and Turkey's increasing self-reliance, this confusion was exacerbated. Previously, both the EU and the U.S. would use peremptory language addressed to the representatives of the tutelage system and these representatives would create policies accordingly. However, this changed when Turkey started to advocate equal footing in relations; as this wasn't what the U.S. wanted, a crisis emerged. Seeing the change in Turkey's disposition, the U.S. and European countries started to pressure Turkey and intervene Turkey's conducts legally or illegally since 2013.

In short, the YPG will continue to be an issue in Turkey's relation with the U.S.; however, the resolution of this problem is all about the Syrian civil war. It's about the creation of federal or independent states which rely on local governments in Syria. It's not clear what policies the Western countries, Russia and China have in this manner. In such an equation with multiple variables, I believe the YPG will have to revise its relations with Turkey and the U.S.

DS: What does Trump's visit to Saudi Arabia and Israel in the Middle East entail?

M.A.: Trump was able to rise to power with promises to change certain domestic and foreign policies of the Obama administration. There are three important issues about the Middle East on the table. Firstly, Trump asserted that he would rely on legitimate states rather than non-state actors. Secondly, he stated that the U.S. was neglecting some of its traditional allies in the Middle East and that he would improve relations with these allies. Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Israel were the three countries that the Obama administration had problematic relations with. There were expectations that relations with these three countries would be started anew. Thirdly, Trump is against Iran's expansionism. Obama, starting with his speech in Cairo in 2009, constantly opened up the field to Iran for eight years, which drastically changed the balances in the region.

Trump made some moves in these three subjects. He returned to the U.S.'s traditional allies, while keeping Turkey aside a little. This action has multiple dimensions. Firstly, there was a development in security; they agreed on cooperating against international terrorism and "religious radicalism." In this respect, the Center for Fighting International Radicalism was established in Riyadh. A second development occurred regarding the economy; as a businessman himself, Trump signed a substantial weapons deal with Saudi Arabia.

During his visit to Saudi Arabia, Trump realized meetings on three levels. The first was with bilateral meetings with Saudi Arabia. The second, on the other hand, was bilateral and multilateral discussions with the Gulf Cooperation Council. Lastly, he realized a meeting attended by high-ranking representatives of 55 Muslim countries. The meeting, which was a part of the strategy of using Sunni-Arabism against Iran, hinted at how the region will be shaped, especially with the photo of Trump, el-Sisi and King Salman. Trump commenced a process that is to be carried by Israel, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

I believe Turkey is in between, because both Iran and Saudi Arabia are conflictual countries that employ a sectarian policy. Turkey, on the other hand, is always conditional in its relations; it neither demonizes Iran nor sees Saudi Arabia as the ultimate ally. In this respect, Turkey's real challenge in the days to follow will be balancing the process Trump started.

Looking at the U.S. policy towards the Middle East, it's possible to say that the U.S. won't be creating a mechanism that will resolve the regional issues in the short-term. As far as I can see, Trump doesn't have a clear policy towards the Middle East. He was ambiguous about Jerusalem becoming the capital of Israel. He says that they will move the U.S. embassy in that country, while also saying that moving the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem isn't a priority. If he indeed approves these proposals, it's highly possible that Saudi Arabia's sought religious legitimacy will be harmed.

Trump may transform indirect relations between Israel and Arab countries into a direct relationship, which can upset all regional relations, I believe. No state would feel secure anymore. Despite the partial religious legitimacy, Saudi state and other countries which are already fragile against terrorist organizations like Al-Qaida and Daesh would become more fragile and it could descend into chaos. Neither the U.S., nor the Western countries could control such a downward spiral.