Since November 2013, our neighbor Ukraine has been subjected to a change of government as a result of protest movements. This domestic political crisis has become an international problem with global players interfering.Five days after Verkhovna Rada dismissed the country's parliament led by President Viktor Yanukovych on Feb. 27, Russia sent Special Forces into the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, which is part of Ukraine, and took control of the local parliament. The move instantly changed the scale of the domestic crisis in Kiev.As a result, our region is faced with an international crisis that has serious consequences.Almost all the analyses produced on the matter in Turkey deal with it from the perspective of rivalry between the West and Russia, without attributing much importance to the internal dynamics of the country. This view particularly portrays the Ukraine populace as neatly divided into either pro-West or pro-Russia camps. This type of analysis is limited in its usefulness and does not help us understand the internal dynamics of the country.It is division and rivalry in the country, rather than identity politics (East versus West), that can be seen as flowing from the political and economic base. In other words, the crisis in Kiev is a result of the fragility of the political system and the political economy that is fed by the oligarchic structure. This fragility, which has prevented political and socio-economic reforms, has left the country paralysed. The neoimperialist mentality of the Russian leadership has capitalized on the situation both in terms of bilateral agreements as well as flouting international law by sending troops into Crimea in a show of force.The political system that developed in Ukraine after the collapse of the Soviet Union has resulted in a volatile and fragile structure. It is important to note that since 1990 not a single political party or bloc has succeeded in dominating the country's political landscape.The wide range of groups can be divided into three: 1) Left-wingers comprised of socialist and communist organizations; 2) Liberal democrats, national democrats and social democrats that constitute central power; and 3) Center-right and nationalist groups. During the 1990s, the first group was effective in parliament; whereas during the 2000s, the second and to some extent the third groups were relatively active. Aside from this, from 1990 to 2014 a total of seven general elections were held, none of which produced a clear majority for any party to govern by itself. This paved the way for continuous coalition governments.The political instability is striking: In the first 16 years of independence Ukraine had 15 governments. Multiple attempts to bring stability by changing from a majority to a hybrid parliamentary election system failed.Furthermore, none of the candidates for the four presidential elections that were held between 1990 and 2014 achieved more than 50 percent of the vote in the first round. This resulted in political fragmentation in the second round of voting.This problem in leadership can especially be seen in the presidency of Leonid Kuchma in 1999; he was only able to win after the second round. Moreover, during the years of independence, there was an ongoing dispute of authority in many areas of leadership between the parliament and presidency. An example of one of these disputes was whether governors should be elected or appointed by the president. Another aspect of the country's instability is the fact that political power sometimes resided with the presidency and sometimes with the parliament.The evolution of the power center shifting to parliament in 2004 and back to the presidency in 2010 disturbed the fragile balance. Various attempts at political reform (such as the referendum in 2000) proved futile.The political fragility that first appeared in Ukraine in the 1990s was propped up by the oligarchic structure. Oligarchs are businessmen whose financial power is in the billions of dollars as a result of the privatization of state factories and property after the USSR moved into a free market economy. On the one hand, oligarchs lend their financial support to politicians and parties, while on the other they establish their own parties and take an active role in politics.Oligarchs have held various official positions, including within the prime minister's office, government ministries, Secretariat-General of the National Security Council, and Secretariat-General of the Presidency. Since 1990, three clans of oligarchs have clustered in three cities: Dnepropetrovsk, Donetsk and Kiev.The oligarchs in the first two cities are located in the southeast, which has the largest industrial plants in the country and have taken on key roles in the country's domestic politics.The Dnepropetrovsk clan was more influential during the 1990s because it was based in the hometown of President Kuchma (1994-2004).One of the biggest oligarchs of that era, Pavlo Lazarenko, served as prime minister from 1996 to 1997 and was governor of Dnepropetrovsk from 1992 to 1994. A name we have come to hear often, "Orange Leader" Yulia Timoshenko was the right-hand man of Lazarenko and worked for his YESU holding company and Hromada political party.Kuchma's son-in-law was another oligarch with roots in Dnepropetrovsk. In the early 2000s, the Donetsk oligarch (of which Rinat Ahmetov was the biggest) grew politically.Viktor Yanukovych served as governor of Donetsk from 1997 to 2002 and took on the role of political leader of the Party of Regions. Yanukovych served as prime minister from 2002 to 2004. While the oligarchs of Kiev are of a more moderate disposition, they possess relative closeness to the political center. For example, Viktor Medvedchuk served as secretary general of the presidency during Kuchma's second term (2002-2004).The oligarchic structure, with its complex ties, has helped create a multitude of voices in Ukraine. Oligarchs have opened the door to corruption, as well as serving as a primary cause for the current political deadlock through the political control and influence they exercise over deputies; thus blocking any attempts at consolidation of political power. Oligarchs are opposed to a strong political government because of the looming possibility of their companies' liquidation. This threat manifested in mid-range oligarchs supporting the 2004 Orange Revolution because of the possibility of Yanukovych attaining enough power to liquidate the assets of other oligarchs.Just as Viktor Yushchenko won the election without even stating his oath, parliament constrained presidential authority. While the Orange Revolution brought Timoshenko to the position of prime minister, she did not possess enough power to push through political and economic reforms. Yushchenko was once again elected president in 2010 and tried to restore previously lost authority and consolidate political power, all the while using his political influence to broaden his family's business ties and become a powerful oligarch. This unsettled other oligarchs and caused them to align against Yushchenko. Therefore, oligarchs with ties to the West, as well as those with ties to Russia, are now worried. It is not a matter of them being pro-West or pro-Russia but rather of maintaining their political-economic harmony.All the while, with its fragile political and economic situation Ukraine is being forced to choose between economic integration with the EU or Russia. However, as much as Yanukovych had close ties with Moscow, he continued to negotiate a partnership agreement with the EU up until the last moment. In the interim, Moscow did not stand idly by and in August 2013 sent a strong message to Kiev by closing its borders.Yanukovych continued with the negotiations until the last moment. Rather than opting for public support by holding a referendum -which would almost certainly have resulted in a "yes" for the EU- he took a risk and withdrew from further negotiations with the EU. Russia's financial support and cheap natural gas played a central role.The refusal of Yanukovych to sign an agreement with the EU consolidated the opposition and led to street protests. The violent suppression of the protests only escalated the situation to a point of no control. Yanukovych , disowned by his own party and having lost power, fled to Russia. The switching of roles between the government and the oligarchs also played a key role in the situation. Russia cannot "tolerate" the removal of the man it bargained from power. In addition, the new Ukraine would not go near another similar agreement with Russia. In an unprecedented move, Russia de facto invaded the Crimean Peninsula. At this point, the crisis in Kiev went from being a domestic issue to a regional and global problem.In my next piece, I will address the rationale of the Russian leadership in sending forces to a peninsula that did not have a public law and order problem, the hastily agreed referendum to tie Ukraine to Russia, Crimean Tatars, the future of Ukraine and the possible outcomes of the Crimean crisis. * Assistant Professor, Istanbul Şehir University