Late prominent Turkish professor Idris Küçükömer’s book "Alienation of the Order and Westernization" is an important work that comprehensively examines, on an economic basis, the economic dynamics of the late Ottoman period and the first century of the republic, the position of the intellectual-bureaucratic elite within these dynamics, and the historical roots of the intellectual-bureaucrat’s detachment from the people. In the preface, Küçükömer explains what he means by the alienation of the order, emphasizing that it has been propelled by Westernism, while the large masses of the people have been left outside, as outsiders.

Küçükömer defines Westernization as a current that has prevented the emergence of a genuine thesis in these lands; in contrast, "the Easternist-Islamist current," which was rendered passive, appears more consistent. In both strands, the emphasis on continuity linking the republic to the Ottoman Empire is significant. The core problem, in fact, lies in ignoring the dynamics of Europe that became increasingly visible in the late Ottoman period, and in the emergence of a false positioning that resulted from acting as if those dynamics existed in our context even though they did not. This false positioning emerges within the Westernist camp. Because it lacks a genuine grounding in these lands and is also devoid of a deep understanding of developments in the West, it does not possess an authentic thesis and therefore brings with it a process of alienation – both from itself and from the people. According to Küçükömer, this is the paradox of the Westernists.

To explain why the Westernist group in Türkiye found itself "proceeding in a direction contrary to the categorical historical development model of the West,” Küçükömer first examines the process and dynamics of the development of capitalism in the West. As Küçükömer emphasizes throughout the book, the transition to capitalism in the West took place through processes and actors quite different from those in our context. In 16th- and 17th-century Europe, the bourgeoisie (owners of the accumulated capital of the period) emerged as the principal actor, and in their struggle against medieval feudalism they became the pioneers of capitalism. By continuously eroding the positions of feudalism, the bourgeoisie became the main determinant of economic processes.

As this economic process carried by the bourgeoisie continued, cities grew stronger and municipal superstructures governing these cities began to take shape. Possessing their own military forces, municipalities gradually increased their autonomy and consolidated their power, with some eventually transforming into independent republics. The bourgeoisie consolidated its positions across all organs of municipal governance. As city councils accumulated power, general assemblies and parliaments – again with the bourgeoisie as a central presence – also emerged. Thus, a major transformation occurred in governance superstructures, moving from inward-looking feudal structures toward municipal councils and general assemblies capable of engaging in power struggles with kings. The bourgeoisie, as the powerful actor directing the economy, now also occupied a decisive position within these new superstructures that had become centers of political power.

With the Industrial Revolution, the bourgeoisie became far more powerful on the path toward capitalism. While mechanization of the means of production increased productivity, small workshops in rural areas began to be eliminated; villages started to flow into cities, and the new workers of the new means of production began to cluster around these sites of production. A vast working class, which the bourgeoisie could employ at low wages due to rising unemployment, was now readily available. Thus, by increasing productivity through machinery and simultaneously lowering costs through low-paid labor, the bourgeoisie was able to accelerate the growth of capital accumulation. On the other hand, the lands abandoned by peasants who left to become workers were taken from them, and together with public lands added to these holdings, they were transferred into the ownership of a small number of people.

What unfolded was a profound transformation. While medieval Europe, under feudalism, was characterized by fragmented structures distant from centralization, and while the papacy, taking advantage of such an environment, functioned as a supranational central authority by employing religion and all its instruments for this purpose, the transformation driven by the bourgeoisie not only undermined the power of the feudal structure but also challenged the authority of the papacy itself. At this point, as Küçükömer notes, it was the Church’s turn. With the Renaissance, individualism and secularism were consolidated. The next step concerned securing property rights that would protect the bourgeoisie’s ever-expanding ownership – and this, too, was achieved.

As Küçükömer emphasizes, throughout all these processes the bourgeoisie ensured that developments evolved in line with their own interests by exploiting the conflicts among kings, feudal structures and the Church, and by extending their support selectively according to those interests. As a result, capitalism was consolidated, paving the way for the emergence of nation-states. The next stage involved expanding markets into transnational geographies and, much as in the formation of the working class, creating colonial domains that would reduce costs for Europe and increase its wealth – through human resources, raw materials, markets, and so on. To this end, whether through coercion or by finding local collaborators, superstructures capable of enabling this process were established, much as was attempted in the Ottoman context. Ultimately, capitalism, which set out with a bourgeoisie endowed with capital accumulation, first brought about a series of major transformations across Continental Europe and entered a phase of national capitalism; it then moved into a new phase through the search for external markets and colonies, transforming into international monopoly capitalism.

While the structural differences between Continental Europe and the Ottoman Empire persisted, production relations in Continental Europe were transformed through the process outlined above, paving the way for capitalism and acquiring a radically different dimension with the Industrial Revolution. With the subsequent search for external markets, Continental Europe and the Ottoman Empire increasingly found themselves in confrontation. In other words, while the Ottoman Empire was grappling with internal difficulties within its own dynamics, it was simultaneously forced to confront a Continental Europe that had undergone major transformations and had grown far stronger. For an Ottoman state already experiencing internal strain, what it encountered externally was nothing short of a storm. In these encounters, the Ottoman Empire began to lose ground vis-à-vis Continental Europe.

As the costs of escalating wars and territorial losses increased, the Ottoman Empire introduced significant changes to its taxation system and resorted to measures aimed at increasing cash revenues to meet these rising expenses. With each such change, the sultan’s centralized authority weakened; new power centers – such as the powerful and wealthy ayan class, whose emergence had previously never been permitted – began to appear, and the burden on large segments of the population increased. At the same time, as the Ottoman state sought solutions to this external, confrontational challenge, it also began to question its own internal dynamics, producing various proposals for a way out. It is precisely at this juncture that Küçükömer refers to the alliance of traditionalist janissaries, artisans and the ulema, the learned class of Islamic scholars, theologians and legal experts, in opposition to reformist initiatives. According to Küçükömer, the nucleus of the "dualization” that would persist up to the present day originates in this period.

On the traditionalist side, there was an alliance of Janissaries, artisans (guilds) and the ulema, all of whom were supported by large segments of the population; on the reformist side stood the bureaucrats and the ayan. The ayan had accumulated significant capital through transformations in the sphere of property in the late period, became particularly powerful toward the end of the 18th century, and at times even challenged the central authority. The bureaucrats, in contrast, derived their power from the Ottoman administrative system itself, which had been centralized since its inception. Although they did not draw their power directly from control over the means of production, bureaucrats nevertheless lived in a relatively comfortable sphere. In this dualization, they adopted a stance in favor of preserving that comfort. Consequently, bureaucrats and the ayan became the principal actors of a process that produced outcomes in favor of the West.

What is striking is that those who sided with the sultan were the bureaucrats and the ayan. Thus, the sultan’s cooperation – motivated by different impulses – with bureaucrats and ayan who favored Westernization set in motion a process in which the traditionalist segments, who were seeking a form of repair outside the demands of the bureaucrats and the ayan, would ultimately lose. The first step was the abolition of the Janissary corps. What remained were the artisans (guilds) and the ulema. Through the contributions of the bureaucrats, bilateral agreements and concessions that turned Ottoman lands into an open market in favor of the West weakened artisans and domestic production. Eventually, only the ulema remained. Through transformations in the education system and legal regulations, the ulema was also marginalized. Once all three representatives of the traditionalist camp lost their capacity for representation and power in this process, what remained in the face of the Westernization represented by the bureaucrats and the ayan was a silent populace.

However, unlike the experience of Continental Europe, this process did not lead to capital accumulation or prosperity; on the contrary, it greatly intensified the misery of the population. As Küçükömer emphasizes, the bureaucrats, quite tragically, became active agents of a process that operated in favor of the West but against their own society. For the people, the order had by this point become completely alienated. In the late Ottoman period, the bureaucrats or political intellectuals whose developmental trajectories were discussed above further deepened this alienation through their attitudes and positions. This was because the focus of this group was not society but the state – in other words, the capture of the state itself.

Küçükömer emphasizes that the cooperation between bureaucrats and the ayan or local notables (eşraf) was not interrupted with the establishment of the republic; on the contrary, this continuity persisted, as he demonstrates through examples drawn from initiatives of the period. The fundamental characteristic of this era lies in the oscillation between statism and capitalism. At certain moments, capitalist initiatives were pursued, but when these efforts reached an impasse, a return to statism followed. Public investments were carried out in the name of the state, and public enterprises played a central role in employment. However, because efficiency was not taken into account, statism eventually became unsustainable. This, in turn, led to a renewed shift toward strengthening private enterprise and adopting development policies based on capitalism. These phases are also notable for the intensity of international connections and engagements. While society was confined within this cycle, the desired level of prosperity could never be achieved. Moreover, as the elite preserved its comfort, the large masses – unable to receive their rightful share of distribution – were additionally subjected to indoctrination in Western values. This further deepened alienation.

On the other hand, the parallelism between Küçükömer’s approach in his book and the works of late Turkish historian Mehmet Genç is particularly striking. Both scholars refuse to reduce the Ottoman encounter with the West to a simplistic narrative of "backwardness”; instead, they take internal dynamics seriously and regard Western-centered, linear modernization schemes as problematic. According to Genç, the Ottoman Empire was not an "incomplete” structure that failed to transition to capitalism; rather, it represented a coherent set of economic and political choices that consciously prioritized price stability, provisioning security (iaşe), and social balance. In other words, the Ottoman economic order possessed its own internal rationality and consistency. Centralization, the "miri" land regime, and the limitation of the market were not indicators of backwardness but elements of a system aimed at preserving state continuity and social justice.

Within this framework, Genç emphasizes that these internal dynamics long remained decisive in the Ottoman case, and that the real rupture emerged as external pressures gained increasing weight with the rise of a new structure in Continental Europe that was markedly different from the Ottoman economic paradigm. The Ottoman problem, therefore, was not a flawed order, but the progressive narrowing – under external pressures – of the room for maneuver required to sustain that order in a changing world.

Küçükömer, by contrast, focuses primarily on the domestic actors who supported this narrowing in favor of the West. He evaluates the Westernization preference of the bureaucratic and intellectual classes as a direction that lacked social grounding and operated against the interests of the people, and he further notes that these actors, although occasionally losing power during the Republican period, maintained their continuity in different forms. As a result, the policies produced failed to advance on a sound footing and became trapped in oscillation between statist development and capitalist development. For this reason, Küçükömer regards "the Easternist-Islamist current," though suppressed, as more respectable in his own terms, since it carries the potential to generate theses that are organically connected to these lands.