Every era has its defining wars, and each war develops its own character. Recent conflicts – from Nagorno-Karabakh to the Russia-Ukraine war – have given rise to a new generation of hybrid warfare. Such wars have become relatively easy to start but increasingly difficult to end. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, although sharing many characteristics with today's hybrid wars, was different in one important respect: it concluded swiftly with a decisive military victory.

When Russia, as a major power, invaded Ukraine, the general expectation was that the war would be over within days or, at most, a few weeks. Yet Russia's initial strategic miscalculations prevented it from achieving the rapid advances it had anticipated.

Over time, with growing military and financial support from the U.S. and European countries, Ukraine significantly strengthened its resistance, in addition to its national characteristics of resilience. Although it lost territory in the early stages of the conflict, it gradually restored a military balance.

Modern warfare paradigm

Initially fighting from a defensive position, Ukraine increasingly adopted the new methods of warfare that became evident during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. As Francis Fukuyama observed, the paradigm of modern warfare had fundamentally changed – a transformation he argued was driven largely by Selçuk Bayraktar's innovations in drone technology.

When the U.S. and Israel entered into conflict with Iran, Washington found itself in a position that, in some respects, resembled Russia's at the outset of the Ukraine war. U.S. President Donald Trump predicted that the conflict would be concluded within a week. And before two weeks had passed, he declared that Iran's military infrastructure and war-fighting capacities had been effectively destroyed.

Iran, however, demonstrated remarkable resilience against both Israel and the U.S. It showed that it was capable of striking American bases across the Gulf while simultaneously threatening U.S. naval assets and military deployments with its missile capabilities. From the beginning of the conflict, Iran's diplomatic maneuvering repeatedly complicated Trump's calculations, while Trump himself employed shifting and often contradictory statements in an apparent effort to mask his strategy and keep Tehran off balance. In reality, both sides managed a highly vague process in which their ultimate objectives often appeared unclear.

Although the parties eventually announced a ceasefire agreement intended to last sixty days, many observers questioned whether it would lead to a durable settlement.

The U.S. also struggled to persuade its own public that it was engaged in a necessary or justified war.

At the same time, many Americans came to believe that Israel had played the decisive role in bringing about the conflict and that this was ultimately not America's own war.

The discussion gradually eroded Trump's public support, while backing for the war itself continued to decline.

Bad precedents replicate

In everyday life as in international politics, unsuccessful models are often the easiest to imitate. Today's hybrid wars blur the distinction between war and peace. The interests of the countries directly involved in the conflict increasingly separate from those of their allies. Under such circumstances, some actors may have little interest in seeing the conflict come to an end.

Just as many in Europe and the U.S. appear to believe that prolonging the war in Ukraine gradually weakens Russia, it is equally plausible that both China and Russia may see strategic advantages in preventing a quick end to the conflict involving Iran. Other regional and international actors may also have an interest in sustaining the confrontation.

Ironically, the Republic of Türkiye has emerged as one of the few countries that has both maintained domestic stability and actively worked to preserve stability across the wider region. From the outset, Ankara sought to prevent the Gulf states from becoming direct parties to the conflict, and to a considerable extent it succeeded.

At the same time, there were efforts to encourage some groups to open a new front against Iran and contribute to internal instability there. Yet through its "terror-free Türkiye" initiative, Türkiye helped facilitate the re-establishment of a unitary Syrian state while demonstrating that the PKK/YPG was far less formidable than many had assumed. In doing so, it effectively removed what might otherwise have become a significant proxy force available to the U.S. for use against Iran.

Much can still be said about the course of this war, and numerous theories will continue to emerge. One possibility is that Iran hopes to weaken Trump politically ahead of the November elections. Yet it remains unclear to me how Trump's electoral defeat would ultimately serve Iran's strategic interests.

While Trump has been increasingly preoccupied with domestic political challenges, the Iranian leadership is trying to persuade the Revolutionary Guards and other hardline factions to accept an end to the fighting.

Meanwhile, Israel – believing that Iran has not yet suffered sufficient damage – has intensified its lobbying efforts in Washington in favor of prolonging the conflict. One of the strongest objections to such lobbying has come from U.S. Vice President J. D. Vance.

Ultimately, like mentioned above, unsuccessful models are often the easiest to imitate. One can only hope that the Israel-U.S.-Iran conflict does not follow the path of the Russia-Ukraine war and evolve into another prolonged confrontation lasting five years or more.