Israel's Aug. 18 strike on Syria’s Abu al-Duhur Air Base in Idlib was Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s latest entry in a now-familiar strategy: make an unprovoked strike and let the region deal with the consequences. Syria is simply the newest theater, in addition to Lebanon, Iran and, of course, the genocide in Gaza.

After the Israeli jets hit Abu al-Duhur's runways and hangars, Israel didn't even claim that they did it. Instead, it was the U.S. ambassador to Ankara, Tom Barrack, who confirmed the attack publicly. When the story became big in the headlines, the Israeli premier’s office then said the strike was pre-emptive: Syria was "on the verge of breaching" a security understanding by letting Turkish troops deploy at the base, despite repeated warnings.

This story was not more than another excuse, however, for Israel to expand its policy of creating instability in the region. Of course, nobody has accepted Israel’s story about Abu al-Duhur Air Base.

The Turkish Defense Ministry called it baseless and warned against Israeli strikes on neighboring states becoming "routine." Syria's foreign minister said Damascus had told Israel in advance there was no plan for a Turkish base and that it was only routine cooperation for infrastructure rebuilding. Turkish officers had visited the site, yes, but a visit is not a deployment.

The reality, however, is not what Israel wants. Israel not only violated Syria’s territorial integrity and the "status quo" but also exposed the fact that it aims to have an open-ended license to act in Syria’s airspace in a fashion that is defined entirely by itself.

As such, what becomes clear is that what is carried out as "deterrence" is rather a reflection of Israel’s doctrine of having control over the whole region at all costs, even if this means violating the sovereignty of a country and cease-fire commitments, and even committing genocide.

Of course, the reasons behind this policy are multifaceted, and none of this happens in a vacuum. While the ultimate aim of Israel is to expand territorially and occupy, for Netanyahu’s short-term aims, the game is different. Bibi is heading into an election under the weight of corruption charges. Escalation abroad has consistently proven more useful to Netanyahu's political survival than de-escalation. Increasing security-driven policies consolidate his electoral support and limit the effectiveness of those who call for accountability in Israel.

Yet, a number of significant, cool-headed political figures in Israel have harshly criticized the premier. Former Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Yaalon, former Prime Minister Ehud Barak and opposition leader Yair Golan are among the figures criticizing the Israeli prime minister. Ehud Barak described Netanyahu’s "deliberate" escalation of tensions with Türkiye as "reckless and stupid."

"It is hard to decide which one it is more," Barak wrote on the U.S. social media platform X.

"Netanyahu has completely gone off the rails. Faced with the 'total failure' to achieve even one of the war’s objectives, and with his expected political defeat in about two months, he is no longer concerned with Israel’s security, but rather with the survival-driven manipulations of a compulsive gambler. His reckless conduct is deeply alarming our few remaining allies and friends in the region and around the world," Barak said.

Opposition leader Yair Golan called Netanyahu an "extremist and unreliable," arguing that military force is "once again being used for political considerations."

Yalon accused Netanyahu of using new conflicts to avoid accountability.

Where does U.S. stand?

While the U.S. has been the main supporter of Israel in its actions, in the latest episode, Washington's own envoy undercut the story. Tom Barrack called the Syria strike "an unnecessary escalation that does not advance regional stability.” Barrack’s response should be read against the backdrop of the Trump administration’s post-Assad Syria policy and the U.S. president’s remarks on Türkiye’s role in Syria.

The latest move has made the friction between Bibi and U.S. President Donald Trump clearer than in Lebanon, where U.S.-brokered cease-fires have been repeatedly violated, and in Gaza, where Trump’s peace plan is not taken seriously by Netanyahu.

While this friction has created discomfort and voices like JD Vance have criticized Tel Aviv, not much has been done to change the facts on the ground. To put it simply, Netanyahu keeps acting to secure his political future while U.S. officials say they are "concerned" after new chapters of tensions arise.

Regardless of the official remarks, there is ambiguity on the U.S. position regarding the latest strike. This time, there are new complications. Israel is also confronting Türkiye, a NATO member with superior military capabilities and a country that the U.S. and the West must keep on its side for many different reasons in the region and beyond.

I reached out to two former U.S. ambassadors who served in Ankara and Damascus for how they evaluated the U.S. position as Israel continues to dangerously escalate tensions with Türkiye.

Robert Ford, a research fellow at the Middle East Institute in Washington, who also served as the last U.S. ambassador to Syria, said that "Ambassador Thomas Barrack condemned the Israeli airstrike against Syria’s Abu Al-Duhur airbase, and given Barrack’s close relationship to President Trump, we can believe that his statement reflects President Trump’s viewpoint. The United States is committed to Israeli security, but especially in this administration, Washington does not always agree with Israeli tactics, such as this airstrike."

He also added that, "More importantly, the Trump administration does not want to see a direct confrontation between Ankara and Jerusalem in Syria or anywhere else."

Ford explained President Trump "does not like surprises, especially from countries that receive direct financial and military aid from the United States" in case tensions escalated and Israel attacked Turkish targets. "Looking to the future, Washington could play a useful role in helping Israel and Türkiye define redlines so that they can avoid direct hostilities,” he further added.

"No administration, whether Republican Party or Democratic Party, will want to choose between Ankara and Jerusalem as a security partner. Türkiye plays a strategic role in sensitive issues ranging from Ukraine to NATO to energy in addition to the Middle East," Ford said and added: "Washington has greater national interests in Türkiye and in Israel than it does in Syria, in fact. Therefore, Washington’s interest is in a clear, reliable deal between Ankara and Jerusalem about Syria rather than the specific details of that deal."

I also reached out to James Jeffrey, a former U.S. ambassador to Türkiye and a Distinguished Fellow at The Washington Institute, for his insights into how he thinks the U.S. could mitigate the friction before it takes a dangerous turn.

"The U.S.’s short-term goal is to calm the situation," Jeffrey said, while also acknowledging that Ankara and Damascus are downplaying the action.

"General U.S. view mirrors Tom Barrack's statement. The U.S. is long aware of tension between (President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Netanyahu," he said, however, adding that Washington would prefer to manage the tensions between Türkiye and Israel diplomatically, instead of a method used against Iran.

Jeffrey said that with the consequences of the Iran war and the "U.S. interest is shifting eventually away from region, Türkiye and Israel have emerged as the two most powerful states in the region."

Jeffrey said this rivalry is more apparent in the post-Assad Syria.

"Both countries have key security interests and differing views of Al Sharaa related to Syria and both have forces in Syria. That creates inherent tension,” he said.

"The danger is at some point Israel could miscalculate and get into a serious incident with Türkiye either in Syria or Eastern Med. This would be a huge blow to U.S. tied closely with both. And most importantly it would advantage Iran in Syria and beyond,” he added.

The valuable insights and reading of the situation by both Ford and Jeffrey reflect one clear picture: the United States wants to ensure the lines are clearly drawn to avoid a hard confrontation between Israel and Türkiye.

Time will show, however, how far Netanyahu will go to secure his political future in Israeli elections in October, and drag Israel and the region into more chaos and conflict.

In the face of this uncertainty, what Washington will do will be closely watched not only by Türkiye and the region but also by American taxpayers who will evaluate the cost of the U.S. fighting new wars during the November elections in the U.S.