Last August, in this column, I stated that the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, which was signed by Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, showed the three middle-power countries’ desire to move from being security-consuming to security-producing states. I also pointed out that flexibility would be needed in regard to the commitments under the agreement. Although the political aspect of solidarity must be clear, the retaliation options should be graded to avoid the shared defense arrangement becoming an automatic escalatory mechanism. Two months later, the conflict in Yemen has brought this issue to the surface earlier than anticipated.

In early October, the Houthis stated that they had carried out missile and drone attacks on Aramco’s facilities close to Riyadh, but Riyadh did not confirm that any damage had been caused, and a spokesperson for the coalition called the claim misleading. At the same time, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar announced that the agreement’s Strategic Political and Defense Committee would have an emergency meeting in Riyadh. Although some of the on-the-ground claims are still in dispute, it is becoming more and more important how the partnership will turn its solidarity into concrete action.

It would be a mistake, however, to think that the purpose of the meeting is only to lead to a military response since there is also going to be political engagement with the Houthis. As a result, the Riyadh meeting might either subject the agreement to a military test or act as a means of de-escalating tensions. The first major test facing the partnership involves not only how to show solidarity but also how to prevent the conflict from escalating.

Until now, two interpretations have taken control of the debate, and both of them are misleading. The first sees the agreement as an automatic guarantee that forces the other members to take part in the war should one of them be attacked. The second treats it as a symbolic move that would come to an end at the first indication of actual cost. However, a third interpretation may be adopted. The agreement acts as a framework for political negotiation in which each member determines the extent and methods of its solidarity.

We should not at this stage exaggerate the legal significance of the agreement. It is difficult to reach definite conclusions regarding Türkiye’s actual military obligations since the complete text has not yet been made public and parliamentary approval is still pending. It therefore wouldn’t be appropriate to ask what Türkiye "owes" Riyadh. The real question is whether Ankara can set the limits of its solidarity by means of its own political will.

To concrete contribution

Over the past two months, the Mecca Pact has gone through various phases. From August until early September, it mainly functioned as a strategic signal, there being three medium-sized powers who stated that external security guarantees on their own were not enough and that they wanted to achieve security together. However, from mid-September on, the situation in Yemen, attacks directed at Saudi Arabia, and the initiatives taken toward military coordination caused the agreement to become a framework for cooperation under pressure. The current focus is on what specific contributions this partnership can make.

Three structural factors have sped up this change. The first of these is Washington’s selective involvement. Although the United States still provides support in the areas of intelligence and military coordination, it is not clear whether it will take part in direct combat. As a result, Riyadh is being forced to make greater use of its own capabilities and those of its regional partners. Yet since the extent of American support could change, it would be too early to regard this division of responsibilities as permanent.

The second point is the regional aspect of the conflict. The Houthis’ location along the Red Sea coast and their influence on the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb connect the war in Yemen with questions of Gulf security, energy transport, and Türkiye’s commercial interests. The increasing risks in both the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb link the economic and strategic effects of various areas of conflict.

The third element consists of the growing convergence between the Yemen question and the Iran question, and it is in this area that Ankara has its most delicate issue; defense cooperation with Saudi Arabia, pressure exerted by the military on Iran’s regional allies, and Washington’s policy toward Tehran all affect each other within the same strategic environment.

The fact that the Yemeni government announced on Oct. 4 that it had begun a new military operation has made the pressure involved more concrete. Nevertheless, it is still too early to reach definite conclusions regarding the extent, length, and type of external support for the operation. The reports stating that Turkish-made equipment might be used do not prove that Ankara is carrying out military operations in Yemen. As attitudes in the field of alliance politics generally change more quickly than verification takes place, it has become all the more important for Türkiye to clearly define its role.

Two fundamental concerns shape the security dilemma in alliance relations. On the one hand, states fear being abandoned by their partners; on the other, they fear being dragged into their partners’ wars. The Mecca Pact demonstrates that the second risk does not arise solely from the terms of the agreement or leaders’ statements. Another mechanism at play here could be defined as "being drawn into conflict through capabilities.”

Türkiye’s defense industry cooperation with Saudi Arabia may create different political expectations depending on how the systems are used. The use of Turkish-made systems in the Saudi arsenal does not automatically make Türkiye a party to the conflict. However, clearly defining the scope of Ankara’s contribution is crucial to prevent misperceptions and safeguard its interests in the region.

While Riyadh seeks to translate solidarity into concrete security contributions, Pakistan’s defense commitments are strengthening trust in the partnership. Türkiye, for its part, can contribute in line with its own capabilities and strategic priorities. The partnership’s resilience depends on members’ ability to complement one another with different tools.

How Iran and the Houthis assess the agreement is also significant in this process. Clarifying the partnership’s defensive nature and assessing the possibility of political engagement with the Houthis could help ease regional concerns. In this way, security cooperation and diplomatic initiatives can proceed hand in hand.

Measured solidarity

Washington is a key actor linking the Yemen and Iran dossiers. The evaluation of new military options against Iran and the deployment of additional forces to the region suggest that developments in Yemen could become part of a wider escalation. However, a stronger U.S. military presence by the end of October does not necessarily mean a specific attack timeline has been finalized.

At the same time, the U.S. sanctions on the Iranian aviation sector, particularly on Türkiye-linked service providers, and the suspension of certain flights are also heightening the sensitivity of Ankara-Tehran relations. It would be incorrect to view individual commercial or administrative transactions as direct evidence of a comprehensive shift in Türkiye’s policy toward Iran. Conversely, as defense ties with Riyadh expand while Iran’s external connections narrow, Tehran may perceive these developments as part of a shared strategic orientation.

Taken together, this picture places Ankara in a delicate position. While Türkiye contributes to Riyadh’s defense capacities, pressure is mounting on the Houthis, who are Iran’s allies. At the same time, the impact of sanctions is narrowing ties with Iran, and U.S. military options are expanding. From Ankara’s perspective, the major risk is that the convergence of these issues could force it to respond in ways it had not previously planned.

Türkiye should adopt an approach of measured solidarity. It must provide effective defensive contributions while retaining decision-making authority over offensive operations. This approach can limit the risk of becoming a party to the conflict while still providing defensive capabilities.

The Riyadh meeting can therefore define the scope and limits of Türkiye’s support. Air and missile defense, protection against drones, early warning, training, and technical support can be evaluated within a clear division of labor. The boundary between intelligence and surveillance support for defensive purposes and that aimed at offensive targets must also be clearly defined.

Ankara can add to this contribution with two complementary measures. The first is maintaining diplomatic lines with Iran. Supporting Riyadh’s security while encouraging efforts to establish political contact with the Houthis could ensure that Türkiye continues to be influential on both sides of the Gulf. The Mecca Pact’s claim to provide security will be strengthened to the extent that it can limit the conflict. The second is open coordination with Washington.

Whether the Mecca Pact will become a model of cooperation among medium-sized powers or a route toward conflict depends on how the members manage these boundaries. If Ankara defines its contribution in phases, maintains communication with Iran, and does not assume responsibility for the objectives of an offensive it does not command, the agreement could expand Türkiye’s strategic options. If Türkiye’s role is determined by on-the-ground capabilities and partners’ statements, the partnership could become a mechanism that shifts one member’s war costs onto the others.

The Mecca Pact was born out of solidarity. Whether it is still a source of strategic autonomy, however, will depend on its capacity to define the limits of that solidarity.