The proposition that "starting a war is easy, ending it is hard" has proven itself once again. The cease-fire reached between the U.S. and Iran could not be sustained. Starting the war required only a unilateral political decision. But now the difficulty of building a new order that Iran itself would accept to stop the war has become clear.

At the outset of the war, the U.S. terms were clear. The war produced new problems that had to be resolved. Because the war was entered into without political and military objectives being fully defined, the U.S., despite achieving military superiority, could not produce an outcome it could call a victory.

The terms put on the table before the war were ending Iran's nuclear ambitions and reducing its missile capacity and the capacity of its proxy forces. Now the problem has changed. For Iran, the Strait of Hormuz has become a more important strategic lever than the nuclear program.

Iran wants the strategic leverage it gained during the war to be recognized and accepted.

The temporary framework that resulted in a cease-fire agreement in June envisioned reopening Hormuz and a 60-day negotiation process on the nuclear program and sanctions. Except for the duration of late Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's funeral, the cease-fire could not be operationalized. Although the intensity of the conflict decreased, mutual attacks continued.

Iran wants to permanently convert its de facto control over the Strait of Hormuz into political, economic and strategic status. Iran's new objective is not whether the strait opens or closes, or whether oil tankers pass through. This much is clear.

Iran wants ships' passage to occur along a route it determines itself, according to security arrangements it sets itself. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) views the U.S. establishing an alternative passage route south of the strait as interference in its jurisdiction.

Iran wants to establish hegemony over the Gulf states by gaining control of Hormuz. To put it more plainly, it has set control of Hormuz as its primary objective, as the key determinant of the order to be established after the war.

Therefore, the reason behind breaking the cease-fire is to focus the war entirely on Hormuz, thereby redefining the content of the negotiations to be pursued after any truce.

The clearest indicator of this objective is that one day before its most recent attacks, Iran even fired a missile at Oman, the country that was at the negotiating table for the cease-fire and had all but sided with Iran since the beginning of the war.

At present, sustaining the cease-fire does not appear possible. Iran does not want to return to full-scale war. However, it intends to keep the war going specifically around Hormuz, which has become an important front of the conflict. By creating an environment of controlled insecurity in Hormuz, it is trying to strengthen its hand, demonstrating that it will exhibit similar behavior even if an agreement is reached

Even if an agreement is reached, costs will always be higher on a route where security cannot be fully guaranteed, due to insurance costs and some companies avoiding the area.

It is known that there are hardline circles within Iran, outside of central control, insisting on maximalist demands regarding the nature of the cease-fire and negotiations. It is no secret that there is division even within the IRGC on this matter.

Iranian negotiators want to avoid large-scale U.S. attacks. They tend to want to preserve economic gains and keep talks going. However, hardline and maximalist groups that aim to continue the war and keep power under control domestically are still the ones calling the shots. Both sides agree on Iran's control over Hormuz. But the disagreement is tactical; they diverge over whether to achieve the objective through negotiation or through continuing the war.

Over the past week, many countries from the region, particularly Gulf states, attended Khamenei's funeral, signaling a tendency toward starting a new normalization process. However, Iran's renewed targeting of the countries that attended the funeral has once again undermined this process.

The attempt to secure control by continuing the war in Hormuz will, in the long run, work against Iran. Iran is once again weakening the partial legitimacy it gained during the war and its chance to return to the international order. By showing its intent and objective to shape the regional power struggle through Hormuz, it is once again fueling hostilities.