Yemen's is not just a sectarian war
A Houthi fighter wears a bullet belt as he takes part in a campaign to mobilize more fighters, Sanaa, Yemen, Oct. 7, 2026. (EPA Photo)

Being more than a sectarian conflict, Yemen's civil war reflects the regional rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia



The Yemeni civil war is a major multilateral and multilevel regional crisis that has been ongoing since 2014. The conflict erupted when Houthi forces seized the capital, Sanaa, and overthrew the government. In response to the Houthi expansion, a military coalition of several Arab states, led by Saudi Arabia, launched a prolonged military campaign against the Houthis, restoring order in some parts of the country. Since then, the country has remained divided, with a de facto Houthi administration based in Sanaa and the internationally recognized government operating primarily from Aden.

Not a sectarian war

Many observers claim that the civil war is a sectarian conflict between Shiite and Sunni communities within the Yemeni nation. The truth is it is not. The civil war erupted amid competing political and strategic interests pursued by Iran and Saudi Arabia, especially after the Arab uprisings. The terms Shiite and Sunni were not commonly used in Yemen. Instead, the war is widely understood as a proxy conflict between two rival camps, which are known as pro-Tehran and pro-Riyadh actors.

On the one hand, Iran indoctrinated the leadership of the Houthi family, including Badr al-Din al-Houthi, the spiritual and religious leader of the Houthi movement. Badr al-Din Houthi and his family members migrated to Iran, embraced the ideology of the Iranian Islamic Revolution, and were influenced by the Twelver Shiite school of thought. He founded the movement by drawing inspiration from the Iranian model. Thus, the al-Houthi family diverted from the Zaydi school of thought, the traditional Shiite understanding in Yemen. Since then, many Zaydi groups have been criticizing the al-Houthi family for deviating from Zaydi doctrine and for being an Iranian proxy.

The movement, officially known as Ansarullah and established in the 1990s, is widely seen as an Iranian proxy. Although there has been no direct Iranian intervention in Yemen, it is obvious that Iran has been providing not only all kinds of weapons but also an ideological basis for the Houthis. The Houthis, which are considered one of the main circles of the Iranian regional project, the Shiite Crescent, embrace a political ideology similar to Iran’s and Hezbollah’s ideology. Shiism, anti-imperialism, anti-Zionism and Third Worldism are among the main principles of their political ideology. Similar to Iran, the Houthis are also close to Russia and China, employing the rhetoric of BRICS and the Global South.

On the other hand, Saudi Arabia has been leading an international coalition intervening in the civil war. Saudi Arabia and its allies have been trying to prevent the Houthis from controlling the Yemeni state and keeping the country within Iran’s sphere of influence. In other words, Sunni Arab states attempt to prevent Yemen from falling under Iran’s control.

Although religious and sectarian rhetoric has been used by both Iran and Saudi Arabia, the conflict in Yemen is not a religious or sectarian crisis, but a political one. The dividing line is not sectarian, but political. It is clear to everyone that not all Houthis are Shiite, and not all Shiites are Houthi. A large part of the Zaydis has been criticizing the Houthis for their pro-Iranian political perspectives. Furthermore, the largest social and political movement, the al-Islah party, the Yemeni version of the Muslim Brotherhood, has been largely alienated by the actors and states who are directly involved in the conflict.

Iran and the Houthis

The relationship between Iran and Ansarullah has different dimensions. The first dimension is ideological affinity. The Houthis and Iran share a common political identity and similar religious identities. Both actors are Shiite Muslims. Ansarullah has been struggling against anti-Iranian regional actors, including Saudi Arabia. As an effective regional Shia actor, it has been following a complementary regional political perspective, mainly serving Iranian national interests.

The second dimension is strategic. The Iranian regime has benefited from the support of various regional non-state actors in the Middle East. Ansarullah, like Hezbollah in Lebanon, is part of the Axis of Resistance, Iran’s primary regional project in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings. Iran has provided the Houthis with advanced drone technology, ballistic missiles, intelligence and financial support. The two actors share similar political and regional perspectives.

The third dimension is trade. In this context, Iran acts as the supplier, while the Houthis are the buyers. This dynamic is one of the main factors shaping the relationship between the two sides. In other words, their relationship has both economic and political dimensions.

However, these factors do not mean that the Houthis are entirely under Iran’s direct control. As a Shiite movement operating in a Sunni-majority Arab state, the Houthis naturally have political perspectives beyond those they share with Iran. For instance, as a populist movement, the Houthis also appeal to Arab nationalism.

The Yemeni civil war can be analyzed within three complementary contexts. First, it is a civil war between different theo-political factions. The conflict is not sectarian, but a political one. Both sides instrumentalize their respective belief systems.

Second, the Yemeni crisis is a proxy war in the regional context, an ongoing regional conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The United Arab Emirates was also a party to the war previously. The Mecca alliance has added a new dimension to this regional context. Türkiye and Pakistan may join Saudi Arabia in its war against the Houthis by providing certain types of military assistance.

Third, the Yemeni conflict also has a global dimension, as control over Yemen is directly linked to influence over the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, one of the world's most strategically important maritime chokepoints. The Houthi advance into southern Yemen and the capture of several towns along the Red Sea coast also represent significant strategic gains for Iran. Iran seeks to establish direct or indirect influence over the Bab al-Mandeb Strait as a means of deterring the United States from attacking Iran. Furthermore, the closure of the strait would impose high costs not only on regional countries but also on countries around the world.