A small Greek response to Türkiye’s brigade deployment
In this photo, taken at an unspecified location, a Turkish soldier is seen during the Sea Wolf maritime exercise in the Eastern Mediterranean, Sept. 24, 2026. (AA Photo)

Türkiye’s 51st Commando Brigade in Söke adds a new dimension to the Aegean, while Athens’ smaller deployment raises questions about competence



Türkiye’s deployment of the 51st Commando Brigade to Söke, Aydın, in western Türkiye sent shock waves through Athens, with its own stationing of a commando company in the Evros regional unit near the Turkish border offering no psychological relief. However, this move cannot be portrayed as a response that alters the balance of power.

To properly assess developments in the Aegean, let’s first look at the timeline. According to the Ministry of National Defense, the relocation of the 51st Commando Brigade was approved in June 2026. The brigade commander assumed his post in Söke on Aug. 28. Brigade personnel were also present in the district for the Aug. 30 ceremonies. In other words, there was no hasty redeployment in response to a decision Greece made in September. Türkiye had made its decision months in advance, based on its own mission and operational needs.

Greece’s move came later. On Sept. 15, the Greek press reported that a commando company would be stationed in the town of Avantas in the Evros region. The opening ceremony at the Palaska Barracks took place on Sept. 17. Greek news reports stated that the unit had been permanently stationed there. Although the barracks were officially opened, there is currently no sign or indication of the Greek unit’s presence. But even if there were, what difference would it make?

Company vs. brigade

This is precisely the point Athens will struggle to grasp. The force in Söke is a commando brigade. The unit in Avantas, however, is, in the words of Greek sources, a "lochos katadromeon,” or commando company. Pitting a platoon against a brigade and presenting it as a response that alters the military balance is unlikely to change the situation on the ground. Moreover, it is also a peculiar approach that only the Greek military elite could conceive.

The difference is not merely a matter of name. A brigade is a much larger force than a platoon, with its subordinate units, command structure and support elements. In terms of personnel, we’re talking about a roughly tenfold difference in scale. Since exact troop strength figures aren’t publicly available, I won’t cite a fixed number. However, it is beyond dispute that a company does not carry the same weight as a brigade.

Moreover, Büyük Derbent is not an Aegean island opposite Söke, but a town in the Meriç region. It is nothing more than a local force reinforcement by Athens. There is no military or logical justification for presenting this as a move intended to counterbalance the 51st Commando Brigade’s deployment to Söke.

51st Brigade's field experience

I know the 51st Commando Brigade well. While serving with the Tunceli Special Operations Unit in 1998, I participated in numerous operations with this unit that has served for years in challenging terrain. For this reason, I know exactly what I am comparing.

Tunceli’s rugged mountains, deep valleys, rivers and water obstacles constantly test the commandos. The 51st Brigade’s training and equipment for crossing rivers and other water obstacles must be evaluated alongside the experience it has gained in this challenging terrain. The operational and combat experience acquired in this geography under harsh winter conditions, including deep snow and extreme cold, represents a highly valuable combat capability developed over a long period of time.

The brigade’s location in Söke makes its mobility even more critical to the Aegean region. When ordered, the unit has the capability to reach any location in the Aegean Sea by drawing on its expertise and equipment for crossing rivers and other water obstacles to reach designated objectives. Any assessment of the 214,000-square-kilometer (82,625-square-mile) Aegean Sea that fails to take this capability into account would be an irreparable mistake.

We know that the Greek company lacks river-crossing and amphibious equipment. More importantly, it has no operational experience, and its combat capability is extremely limited. In terms of military strength, deploying a company does not create a balance or provide tactical superiority against a brigade. Therefore, this deployment can be viewed merely as a message Athens is sending to its domestic audience. Greece has once again miscalculated.