After President Ahmed al-Sharaa came to power, the new Syrian government was met with two main concerns, both domestically and internationally. The first focused on how the new administration would approach minority rights, while the second questioned whether a government with limited experience in state administration could manage a conflict as complex as the Syrian civil war inclusively and sustainably. Now in its second year, the al-Sharaa government has clearly shown that these concerns were largely unfounded.

The inclusive approach toward minorities has gradually extended to include the Kurdish population, long instrumentalized by the YPG, the Syrian wing of the PKK terrorist organization, for political purposes and militant activities. With the 13th Presidential Decree signed by al-Sharaa on Jan. 16, civil rights that had not even been acknowledged as basic citizenship rights under the Assad regime were formally recognized. Damascus’ official recognition of Kurds as an integral part of Syria has effectively stripped the YPG of its remaining political leverage. In this context, the agreement reached on Jan. 30 can be seen as a clear retreat by the YPG, which has steadily lost legitimacy among the Kurdish population.

Provisions of the agreement

A close look at the terms of the agreement shows that Syria has largely secured its territorial integrity and, more importantly, reasserted its sovereignty. Except in areas under Israeli occupation, the Syrian flag now flies across the country. At the same time, the Damascus government has made clear that it will not allow the YPG to regroup, opting instead for a firmly centralized governance model. Under the agreement, all border crossings, entry points and state institutions have been placed under the direct authority of Damascus, signaling that decentralization scenarios for Syria have effectively been set aside.

One of the most serious risks in integrating the YPG was whether its armed members would be incorporated into the army as a bloc or on an individual basis. Syria’s official news agency addressed this concern, emphasizing that integration would take place individually. This distinction is critical, as the mass incorporation of YPG units could have undermined the newly formed Syrian army before it became fully institutionalized. If this risk is addressed not only on paper but also in practice, one of the main obstacles to building a strong and cohesive Syrian army will have been removed.

The Syrian army had already cleared the YPG from symbolic strongholds such as Raqqa and Deir el-Zour, one of the country’s most strategic provinces in terms of both underground and surface resources. Under the agreement, however, the planned deployment of Syrian army units to key centers such as Ain al-Arab, Hassakeh and Qamishli carries particular significance both for territorial integrity and for its symbolic value. With this final step, the "Rojava” narrative that the YPG has promoted internationally since the outbreak of the civil war has effectively collapsed. The emerging de facto reality makes clear that the so-called "cantons” established during the war have now been relegated to history.

The YPG’s removal has been largely welcomed by the Kurdish population. Despite attempts by the group to suppress public reaction, Syrian army forces entered Hassakeh amid a generally positive local response. In Ain al-Arab, where the YPG carried out extensive demographic engineering during the civil war, displaced residents have also begun returning to their villages. As a result, daily life across much of northern Syria is gradually showing signs of normalization.

New U.S. position

Syria’s political agenda is likely to remain focused on the issue of integration for some time. During the implementation of the agreement, the YPG may attempt to create obstacles on the ground or resort to provocative actions. That said, it is now clear that there is no longer any non-state actor in Syria capable of negotiating with the central government on equal terms. The YPG’s power has been decisively weakened on the ground and has all but vanished in the diplomatic arena.

The U.S., once the YPG’s main backer, has largely stepped away from its previous support. Washington now approaches the issue not through the YPG’s priorities, but through the interests of the Kurdish civilian population and its integration into Syria. More plainly, the U.S. no longer sees it as beneficial to channel funds to the group, supply it with weapons or defend it in international forums.

Al-Shaara’s inclusive and moderate approach has played a significant role in this rapid shift in U.S. policy. Despite the organization’s maximalist demands, the leader has consistently emphasized unity, territorial integrity, stability and reconciliation. This stance has, in turn, accelerated the international community’s acceptance of the new Syrian government.

Effects of a post-YPG Syria

This normalization process in Syria carries significant implications not only for the country’s internal cohesion but also for the wider region. Millions of people who were forced to leave their homes due to pressure from the regime and the YPG have now found an opportunity to return. In this context, countries such as Türkiye, Lebanon and Jordan, which have hosted large Syrian populations for years, may soon experience their most intense period of reverse migration since Dec. 8. This development could help restore the region’s disrupted demographic balance. Moreover, countries like Türkiye and Iraq, which have long been compelled to maintain heightened border security due to the YPG’s terrorist activities, are now likely to see a significant easing of this burden. In the period ahead, potential cross-border security threats can be addressed far more effectively through coordinated efforts with the Syrian army.

One of the clearest outcomes of the YPG’s neutralization is the message it sends across the region. Non-state actors that rely on violence, external backing and local exploitation cannot sustain themselves over time. As integration advances, Syria is entering a phase in which normalization and reconstruction are becoming tangible realities. Preserving this momentum will depend on the Damascus government’s ability to prevent any force from undermining unity and long-term stability.