The fractures occurring in the Eastern Mediterranean basin are compelling states to pursue new alliances grounded in more concrete and robust foundations. In this context, the Mediterranean is emerging as one of the primary arenas where a new regional order centered on security and economic concerns is being constructed.

Global competition along the Red Sea-Mediterranean axis is transforming the region into one of the most volatile geopolitical hot spots, effectively presenting these two seas in a single strategic basin. This axis, where the same actors are positioned across different fronts, lies at the heart of world politics due to its energy reserves, rare earth elements, maritime trade routes and military transit corridors.

Türkiye and Egypt stand out as two decisive powers in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. The trajectory of their relations carries critical importance not only bilaterally but also for regional and global equilibria. In the bilateral ties that experienced a sudden rupture in 2013, the spirit of alliance is now resurfacing. The regional competitive environment has propelled Egypt toward Türkiye. Moreover, relations have expanded from trade to encompass military and security dimensions, thereby creating new ground for strategic rapprochement.

One of the principal dynamics underpinning this rapprochement is the multilayered security crises afflicting the region. Developments in Egypt's neighboring countries, particularly Sudan and Gaza, have evolved into direct threats to Egypt's national security. Houthi operations in Yemen have also inflicted significant commercial losses upon Egypt.

The clashes that erupted in 2023 between the army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan jeopardize Red Sea security. Meanwhile, international allegations that Iran is supporting certain factions through indirect arms flows underscore the deepening entrenchment of proxy wars in the region. Iran's strategy of exerting influence not directly but predominantly through proxy actors manifests itself along the Sudan, Yemen and Gaza triangle. The propensity of terrorist groups to proliferate across borders also signifies the destabilization of Egypt's southern frontiers.

On the Gaza front, the war between Hamas and Israel, particularly as it converges on the Rafah border, has drawn Egypt directly into the crisis zone. Israel's heightened military control around the Rafah Border Crossing and its attempts to establish buffer zones have generated acute security concerns in Cairo. Egypt fears that Gaza spiraling completely out of control would precipitate a security threat capable of spilling over into the Sinai Peninsula.

Compounding this picture is the escalating military tension in the Red Sea. Iran's capacity to disrupt maritime traffic through the Houthis in Yemen has become a factor directly impinging upon the security of the Suez Canal. The risks along this axis, through which approximately 10%-12% of global trade passes, are rendering the Egyptian economy increasingly vulnerable. The decline in Suez Canal revenues is rendering Cairo's foreign policy choices more pragmatic.

From Greece to Türkiye

As of 2020, Egypt's long-standing maritime jurisdiction collaborations with Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean have recently entered a process of reassessment. Although the agreements with Greece yielded certain gains for Egypt, this equation, which deliberately excluded Türkiye, failed to produce a sustainable geopolitical balance. On the contrary, assessments are proliferating that a potential maritime jurisdiction agreement with Türkiye could unlock substantially broader economic zones for Egypt. Consequently, the Cairo administration is seeking to cultivate a more balanced strategy with Ankara, without entirely severing its ties with Athens.

The geography it inhabits, coupled with conflict zones in the Middle East and Africa, is impelling Egypt toward powerful security-oriented partnerships that transcend maritime agreements. Having engaged in military and defense cooperation with Greece against Türkiye in recent years, Egypt has reoriented itself toward Ankara because this partnership proved inadequate for its own security and rested on precarious foundations. Greece constitutes an actor with a considerably lower defense capacity compared to Türkiye, and its support for Egypt in a potential confrontation with Israel remains highly improbable.

From the perspective of regional power balances, it is evident that Egypt is simultaneously being compressed on multiple fronts. Israel's security policies, the United Arab Emirates' regional influence strategy and Greece's maximalist demands in the Eastern Mediterranean possess the potential to propel Egypt into strategic isolation. At this juncture, rapprochement with Türkiye emerges not as a choice for Cairo but as a geopolitical necessity. Türkiye, with NATO's second-largest army, offers a robust military and defense capacity, naval power and a regional diplomatic network that directly aligns with Egypt's imperative to restore equilibrium.

Furthermore, an examination of Israel's military doctrine in recent years reveals that while the perception of threat constitutes Israel's primary security agenda, other powerful actors in the region are also evaluated as potential long-term risks for Israel. Although Israel directly targeting Egypt appears improbable in the short term, containment strategies such as "from the River of Egypt to the Euphrates" and indirect pressure mechanisms are amplifying Cairo's threat perception. Indeed, Israeli soldiers are currently stationed at the Rafah Gate on the Egyptian border, and this position remains critical for Israel's strategic objectives.

Events in the Persian Gulf in 2025 have further reinforced this perception. Israel's missile attack on Qatar, which operates under the American security umbrella, and the allegations that the U.S. and U.K. supported this attack, continue to be debated. This situation precipitated panic within the Egyptian administration, and the tension in the region galvanized Egypt's security reflexes. Egypt proposed the formation of an Arab army to counter Israel and stated it would deploy 20,000 soldiers to this force. However, the limited capacity for collective action within the Arab world is directing Egypt toward seeking alternative alliances.

All these developments have impelled Egypt away from aligning with Israel's partner and the low military capacity Greek-Cypriot duo, toward rapprochement with Türkiye, which possesses substantial regional influence and military power. On the other hand, the future trajectory of the Greece-Israel partnership remains uncertain. In this process, where public sentiment is reluctant, it is also known that Israeli settlements have commenced in the other leg of the partnership, Southern Cyprus, and that this process lacks local approval.

In conclusion, the Türkiye-Egypt rapprochement is grounded in a structural geopolitical imperative. Intensifying competition along the vast strategic axis stretching from the Red Sea to the Eastern Mediterranean is impelling the two powerful states of this geography toward cooperation rather than confrontation. In terms of energy security, protection of maritime trade routes, containment of proxy wars, and formulation of regional balance policies, the Ankara-Cairo axis could emerge as a decisive line in the forthcoming period.

Within this framework, the multi-dimensional cooperation to be developed by Türkiye and Egypt possesses the potential to constitute a strategic turning point that will shape not only the future of the two countries but also that of the Mediterranean and Red Sea basins. Both countries aim to consolidate their presence by expanding it in the recent processes concerning Libya, Sudan, Somalia, Gaza and Syria.

Considering Egypt's economic dependence on the U.S. and its agreements with Israel, it is apparent that Egypt is approaching Türkiye through multi-vectored diplomacy. Türkiye, for its part, approaches this partnership with a focus on consolidating its strong regional position through its alliance with the U.S., its NATO membership and its balanced relations with Russia.

The Eastern Mediterranean, Red Sea and Middle East region will continue to be the place where the world’s geopolitical pulse beats most intensely in the coming period. Ultimately, as two powerful actors in the region with their military capabilities and geopolitical positions, the inevitable partnership of Egypt and Türkiye on this axis is paramount for regional peace. Time will elucidate how this partnership will be institutionalized in the future and which actors will accede to this geopolitical configuration.