Last month, the leaders of Egypt, Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan met in el-Alamein, an Egyptian city. Ethiopia was not at the table, but the most striking items in the joint statement issued by the four states spoke directly to Addis Ababa’s interests. The governance of the Red Sea, the waters of the Nile and objection to the recognition of Somaliland stood side by side in the same text.

The statement’s weight came from what was happening just before. On Oct. 1, Ethiopia closed its embassy in Asmara and expelled 10 Eritrean diplomats serving in Addis Ababa. Eritrea, in turn, cut diplomatic ties entirely. In the second week of October, Ethiopian forces reached Zalambessa on the Eritrean border. The war that has flared up again in Tigray showed once more how fragile the peace signed with such high hopes in 2022 is.

These developments matter for Türkiye as well. In December 2024, Ankara had brought Somalia and Ethiopia to the same table. Today the dispute has moved beyond the two neighbors’ bargaining over ports and spread along a much wider line stretching from the Nile to the Red Sea. Ankara, for its part, has diplomatic channels through which it can talk directly with Mogadishu, Cairo and Addis Ababa.

Line drawn at el-Alamein

The declaration does not mention Ethiopia by name, but its language reads as though it were written for Addis Ababa. Governance of the Red Sea is treated as the responsibility of the littoral states. Any unilateral step that would harm the water use of countries downstream on the Nile is rejected. While Somalia’s territorial integrity is defended, the recognition of Somaliland is also opposed.

Ethiopia’s Foreign Ministry replied on Oct. 5 without naming the summit. It rejected the positions taken there, said the country stood ready to defend its sovereignty and core national interests, and urged its neighbors to choose dialogue over confrontation.

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland on Dec. 26, 2025, had sharpened Mogadishu’s sovereignty concerns. Ankara had described the move as a clear interference in Somalia’s internal affairs.

Each item has its own history. Ethiopia, which lost its coastline when Eritrea became independent in 1993, sees port access as a strategic priority as much as an economic one. Egypt is seeking guarantees over the Nile waters because of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. Mogadishu, for its part, worries that Addis Ababa’s ties with Somaliland undermine its sovereignty. The declaration also backed Sudan’s national institutions and rejected parallel entities, an issue closely tied to the country’s civil war.

The fact that four countries put their signatures to the same text carried these different concerns into a common diplomatic language. It is too early to say that a military alliance will come out of it. Sudan is absorbed by the war at home, and Somalia’s security priorities do not fully overlap with those of Egypt and Eritrea. Still, the decision to set up a regular consultation mechanism shows that cooperation will not end with a single meeting.

Ankara’s three channels

Türkiye’s relationship with Somalia has long advanced through military training, the strengthening of state institutions and development projects. The 2024 defense and economic cooperation agreement placed maritime security at the center of this partnership. The Çağrı Bey drillship left Türkiye for Somalia in February 2026 and began work at the Curad-1 well in April, Turkish Petroleum's (TPAO) first deep-sea drilling operation outside Turkish waters, with Turkish naval vessels escorting the mission.

The tie with Ethiopia, by contrast, rests mainly on the economy and investment. During President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s first visit to Addis Ababa in 11 years, on Feb. 17, 2026, Türkiye and Ethiopia signed an energy cooperation memorandum. According to Erdoğan, Türkiye is Ethiopia’s second-largest investor, and the investments of more than 200 Turkish companies have reached about $2.5 billion (TL 125.1 billion).

Relations with Cairo have also entered a new period over the past two years. The joint declaration signed during the Feb. 4, 2026, visit to Cairo stressed the territorial integrity of the countries of the region, Somalia among them. A military cooperation agreement was also signed between the two countries’ defense ministries. The dispute between Egypt’s demands on the Nile and Ethiopia’s development priorities, meanwhile, continues.

These three lines give Ankara a broad view of the region. Contributing to Somalia’s security while maintaining an economic partnership with Ethiopia, and keeping the deepening cooperation with Cairo in step with both, calls for carefully built diplomacy.

Cairo and Mogadishu agreeing on one issue does not remove Addis Ababa’s concerns. Each capital expects something different from Ankara. Ankara’s advantage is that it has built up enough trust to listen to these expectations one by one.

Follow-up

The Ankara Declaration of Dec. 11, 2024, had opened the way for commercial arrangements that would give Ethiopia secure and sustainable sea access under Somalia’s sovereignty. Leases, contracts and similar methods were to be discussed. Technical negotiations, conducted with Türkiye’s facilitation, began in Ankara on Feb. 18, 2025.

The commercial arrangement envisaged by the declaration remains to be turned into a concrete agreement, a step that will require the two governments to sit down directly.

Mogadishu does not appear to have closed the door. Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud met Abiy Ahmed in Addis Ababa on Sept. 29. In an interview with Al-Jazeera on Oct. 3, a day before the el-Alamein summit, he said Ethiopia could use two or three Somali ports for commercial purposes. His conditions were direct negotiation between the two governments and respect for Somali sovereignty. He added that Ethiopia had not yet submitted a detailed, formal request.

This statement shows that the formula of the Ankara Declaration, commercial access under Somali sovereignty, is still on the table. For Addis Ababa, the scope and guarantees of sea access are decisive. For Mogadishu, any arrangement must remain within its own sovereign authority.

Shadow of war, elections

The war in northern Ethiopia has complicated the bargaining further. Ethiopia accused Eritrea of sending troops into Tigray and arming insurgent groups, and in a letter to the U.N. Security Council dated Oct. 9 invoked its right of self-defense under Article 51. Asmara rejects the accusations and regards them as an attempt to build a pretext for a military operation against itself.

Ethiopia and Eritrea had drawn closer in 2018 and fought on the same side in the 2020-2022 Tigray war. Abiy Ahmed’s appointment on Oct. 16 of a six-month caretaker administration for Tigray, with elections promised within the same period, has not stopped the fighting, and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) rejected the new administration the next day.

Somalia’s domestic politics also demand attention. On Oct. 15, the election commission announced April 15, 2027, for the parliamentary elections and May 15, 2027, for the presidential election. It is impossible to consider the steps Mogadishu will take in foreign policy apart from its internal balances.

Doors can be kept open

The most realistic starting point for Ankara is to keep alive the technical negotiation channel it has built between Somalia and Ethiopia. Progress on port use, customs arrangements and transport links would bring concrete benefits to both countries.

Such an agreement should be prepared together with safeguards that prevent the sovereignty debate from turning into conflict.

The governance of the Red Sea and the Nile disputes, on the other hand, require broader participation. Türkiye’s channels working simultaneously with Cairo, Mogadishu and Addis Ababa can contribute to this discussion.

In the crisis between Addis Ababa and Asmara, supporting the efforts of the African Union and regional organizations is the most workable path.

Moscow has meanwhile offered to host talks between Ethiopia and Eritrea. At the Russia-Africa summit on Oct. 28-29, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov renewed the offer while Abiy Ahmed and Isaias Afwerki were both in Moscow, although no meeting between them has been confirmed. Ethiopia’s announcement in Moscow that it had begun receiving 12 Russian Su-35 fighter jets, with S-400 air defense systems to follow, has raised questions about Moscow’s neutrality. What the Ankara Declaration offered was a formula both sides had signed, and that is harder to supply than a venue.

Ankara’s credibility rests on speaking candidly with each capital. While sustaining its support for Somalia’s territorial integrity, it is also in a position to look for a solution to Ethiopia’s need for commercial sea access. And while deepening security cooperation with Egypt, it can encourage contacts that keep the conflict in northern Ethiopia from widening.

In the Horn of Africa, the capitals look close together on the map. Politically, they drifted apart quickly in October. What Ankara achieved in 2024 was to get Somalia and Ethiopia listening to each other at the same table, and that experience is the obvious place to start putting the table back together.