One of the most significant transformations observed in the international system in the post-Cold War era is the changing nature of conflict. As Professor Mary Kaldor and political scientist Andrew Mumford argue in their works, conventional interstate wars have increasingly been replaced by more complex, multilayered and indirect forms of conflict, and the Middle East has emerged as one of the regions where this transformation is most evident. In this context, proxy wars have come to the forefront not only as instruments of great power competition but also as force multipliers that enhance the operational capacity of non-state actors on the ground.

Proxy wars refer to situations in which states engage in conflicts indirectly by supporting local or regional actors that represent their interests, rather than intervening through direct military means. This model has become increasingly prevalent in the 21st century due to its capacity to reduce costs and minimize political risks. However, over time, these actors have evolved beyond being merely instrumental tools and have developed into semi-autonomous entities with their own strategic agendas.

One of the most illustrative examples of this transformation is Hezbollah. Although initially supported by Iran, Hezbollah has evolved into a multifaceted actor with political representation in Lebanon, a well-developed social services network and an independent military capacity. Similarly, the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in Iraq, originally established to combat Daesh, were formally integrated into the state’s security apparatus in 2016. In contrast, groups such as the terrorist organization PKK's Syrian offshoot, the YPG, continue to operate independently from central state structures despite receiving international support.

An examination of contemporary conflict dynamics in the Middle East reveals a marked increase in the role of militias and paramilitary organizations. During the Syrian civil war, numerous armed groups, including the Free Syrian Army (FSA), Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and Daesh, have been actively involved in the conflict.

According to 2021 data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), more than 1,000 armed actors were recorded in Syria alone between 2011 and 2020. Similarly, 2022 data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) indicates a significant increase in the number of paramilitary actors in Iraq after 2014, with a substantial portion of conflicts being conducted through such entities.

Proxies of U.S., Russia, Iran

At this point, the indirect involvement of major powers such as Iran, the U.S. and Russia emerges as a decisive factor. Iran’s regional strategy has largely been shaped through groups such as the Kataib Hezbollah militia in Iraq and the Fatemiyoun Division militia in Syria, both directed by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). While some of these actors participate in electoral processes and become part of formal political systems, others continue to operate as armed forces.

The U.S., on the other hand, has exercised indirect military influence primarily through the YPG. According to 2022 reports by the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. allocated more than $5 billion between 2014 and 2022 to train and equip local forces in Iraq and Syria.

However, the long-term implications of this model remain contested. In Iraq, the empowerment of the PMF has weakened the state’s monopoly over the use of force, while in Syria, the emergence of de facto autonomous administrations in areas controlled by the YPG represents a fragmentation of state sovereignty.

Following the Russian intervention in Syria, Russia has expanded its influence not only through regular military forces but also via private military companies such as Wagner Group. This development demonstrates that non-state actors have become central players not only in regional conflicts but also in global power competition.

Empirical data clearly illustrate this transformation. According to 2022 UCDP data, the proportion of conflicts involving non-state actors in the Middle East has exceeded 60% since 2010. 2021 ACLED data shows that during the same period, a significant proportion of civilian casualties has been concentrated in areas where these actors are active.

The increasing role of non-state actors has also led to a re-evaluation of the concept of sovereignty. In countries such as Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, militias have evolved into actors that not only provide security but also deliver social services and generate political representation. This indicates a gradual erosion of the traditional state-centric understanding of security.

In conclusion, in the age of proxy warfare, non-state actors are no longer merely instruments of great powers but have evolved into independent centers of power pursuing their own strategic objectives. The primary drivers behind the growing prominence of these actors include cost-efficient warfare strategies, intensified great power competition and the prevalence of weak state structures. As this trend is likely to persist in the foreseeable future, ensuring regional stability will require the development of multi-layered security approaches that incorporate not only states but also non-state actors.