On Sept. 25, the chiefs of staff of Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan met in Riyadh to discuss the future of the Mecca agreement and issues of common defense and security. The military leaders reaffirmed their commitment to collective defense and to developing the agreement into a functioning security framework aimed at protecting Saudi Arabia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, implicitly referring to Houthi attacks against the country.

A second meeting on Oct. 5 further clarified this commitment. The defense and foreign ministers of the three countries reaffirmed their solidarity with Saudi Arabia, while Türkiye and Pakistan committed to "provide the agreed military forces and capabilities and ensure their rapid deployment” to the kingdom, subject to approved arrangements and their respective national laws.

While the three members of the alliance collectively possess nearly 1.4 million active troops, approximately 3,400 military aircraft, 6,000 tanks, and more than 340 naval assets, the pact’s implications for the kingdom’s calculations in Yemen extend beyond its military capabilities. Its potential significance is particularly evident in two areas: weakening the ideological narrative through which the Houthis justify their regional role, and providing Pakistan with an additional channel to exert leverage over the Houthis through its ties with Iran.

Houthis attacking Muslims

Signed in August by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan, the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement was designed to strengthen collective deterrence and regional stabilization. The three countries bring different sources of strategic power to the arrangement: Saudi Arabia's financial resources and regional position, Türkiye's military and defense-industrial capabilities, and Pakistan's military capacity and diplomatic relationship with Iran. The agreement has therefore understandably been discussed primarily in terms of its potential military implications. Yet its significance for Yemen may ultimately extend beyond the battlefield.

The first potential effect is ideological. Since Oct. 7, the Houthis have increasingly presented their confrontation with Saudi Arabia and other regional actors as part of a broader struggle against Israel and the United States. Their attacks have been framed not simply as an extension of Yemen's civil war, but as acts of resistance in support of Palestine. This narrative has allowed the Houthis to transcend their domestic political and territorial base and portray themselves as participants in a wider Muslim struggle. It has also provided the movement with a means of compensating for domestic weaknesses, including economic hardship, governance failures, and shortcomings in the provision of basic services.

The Mecca agreement creates a direct challenge to this narrative. Its symbolism begins with its name: Mecca is one of the most important religious symbols in the Muslim world, and an agreement named after Mecca brings together Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan under the language of Islamic solidarity and collective defense.

More importantly, neither Türkiye nor Pakistan can easily be incorporated into the Houthi portrayal of Saudi Arabia as simply an extension of an Israeli or American regional agenda. Both countries have maintained strong positions on Palestine and have repeatedly criticized Israeli military operations in Gaza. Türkiye, in particular, has made support for the Palestinian cause a prominent element of its regional foreign policy. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, in particular, has emerged as one of the most prominent international advocates of the Palestinian cause, a position that gained global visibility following the 2009 Davos summit and that he has continued to articulate, most recently by explicitly accusing Israel of state terrorism in his 2026 address to the United Nations.

This creates a contradiction for the Houthis. Their claim to regional legitimacy depends partly on presenting their confrontation with Saudi Arabia as part of the broader struggle against Israel and its supporters. But when Saudi Arabia acts together with Türkiye and Pakistan, two states that themselves maintain strong political positions on Palestine, that framing becomes considerably more difficult to sustain. Therefore, their attacks on Saudi Arabia could further erode their claim to uniquely represent the broader Muslim struggle against Israel, a claim that has already been weakened by allegations that they have attacked Islam’s holiest sites.

Pakistan's mediatory role

The second potential effect is Pakistan's ability to exercise leverage over the Houthis through Iran. Pakistan occupies a particularly useful position because it maintains close relations with Tehran while simultaneously being a party to the Mecca agreement. Islamabad has also established itself as a diplomatic intermediary in the broader confrontation involving Iran, including through the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding and subsequent contacts with Tehran. Pakistani officials have explicitly emphasized their ability to engage Iran while pursuing regional de-escalation.

Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif, in particular, played an important role in accelerating the mediation process and remains engaged in ongoing negotiations. This diplomatic channel could give Pakistan additional leverage to constrain Iran’s political, diplomatic, military and logistical support for the Houthis.

This gives Pakistan a channel that Saudi Arabia and Türkiye do not possess to the same extent. Iran remains the Houthis' most important external partner, even though the precise degree of Tehran's control over the movement is debated. Pakistan therefore does not need to be capable of compelling Iran to change its policy toward the Houthis for this relationship to matter. Its value lies in creating an additional channel through which Tehran can be engaged, pressured, or encouraged to restrain the Houthis.

The significance of the Mecca agreement in Yemen, therefore, should not be measured solely by whether Turkish or Pakistani forces are deployed, or by the number of aircraft, troops or military systems the three countries can make available. Its effects may be more consequential in two less visible areas: the ideological legitimacy of the Houthis and the diplomatic channels available for influencing them. By bringing Saudi Arabia together with two states that have their own strong claims to represent Muslim political interests, the agreement can complicate the Houthis' resistance narrative. At the same time, Pakistan's relationship with Iran provides a potential channel for indirect leverage over the movement.

The Mecca agreement is unlikely to transform the Yemeni conflict on its own. But if these two dimensions develop alongside its military commitments, the pact could affect the Houthis not only through deterrence and battlefield pressure, but also by reducing their ideological room for maneuver and opening additional channels for political pressure.