Bosnia-Herzegovina’s general election has produced a familiar political contradiction: The Bosniak nationalist and conservative Party of Democratic Action (SDA) led the parliamentary vote, while its chair, Bakir Izetbegovic, trailed in the race for the Bosniak seat in the country’s tripartite presidency. Incumbent Denis Becirovic declared victory at his election-night press conference. Preliminary results published by the Central Election Commission (CIK) showed him maintaining a clear lead over Izetbegovic as the count approached completion.

In the latest detailed count for the Bosniak seat, over 3,000 of the 3,177 polling stations had been processed. Becirovic had received more than 210,000 votes, or 38% of valid votes. Izetbegovic followed with 187,000 votes, or 34%. Semir Efendic of the centrist and unitarianist Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina (SBIH) had 141,000-plus votes, or 25%, while Fahrudin Radoncic of the center-right Union for a Better Future (SBB) received around 11,000 votes, or 2%.

Darijana Filipovic emerged as the winner of the contest for the Croat presidency seat, while incumbent Zeljka Cvijanovic won the Serb seat, according to preliminary results. The results remain preliminary and subject to official certification. Postal ballots and votes cast through several other supplementary categories had not yet been incorporated into the detailed presidential tally.

Efendic’s performance stands out. More than a quarter of the valid votes counted in the Bosniak presidential contest went to a candidate outside the two political camps that have dominated the race. His result establishes SBIH as a significant third force and challenges the assumption that voters must choose between the SDA and the political alliance supporting Becirovic.

For Becirovic, who is vice president of the Social Democratic Party of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SDP), victory does not remove the need to examine that challenge. His lead over Izetbegovic is clear, but Efendic’s substantial result shows that a significant part of the electorate was looking for an alternative to both leading candidates. For the SDA, the emerging picture raises a different question: How much stronger is the party than its leader?

Preliminary results put the SDA ahead in the state parliamentary election, followed by the Serb nationalist party, the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) and the multiethnic, center-left SDP. At the latest count, the SDA had 236,401 votes, compared with 201,401 for the SNSD and 116,881 for the SDP.

Preliminary mandate projections based on those results would give the SDA nine of the 42 seats in the state House of Representatives, the SNSD six and the SDP five. These projections are not yet an official CIK allocation of mandates.

Coalition negotiations will largely determine who ultimately forms governments at the different levels. If Izetbegovic’s defeat is confirmed, the broad pattern would resemble 2022, when the SDA became the largest single party in the state House of Representatives with nine of 42 seats, while Becirovic defeated its chair in the presidential race.

That would suggest that the SDA’s established electorate and organizational strength remain more resilient than Izetbegovic’s personal appeal. Some voters appear willing to support the party in parliament while preferring another figure in the presidency. For its leadership, parliamentary success cannot indefinitely obscure that distinction.

The next decisive stage will take place at the negotiating table.

SDP leader Nermin Niksic indicated on election night that the multiethnic Troika alliance – consisting of the SDP, People and Justice, and Our Party – should remain together if the results allow it. His statement points toward preserving the alliance, although it does not establish the composition of a future government.

Renewed cooperation between the Troika, the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZ) and the SNSD at state level is therefore a possible outcome. If agreed, it would retain much of the existing political arrangement. But coalition talks, final mandate distribution and competing demands for government positions could still alter that course. The relatively restrained exchanges between some leading rivals during the campaign can be read as an attempt to preserve negotiating options. Parties knew that opponents on the campaign trail might become partners after election day. This interpretation does not prove that agreements were reached in advance.

New tech, more reliability

What is already clear is that electoral strength alone does not guarantee entry into government. In Bosnia’s fragmented political system, the ability to assemble partners and control pivotal institutions is equally consequential.

One significant change concerned the voting process itself. Biometric voter identification and ballot scanners were introduced for the first time at general elections, alongside rapid transmission of results. Approximately 3.41 million voters were registered.

The new safeguards can make impersonation and manipulation during counting more difficult. Their democratic value lies in giving citizens greater confidence that political strength reflects votes genuinely cast.

Niksic explicitly linked his confidence in the results to the introduction of the new technology, saying this was the first time his party did not doubt the election result because the new system had made the outcome depend on the will of citizens rather than those counting the ballots.

That reaction suggests an important improvement in acceptance of the electoral process. Nevertheless, technology cannot eliminate political pressure on voters, misuse of public resources or the institutional blockades that emerge after counting ends.

Adnan Kapo, director of the Institute for Geopolitics, Economy and Security in Sarajevo, expects those structural obstacles to remain. "It is difficult to expect fundamental changes in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” he said in a statement provided for this article.

Kapo describes the political order as a consequence of the aggression and genocide committed during the war. He argues that its constitutional mechanisms allow a small political minority to obstruct decisions supported by a much broader public. He believes that about 70% of citizens would vote for European Union and NATO membership in a referendum. This is his assessment, rather than a polling finding cited here. His central argument is that public support cannot necessarily overcome institutional resistance.

The state House of Peoples illustrates how concentrated blocking power can become. Its quorum requires at least three delegates from each of the Bosniak, Croat and Serb caucuses. Coordinated absence by three delegates from one five-member caucus can prevent the chamber from taking decisions. Mechanisms intended to protect collective representation can consequently become instruments of prolonged obstruction.

Kapo argues that this paralysis exposes Bosnia to anti-European influences and damages security and development beyond its borders. He also criticizes the EU for failing to use its political and economic leverage more effectively against those responsible.

"Unfortunately, the European Union has not used all its political and economic mechanisms to compel those responsible for keeping Bosnia and Herzegovina blocked to behave differently,” he said. His prediction is blunt: "The blockades will continue.”

The role of neighboring Croatia and Serbia adds a further question of accountability. Bosnia needs constructive relations with both countries. But political support across borders becomes problematic when it makes elected representatives more responsive to outside patrons than to the citizens they represent. The election has offered a more transparent measure of political support. Whether that produces more accountable and effective government will depend on what follows.

Becirovic’s victory, the SDA’s parliamentary strength and Efendic’s substantial result each carry different messages. Coalition negotiations will determine which of those messages shapes the next government and whether citizens receive meaningful change or another term dominated by bargaining and obstruction.