The discussions held at the recent summit of the Quad – which comprises the United States., Australia, Japan and India – were originally expected to focus on countering China’s expanding influence in the Indo-Pacific. Instead, the escalating Iran war shifted attention toward maritime security, energy stability and vulnerable supply chains, exposing how rapidly wider geopolitical crises can reshape the grouping’s priorities.

India, interestingly, raised concerns over free maritime movement, fertilizer supplies and energy chokepoints affecting regional trade, partially because nearly half of India’s crude imports pass through the Strait of Hormuz. Any prolonged disruption in the waterway risks increasing shipping insurance costs, delaying cargo movement and placing additional pressure on India’s already sensitive domestic fuel market. Rising oil prices carry political consequences for the BJP’s government, where inflation and energy affordability remain closely tied to public sentiment and economic stability.

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio called for deeper Quad cooperation on energy security, maritime coordination and resilient supply chains, while Australia warned that instability in West Asia was creating broader economic stress across the Indo-Pacific, particularly for trade-dependent economies. The grouping also opposed any move toward tolling commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, reflecting wider concerns that strategic waterways are increasingly becoming instruments of geopolitical leverage.

The discussions at the summit and the differing priorities each member brought into the room revealed a larger reality confronting the Quad. Its central challenge is no longer simply China, but whether the grouping can maintain internal cohesion as its members navigate increasingly different strategic pressures and regional interests.

Quad’s uncertainty

That concern has deepened amid growing uncertainty over the Quad’s own political momentum. Despite plans for a leaders’ summit in New Delhi, no meeting was held in 2025, while the proposed summit in Australia later this year remains tied partly to developments in the Iran crisis and wider U.S. engagement. In geopolitics, delayed summits are rarely just scheduling problems. They often reveal shifting priorities more clearly than official communiques.

This slowdown is striking because the Quad institutionalized rapidly after 2020. Between 2021 and 2024, leaders met annually while expanding cooperation on vaccines, maritime domain awareness, semiconductors, critical technologies, cybersecurity and supply chains. Malabar naval exercises also grew more integrated across the Indo-Pacific.

Military cooperation continues to deepen through naval patrols, intelligence-sharing and logistics agreements. Quad members collectively account for a large share of global defense spending, yet the political confidence underpinning the Quad appears less certain.

Washington’s shifting focus

The immediate source of that uncertainty is Washington.

Under President Donald Trump, U.S. foreign policy has become more transactional and less predictable for partners. Trade disputes between the U.S. and its allies, ambiguities surrounding the U.S.-U.K.-Australia security partnership (AUKUS) and its flagship nuclear-powered submarine program, U.S. criticism of India’s continued purchases of discounted Russian energy, and Washington’s inconsistent messaging during last year’s India-Pakistan tensions have all complicated efforts to project strategic consistency. India still views the U.S. as indispensable, but no longer entirely reliable in its long-term regional focus.

That anxiety is reinforced by the widening crises across Europe and West Asia, which are again pulling American attention away from the Indo-Pacific. Allies increasingly worry that Washington is trying to manage too many theatres simultaneously while offering diminishing reassurance in each.

This shifting calculus is also visible in how Quad members view their own roles. For the U.S., front-line maritime states such as the Philippines now hold immediate tactical relevance in the South China Sea. India, by contrast, remains a longer-term balancing power, strategically vital, but slower-moving and deeply committed to preserving policy autonomy. India, on its part, still views the U.S. as indispensable, but no longer entirely reliable in its long-term regional focus.

India’s balancing strategy

That autonomy remains central to New Delhi’s approach. India wants U.S. technology, investment, intelligence cooperation and defense access, but not at the cost of becoming part of a formal anti-China bloc. China has long criticized the Quad as a containment mechanism, a characterization India continues to reject.

The problem for the Quad is that India’s broader strategic priorities do not always align neatly with Washington’s increasingly confrontational China strategy.

Russia remains one of India’s major energy suppliers at a time of volatile global oil markets. Recent India-Russia defence discussions reportedly focused on joint weapons production, land-force cooperation and space coordination. At the same time, BRICS has expanded to include Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Iran, all important to India’s energy security and trade diversification strategy.

For New Delhi, BRICS is not an ideological alternative to the Quad. It is a hedge against overdependence on any single power centre. India sees the Quad as one useful strategic platform among several, rather than the organizing principle of its foreign policy.

That divergence increasingly defines the Quad’s cohesion problem. Anxiety about China may bring the four countries together, but it does not automatically produce a shared geopolitical strategy.

Fiji port plans

The most notable outcome of the Quad meeting in New Delhi was the plans to jointly develop port infrastructures in Fiji, a strategically important Pacific island nation. However, the initiative remains marked by considerable ambiguity. The deal is still in the early planning stage with no detailed timelines, exact funding amounts, or specific construction contracts yet made public. Moreover, the U.S. communique frames it as collaborative support with the Fijian government rather than a fully Quad-owned port.

This initiative is one of the few areas where all four members appear broadly aligned. Yet, observers note differing strategic priorities beneath this unity. Australia simply wants to reinforce regional influence, the U.S. seeks to counter China’s growing footprint, Japan focuses on maritime security, and India desires to advance its Indo-Pacific diplomatic outreach. The project shows that while cooperation remains possible, it is often driven by overlapping interests rather than a fully shared strategic vision.

Flexibility may be strength

Though the Quad is far from collapsing, its purpose has evolved considerably, as the Fiji case exemplifies. What began as a grouping largely united by concerns over China's rise is increasingly becoming a platform for defense cooperation, technology partnerships and strategic transactions. The relationship among its members is now defined less by a shared grand objective and more by the pursuit of individual national interests.

The recent summit in New Delhi underscored this transformation. Each participant brought their own priorities to the table. These differences are not temporary deviations but structural features of each country’s domestic politics and external security environment.

With the Iran-U.S. conflict and other global crises steering the new global order, the Quad's challenge is no longer simply deterring China. Rather, it is whether the group can sustain strategic cohesion when each member increasingly views the Indo-Pacific through different priorities, threat perceptions and regional commitments.