In the Nov. 3 U.S. midterm elections, held in the ninth month of the war that began on Feb. 28, Democrats won both chambers of Congress. Tehran presented the outcome as its own victory. Parliament Speaker and chief negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf wrote that Americans had said "NO TO WAR,” while the daily Kayhan ran the headline "Trump Lost, Iran Determined the Election.”

Yet, Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei said that those pinning their hopes on partisan shifts in the U.S. are mistaken. U.S. affairs specialist Mehdi Zakerian recalled that the two parties agree on Israel, weapons of mass destruction and the free flow of energy. Abolghasem Delfi, a former ambassador to France, sees an opening for diplomacy, while security circles remain on high alert. On the surface, the election seems poised to change the course of the war. In reality, however, the issue has largely moved beyond personalities and elections.

Starting in January, the new Congress could seek to restrict funding for further U.S. military operations against Iran, potentially limiting the Trump administration’s room for maneuver. Sen. Chuck Schumer, the presumed incoming majority leader, has pointed to Congress’s "power of the purse” as a means of pressuring the administration to end the war. For now, however, U.S. military deployments to the region continue. The USS Theodore Roosevelt carrier group and the Makin Island amphibious group are expected to arrive in the region by late November. The U.S. military is reportedly completing preparations for a possible return to major combat. President Donald Trump says he has no immediate plans to launch a strike, while Qatari mediation continues. Yet, the knots driving this conflict cannot be untied at the ballot box.

Deadlocks of war

The first knot is the Strait of Hormuz. The real contest is not whether the strait remains open, but who sets its rules. Tehran no longer treats it as a source of temporary leverage. In late April, Khamenei promised "new management” and "new legal frameworks.” A strait authority was established in May, and a sovereignty bill was submitted to parliament. Deputy Foreign Minister Kazem Gharibabadi argues for "historic sovereignty.” Although this claim is legally contested, it makes political retreat more difficult. On Nov. 3, Supreme National Security Council Secretary Mohsen Rezaei called the U.S. response "not convincing.” On Nov. 5, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) declared the strait "unsafe and closed” to ships not coordinating with Tehran.

Stepping back is not easy for Washington either. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said in June that no country may charge tolls on an international waterway. Retreat would bring no gains for the U.S. while handing Iran a victory. Regardless of which party is in power, keeping the Strait of Hormuz open has become a necessity for Washington.

The second knot is older. During the 12-day war in June 2025, Israel sought to paralyze Iran’s political system. Its aim was to cripple the state’s decision-making and security mechanisms simultaneously, using public anger as a force multiplier. The broader goal was to turn Iran into a country of permanent instability. In October, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called the overthrow of the government the "primary objective.” Washington, meanwhile, believed it could achieve this goal step by step and at little cost.

Yet Iran has raised the stakes each time. The killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on Feb. 28 did not produce the expected paralysis, and Tehran responded by closing the Strait of Hormuz. The two conflicts also gave Iran an opportunity to address its vulnerabilities. Successors had been designated in advance to account for potential leadership losses, and missile capabilities were dispersed. Of the 69 tunnel entrances at underground missile sites that were struck, 50 had reportedly been reopened by late May. This resilience has prevented Iran from collapsing but has not won it the war. Air defenses and munitions remain serious weaknesses. Having survived the initial shock, Tehran has regained its confidence. Turning back at this point has become extremely difficult.

Iran in tight corner

A new campaign could target energy facilities and infrastructure. Iran has struggled with drought for years, and about 27,000 villages face water shortages. As the naval blockade continues, strikes on power and water networks could lead to hunger, thirst and disease. New sanctions announced the day after the vote suggest that the pressure could outlast the fighting.

However, despite all this, the desired political outcome may not materialize. In Iraq after 1991, the power grid was targeted, and the embargo lasted more than a decade. The people paid the price, but the regime survived. What ultimately toppled it was a ground invasion. Netanyahu himself acknowledged this in March, saying, "You can’t do it only from the air.”

Relying on third parties and exploiting internal turmoil may therefore seem attractive. In March, discussions about sending armed ethnic groups into the field yielded no results. Such groups lack the strength to challenge the IRGC. They also know the costs of acting prematurely, as demonstrated by the experiences of 1946 and 1979. Mossad chief David Barnea reportedly said before the war that his agency could galvanize the opposition. However, the expected uprising never materialized.

None of this signals support for the regime. The protests in January showed that public anger is real. However, under foreign attack, the focus shifts to defending the homeland, bringing people closer together. Iranians also fear that their country could become another Syria or Libya.

A similar assurance was given in 1980. Iranian exiles in Iraq told Iraq's late leader Saddam Hussein the Iranian regime would collapse under invasion. Gen. Gholam Ali Oveissi assured Saddam Iran’s military was in disarray. However, the Arabs of Khuzestan did not rise. On the contrary, the invasion produced a nationalist surge. About 20 months later, Iran, at its weakest after the revolution, retook Khorramshahr. This is where Washington and Israel fall short. They read Iran’s networks and structures well. Their cultural and anthropological intelligence is far weaker. Iranians may criticize their rulers harshly. But they remain deeply attached to their country. American and Israeli decision-makers take diaspora narratives detached from the ground too seriously.

None of this establishes a timetable for the war. An interim agreement on Hormuz brokered by Qatar remains possible. However, unless these knots are untied, such an agreement will only postpone the crisis. Democrats can limit spending on war, but they cannot eliminate Washington’s need to keep Hormuz open. Bombing and an embargo may weaken Iran, but achieving the desired political outcome remains doubtful. What may lie ahead is prolonged instability, with Iranians paying the price first, followed by the rest of the region. The real question is not only whether another round of conflict will occur, but also what it would achieve.