Türkiye's political system gained a democratic framework with the transition to a multiparty system in 1946. Power changed hands for the first time through the ballot box in the 1950 general elections. The Democratic Party (DP) won the 1950, 1954 and 1957 elections and remained in power. However, it was removed from office by a military coup on May 27, 1960. After the coup, a new constitution was drafted by the military administration, and Türkiye returned to an electoral system. However, the 1961 Constitution established constitutional institutions that limited the powers of the elected political authority, apart from Parliament and the government. Here is the cautionary tale of how these constitutional institutions engaged in anti-government rhetoric and ultimately brought down the government on Feb. 28, 1997.

The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) intervened directly in the political process again through a memorandum on March 12, 1971. As a result of this intervention, the government fell, and Türkiye entered a period of long-term coalitions. Years later, the military coup of Sept. 12, 1980, profoundly disrupted political life. Under the new constitutional order established in its aftermath, the emergence of strong single-party governments remained limited until the 1990s. That decade, in turn, was once again characterized by coalition governments.

Context of coup

The Welfare Party (RP) emerged as the leading party in the 1995 general elections. However, the government was formed by the True Path Party (DYP) and the Motherland Party (ANAP), which came in second and third in the elections. When this government failed to win a vote of confidence in Parliament, the search for a new government began, and the RP, the largest party in the Parliament, and the DYP, the second largest party, succeeded in winning a vote of confidence by forming the 54th government. This coalition government, formed by the conservative RP and the center-right DYP, took office on June 28, 1996. In the government, RP Chairperson Necmettin Erbakan served as prime minister, while DYP Chairperson Tansu Çiller served as deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs.

From the moment it took office, the Refahyol government faced an extraordinary and intense backlash. This reaction stemmed primarily from the RP’s ideological conservatism, which unsettled entrenched and undemocratic political actors in Ankara. Foremost among these actors was the National Security Council (MGK), dominated by the military bureaucracy. Unlike classic military coups, the Feb. 28 process was carried out not by directly seizing power, but by coordinating elements such as the bureaucracy, the judiciary, the police and the media to take action against the government. For this reason, the process has been termed a "post-modern coup” in the literature. A constant narrative of crisis was produced through the media, spreading the perception that Türkiye was experiencing a regime problem both domestically and internationally.

Women played a significant role in the social dimension of the process. The government's efforts to introduce a dress code for university students to expand women's rights were labeled as "anti-secularism,” and women who complied with an Islamic rule by covering their hair were barred from entering schools, universities and even public institutions. These practices created deep tension between the state and society; tens of thousands of young women were forced to give up their education and professional lives, while those who had the opportunity turned to going abroad. This situation led to a serious social trauma that continued to have an impact in Türkiye for a long time.

The "Jerusalem Solidarity Night” meeting, held in the Sincan district of Ankara in support of the Palestinian cause, was portrayed as a regime crisis. The passage of tanks through the streets of Sincan on Feb. 4, 1997, served as a tool of psychological pressure and was perceived by the public as a sign of an impending military intervention. In response, Prime Minister Erbakan, who met with President Süleyman Demirel on Feb. 21, stated that Türkiye was not facing a regime crisis. However, remarks made the same day in Washington by Gen. Çevik Bir, then deputy chief of staff and a leading figure in the process, "We have adjusted the balance of democracy in Sincan,” clearly revealed the true nature of the developments.

Coup of Feb. 28

Following all these developments, an MGK meeting was held on Feb. 28, 1997, chaired by President Demirel. The meeting, attended by government members and force commanders, lasted eight hours and 45 minutes as the commanders presented a series of 20 decisions they wanted the government to implement. The most striking aspect here was not so much the content of the articles, but rather the top-down and coercive language used by the appointed military bureaucrats against the elected legitimate government. This situation created a serious legitimacy problem for the democratic system.

The statement released after the MGK meeting emphasized secularism in particular; the "threat of reactionism” and the fight against it were among the army's top priorities. On June 11, a "Western Working Group” was formed within the General Staff to combat reactionism. Under this pressure, Prime Minister Erbakan resigned before the end of his term, submitting his resignation to Demirel on June 18, 1997. Although the government protocol stipulated that Tansu Çiller should be given the task of forming a new government, the president assigned this task to Mesut Yılmaz.

On Jan. 16, 1998, the Constitutional Court closed the RP on the grounds that it "acted contrary to the principles of a democratic and secular republic, violated the principles of the indivisible unity of the state and its people and the sovereignty of the nation, and was the focus of reactionary activities.” The parliamentary seats of General Chairperson Necmettin Erbakan, Şevket Kazan, Ahmet Tekdal, Şevki Yılmaz, Hasan Hüseyin Ceylan and Ibrahim Halil Çelik were revoked, and they were banned from politics for five years. With the publication of the decision in the Official Gazette on Feb. 22, 1998, the RP's 14-year political life came to an end.

During the Feb. 28 process, Demirel and other political parties did not take a sufficiently clear and strong stance against the undemocratic pressures on the elected government. This process deepened the tension between the state and society, and between the nation and the army. Between 1998 and 2002, Türkiye was again ruled by coalitions; in the 2002 general elections, many parties remained outside Parliament, and the newly established Justice and Development Party came to power alone. The experiences of the Feb. 28 process can be considered one of the most important factors shaping the socio-political background of the public's support for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party).