In discussions between Turkish and Chinese counterparts, one subject returns with striking consistency: the trade imbalance. Turkish officials frequently describe it as one of the most serious obstacles to the long-term sustainability of bilateral economic cooperation. The imbalance should not be reduced to questions of intent; it reflects a combination of structural, commercial and market-access factors on both sides. Yet it would be equally mistaken to dismiss it as an unreal problem or reduce it solely to Turkish consumers’ preference for Chinese goods.

The scale explains Ankara’s concern. In 2025, Türkiye imported approximately $49.6 billion in goods from China while exporting about $3.3 billion, producing a deficit of roughly $46.3 billion – around half of Türkiye’s overall merchandise trade deficit. Bilateral trade of around $53 billion may represent less than 1% of China’s total foreign trade, but it carries far greater weight for the Turkish economy. Bilateral trade need not be perfectly balanced, yet a persistent import-to-export ratio of about 15 to 1 raises legitimate questions about industrial capacity and external financing.

China’s competitive position must also be recognized. As the world’s largest manufacturing hub, it combines scale, sophisticated supply networks and competitive pricing. Many Turkish imports from China are machinery, components and intermediate goods used by Turkish manufacturers. Abrupt restrictions could raise production costs, aggravate inflation and weaken Turkish exporters. At the same time, excessive concentration of imports in strategic sectors can create vulnerabilities for domestic production, supply-chain resilience and industrial development. The experiences of the United States and the European Union also show that tariffs alone cannot eliminate structural imbalances.

However, price and quality alone do not shape market outcomes. Industrial policy, state-backed financing, subsidies, technical standards and market-access rules also influence competition. Trade-defense measures can therefore be legitimate when they are transparent, proportionate and consistent with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. Türkiye’s objective should be to reduce excessive dependency without giving up the benefits of competitive imports.

Toward a balanced relationship

The first path is expanding Türkiye’s exports to China. In 2025, China remained one of the world’s largest import markets, purchasing approximately $2.58 trillion in goods. Initiatives such as the China International Import Expo also demonstrate Beijing’s stated interest in promoting imports.

For its part, Türkiye should continue developing products suited to Chinese demand, strengthening recognizable brands, meeting applicable standards and building more effective distribution channels. Its exports remain concentrated in a narrow group of products, including minerals, stone, chemicals and selected machinery and agricultural goods.

Yet the problem cannot be attributed to Turkish supply capacity alone. Access to China can require lengthy risk assessments, product-specific protocols and registration procedures. In the WTO’s 2024 review of China’s trade policies, members raised concerns about sanitary measures, regulatory transparency, state support and technical rules that differ from international standards. China should therefore work with Türkiye to accelerate product-approval procedures, improve regulatory transparency, advance outstanding agricultural and food protocols, facilitate compliance with relevant technical requirements and create clearer market-entry channels for higher-value Turkish industrial products.

The second path is services, particularly tourism. Türkiye’s goal of welcoming 1 million Chinese visitors remains achievable with more direct flights, coordinated promotion and easier payment options. Tourism alone cannot offset a goods deficit of this size, but it generates service exports, supports employment and strengthens bilateral ties.

The third and potentially most consequential path is productive Chinese investment. Manufacturing projects in electric vehicles, batteries, renewable energy equipment, robotics and advanced technologies could support Türkiye’s industrial upgrading while giving Chinese companies a diversified base close to European, Middle Eastern and Central Asian markets.

The quality of investment matters as much as its headline value. Projects should create local supplier networks, research and development capacity, skilled employment and exports to third markets. Investment based mainly on imported inputs and domestic sales would do little to correct the imbalance.

China’s outward investment flow reached approximately $213.6 billion in 2025, while its accumulated stock exceeded $3.4 trillion. Türkiye, according to Turkish official figures, hosts more than 1,400 Chinese-funded companies and has attracted around $3.2 billion in cumulative Chinese investment. This is not an insignificant presence, but it remains modest when compared with the potential of the two economies.

What BYD case shows

The BYD project illustrates both the promise and the complexity of this investment relationship. On July 8, 2024, BYD and Türkiye’s Ministry of Industry and Technology signed an agreement for an approximately $1 billion investment in Manisa. The plan envisaged an electric and plug-in hybrid vehicle plant with an annual capacity of 150,000 vehicles, a research and development center, and up to 5,000 direct jobs.

In June 2026, BYD said that work on the Turkish plant had been placed on hold and that no timetable had been set for construction, while the company prioritized its Hungarian operation. Turkish authorities subsequently stated that the investment agreement, BYD’s obligations and the guarantees submitted to the state remained valid, although access to incentives had been suspended because the expected progress had not occurred. The project therefore should not be presented either as a completed success or as an officially terminated investment. It remains an unresolved test of the two sides’ ability to implement major commitments.

Publicly available information does not establish a single definitive cause for the delay. A range of commercial and strategic considerations may be relevant, including BYD’s global investment priorities and internal decision-making, its European production strategy, changing EU trade measures on China-made electric vehicles, as well as Türkiye’s macroeconomic and regulatory environment. Without clearer evidence from the parties, it would be inappropriate to assign primary responsibility to any one of these factors.

What is clear is that a jointly negotiated project requires accountability from both the host government and the investor, including transparency regarding agreed timelines, commitments and implementation milestones.

Tariffs, rules, trust

Between 2023 and 2024, Türkiye introduced additional duties and import requirements affecting vehicles from China. Turkish authorities presented these measures as instruments to support the domestic automotive transition, encourage local investment and ensure adequate after-sales services. However, country-specific and rapidly introduced measures also created legitimate questions about predictability and WTO compatibility.

In July 2026, a WTO panel found several additional duties on electric and hybrid vehicles, as well as elements of the import-permit system, inconsistent with Türkiye’s obligations. The findings, however, were more nuanced than a blanket ruling against every Turkish measure. China did not establish its case regarding certain duties on internal combustion vehicles. Some hybrid vehicle categories were not found inconsistent, and most exemptions granted to Türkiye’s regional trade agreement partners were justified under WTO rules.

Moreover, Türkiye amended its system in September 2025 so that the relevant additional duties applied to imports from all countries without a regional trade agreement, rather than China alone. Describing the entire Turkish policy as an unlawful or exclusively anti-China measure would therefore overlook both the mixed nature of the WTO findings and Türkiye’s subsequent regulatory changes.

Türkiye should nevertheless draw a lesson from the panel report. Legitimate industrial and economic-security objectives should be pursued through WTO-compatible instruments, including properly investigated anti-dumping, countervailing or safeguard measures, and through transparent investment incentives tied to production, employment and export milestones.

Fairness and reciprocity, however, cannot be obligations for Türkiye alone. China’s own industrial support system, regulatory transparency, public procurement practices and market-access restrictions are also relevant to the relationship. Mutual trust cannot be built by asking one side to abandon its policy concerns while leaving the other side’s barriers outside the discussion.

Türkiye continues to offer important advantages: a large domestic market, a developed automotive supplier base, skilled labor, strong logistics, a customs union with the EU, free trade agreements and access to several surrounding regions. Chinese companies, in turn, bring capital, technology, production experience and integration into global supply chains. These complementary strengths explain why neither side should approach the relationship as if the other were easily replaceable.

Shared responsibility

As 2026 marks the 55th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Türkiye and China, the occasion provides a timely opportunity for both countries to translate their long-standing relationship into a more balanced, reciprocal and future-oriented economic partnership. The way forward is a joint and measurable economic road map.

Türkiye should continue strengthening macroeconomic stability, regulatory predictability and its capacity to export higher-value products. China, for its part, should facilitate more effective market access for Turkish goods, encourage long-term manufacturing and technology investment, and contribute to the timely implementation of mutually agreed commitments. Both sides should establish measurable benchmarks for trade, investment and market access and review progress through regular institutional dialogue. However, these complementary advantages are no longer sufficient for high-quality cooperation in a rapidly changing international order. Both sides should expand tourism, transportation links and regular institutional dialogue. improving mutual trust and fostering an overall environment conducive to economic cooperation.

The trade imbalance is not evidence of deliberate wrongdoing by China, but neither is it an imaginary Turkish grievance. It is a structural challenge that can be managed only through shared responsibility. A durable Türkiye-China partnership will not be measured by whether the bilateral deficit disappears entirely, but by whether trade, investment and market access become more reciprocal, productive and sustainable for both sides.