This week may prove to be one of the most important diplomatic moments in Bosnia-Herzegovina since the end of the war.

Behind closed doors in Sarajevo, international diplomats are deciding who will replace Christian Schmidt as the next High Representative following his sudden departure after five turbulent years in office.

The decision is being made by the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), the international body established after the Dayton Peace Agreement to oversee the civilian implementation of peace in Bosnia. The board includes the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Canada, Japan, the European Union and Türkiye.

The position remains one of the most powerful international offices in Europe. Under the so-called Bonn Powers, a High Representative can impose laws, amend legislation and remove elected officials deemed to be violating the Dayton framework.

This week’s decision, therefore, goes far beyond selecting a successor to Schmidt. It is also a decision about what kind of Bosnia the international community believes it is dealing with in 2026.

Italian diplomat Antonio Zanardi Landi is widely viewed as one of the frontrunners and reportedly enjoys support from Washington. French diplomat Rene Troccaz has also been mentioned, while British diplomat Karen Pierce and former NATO official Stuart Peach and some other names have appeared in diplomatic discussions. But the real question is not who will replace Schmidt. It is whether the U.S. and Europe still share the same vision for Bosnia’s future.

For the first time in years, that appears increasingly uncertain.

While Germany, France and the U.K. continue to argue that Bosnia requires a strong Office of the High Representative (OHR) capable of using the Bonn Powers when necessary, recent statements from Washington suggest a different emphasis.

Speaking before the United Nations Security Council in May, U.S. Deputy Ambassador Tammy Bruce stated that the OHR was never intended to be permanent and that success would mean leaving a successor with "a far more limited set of responsibilities.” Responsibility, she argued, should increasingly be transferred to Bosnia’s domestic institutions.

The issue is not that Washington is calling for the abolition of the OHR. It is not. Rather, the debate is whether international oversight should gradually be reduced at precisely the moment many officials in Sarajevo believe Bosnia needs it most.

Members of the Presidency, ministers and senior officials have repeatedly argued that Bosnia is facing its most serious institutional challenge in years and that reducing the role of the OHR now would send the wrong signal. Similar arguments can also be heard from opposition figures. While Bosnian politicians disagree on many issues, much of Sarajevo’s political establishment remains convinced that international oversight is still necessary.

Republika Srpska leaders have long argued that the OHR has exceeded its original Dayton mandate and should be closed. They never recognized Schmidt’s legitimacy, arguing that his appointment was never formally confirmed by the United Nations Security Council due to opposition from Russia and China. Their position reflects a broader belief in Banja Luka that Bosnia can only become a fully sovereign state once international supervision comes to an end.

But thanks to Bosnian Serb de facto leader Milorad Dodik, the country remains locked in its most serious constitutional crisis since Dayton. Republika Srpska authorities continue to challenge state-level institutions, while rhetoric questioning the authority of the Constitutional Court and other central institutions has become increasingly normalized. Language of secession and calls for the independence of the entity Republika Srpska, which once triggered international alarm, now often receives little more than diplomatic concern.

At the same time, Bosnia is operating in a rapidly changing geopolitical environment.

For years, Dodik positioned himself as one of Moscow’s closest allies in Europe. Today, some of the same political networks are increasingly cultivating ties with figures linked to U.S. President Donald Trump’s political orbit. In April, Donald Trump Jr visited Banja Luka as a guest of Igor Dodik, discussing business opportunities and criticizing the EU as "a bit of a mess.” His remarks were warmly welcomed by Republika Srpska officials.

The Southern Gas Interconnection project has further fuelled debate. While strategically important for reducing Bosnia’s dependence on Russian gas, the project has attracted scrutiny because of reported links to individuals connected to Trump’s political network, including former Trump lawyer Jesse Binnall and Joseph Flynn, brother of former Trump adviser Michael Flynn.

Taken together, these developments paint a picture of a country increasingly exposed to competing geopolitical interests while its own institutions remain deeply divided.

This is precisely why arguments for weakening the OHR appear premature. The Office of the High Representative was never intended to be permanent. Most Bosnians would welcome the day when their country no longer requires international supervision. But institutions are removed when they become unnecessary, not when the challenges they were designed to address are intensifying.

Supporters of reducing the OHR argue that Bosnia must learn to govern itself. They are right.

The problem is that Bosnia is being asked to do so at a time when political divisions remain deep, corruption remains stubbornly high, and public trust in institutions remains low.

At the very moment Europe is warning that Bosnia risks losing hundreds of millions of euros from the EU Growth Plan because of political paralysis, some international actors are discussing reducing one of the few mechanisms capable of intervening when that paralysis threatens the functioning of the state itself.

Bosnia is already falling behind much of the region when it comes to reforms. Leaders routinely clash in front of European officials while young people continue to leave the country in search of better opportunities elsewhere. At times, the debate feels less about joining the EU and more about whether enough people will remain to benefit when membership eventually arrives.

This is not the moment for institutional experiments.

One day, Bosnia should be able to function without the OHR. But that day should come when institutions are stronger, politics is less confrontational, and reforms are moving forward, not when the country remains trapped in political paralysis and geopolitical uncertainty.

The next High Representative should not be chosen to quietly manage the closure of the office. He or she should be chosen to safeguard stability, sound the alarm when Bosnia approaches another political cliff edge and encourage leaders to focus on the reforms that citizens, and the country’s European future, desperately need.

Because Bosnia does not need less attention from the international community today. It needs the right kind of attention. And now is not the time for the international community to experiment with Bosnia. It is dangerous and reckless.