Israel’s policy toward Syria is built on three pillars: occupation, destabilization and coercion. Its efforts to entrench this occupation are particularly evident in southern Syria and the Golan Heights. In these areas, Israel not only maintains a military presence in violation of international law but also conducts repeated airstrikes that perpetuate instability.

Israel’s campaign of occupation and destabilization in southern Syria has never truly ceased. Whenever the issue of ending Israel’s occupation or military presence is raised, the government in Tel Aviv responds with threats of military action against Damascus. Indeed, Jabal al-Sheikh, overlooking the Syrian capital, remains under Israeli occupation. Through this strategy, Israel uses the threat of further military escalation to pressure Damascus into tolerating its continued illegal military presence in Syria.

Looking back, Israel’s military campaign against Syria intensified dramatically after Dec. 8, 2024, with Israeli warplanes striking targets across virtually the entire country. The pace of these attacks declined somewhat beginning in January 2026. That month, Syrian and Israeli officials, under U.S. mediation, signed an agreement covering intelligence sharing, military de-escalation and economic cooperation in Paris.

Yet neither the Paris agreement nor U.S. President Donald Trump’s warnings succeeded in bringing Israel’s military operations in Syria to an end. Nor has Israel withdrawn from the territories it continues to occupy in southern Syria. Instead, it has maintained a state of controlled instability to justify its ongoing military presence and operations. By directly backing separatist Druze factions, particularly in Suwayda, Israel has further facilitated Syria’s de facto fragmentation.

As long as Israel maintains its occupation of these territories, Syria’s prospects for restoring its territorial integrity will remain limited. Given the current regional and political environment, an Israeli withdrawal from these areas appears highly unlikely in the foreseeable future.

Aim of Syrian government

Although the government in Damascus wants Israel to end its occupation of Syrian territory, it is well aware that Tel Aviv has little intention of doing so. As an immediate priority, Damascus seeks to halt Israel’s relentless airstrikes in southern Syria and establish a relatively stable security environment. It also aims to put an end to Israeli threats against the Syrian capital. Against this backdrop, President Ahmed al-Sharaa has been exploring the possibility of a comprehensive security arrangement with Israel. Such an agreement would not entail Syrian concessions over the Golan Heights or its sovereign rights in southern Syria. Rather, its primary objective would be to reduce tensions and replace years of instability with a framework of mutual non-escalation.

In almost every public statement, al-Sharaa has stressed that Syria seeks no confrontation with Israel and poses no threat to its security. This position is more than political rhetoric. Despite repeated Israeli airstrikes and continued violations of Syrian sovereignty, Damascus has consistently refrained from pursuing a military response, instead signaling its preference for dialogue and diplomacy.

This diplomatic approach extends beyond Syria’s relationship with Israel. Al-Sharaa has adopted a similarly restrained position toward Lebanon, rejecting military intervention despite external pressure, including from the United States. His meeting with Trump at the 36th NATO summit in Ankara did not alter that position. Together, these examples illustrate the new Syrian leadership’s preference for diplomacy over military confrontation in addressing regional disputes.

What Lebanon foretells

Although the government in Damascus has consistently favored a diplomatic solution, it should not be forgotten that the party on the other side of the table is Israel. Israel has a long record of disregarding international law and has repeatedly demonstrated its reluctance to resolve disputes through diplomacy. Instead, it has consistently relied on military force and coercion to achieve its strategic objectives. Against this backdrop, it is difficult to imagine Israel engaging in meaningful negotiations without first extracting substantial concessions from Damascus.

While Israel’s reluctance to engage in diplomacy is a problem in itself, an even greater concern is its long record of failing to honor the agreements it signs. Lebanon provides the clearest and most recent example of this pattern.

Although diplomatic talks between Israel and Lebanon began in April 2026 under U.S. mediation, Israeli military operations have continued unabated. Moreover, despite the framework agreement signed on June 26, Israel has neither halted its military activities nor withdrawn from the territories it occupies in southern Lebanon. Instead, its occupation has continued to expand. Within the approximately 602 square kilometers under its control, Israel has demolished Lebanese villages to construct new military bases and establish logistical corridors. Put simply, even as diplomatic negotiations continue, Israel is not scaling back its military presence in Lebanon; it is consolidating and expanding it.

With Lebanon serving as such a stark example, how much confidence can Damascus realistically place in a security agreement with Israel? What concessions would Israel demand in return for such an arrangement? These are questions that the Syrian leadership must answer before moving forward.

Under the current circumstances, Israel appears committed to a regional strategy of keeping its neighbors, especially Syria, in a state of chronic instability. From this perspective, a stable and self-sufficient Syria does not serve Israel’s strategic interests. That calculus is unlikely to change as long as Israel continues to see itself not as part of the region, but as its dominant power.

Since taking office, Syria’s new leadership has worked closely with the international community to address both domestic and external challenges, while seeking to conduct this transition with maximum transparency. Given the immense destruction left behind by the Assad regime, Syria’s reintegration into the international system depends largely on such an approach. From this perspective, al-Sharaa’s efforts to pursue a security arrangement with Israel, arguably Syria’s most challenging external security issue, are understandable. Yet, under the current circumstances, there is little reason to expect these diplomatic overtures to be met with a genuine willingness to compromise on the Israeli side.