Israel after election: Political deadlock and Iran war
Israeli protesters attend a demonstration outside Yashar Party leader Gadi Eisenkot's home, calling on him to form a coalition with Israel-Arab parties rather than allow Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to serve another term, Herzliya, Israel, Oct. 29, 2026. (Reuters Photo)

Israel's election deadlock leaves Netanyahu fighting to retain power, while the prospect of renewed military escalation with Iran adds to regional uncertainty



The Israeli general elections held on Oct. 27 have shaken Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s position in power and deepened uncertainty over the country’s political future. The election results showed that the right-wing bloc led by Netanyahu lost its parliamentary majority, while the opposition also failed to secure enough seats to form a government. More importantly, the promises made by political leaders during the election campaign and the red lines they have set against each other make it extremely difficult to form a new government under the current parliamentary balance. Therefore, the possibility of Israel heading to another early election after a long period of coalition negotiations is becoming a serious scenario. In such a situation, Netanyahu could remain in power as the head of a caretaker government and use a new military operation against Iran to secure his political future.

Eisenkot in tight corner

The main problem in Israeli politics after the elections is that the parliamentary majority against Netanyahu has failed to reach a political agreement to form an alternative government. While Netanyahu's Likud Party and coalition partners won 53 seats in the 120-seat Knesset, the opposition bloc led by Gadi Eisenkot secured 48 seats. The 19 seats won by Arab parties have therefore become a decisive factor in the struggle to form a government.

Leader of the Yashar Party and former Israeli military chief, Gadi Eisenkot (L), and his wife Hannah cast their votes in the elections, Herzliya, Israel, Oct. 27, 2026. (EPA Photo)

With Arab members, the anti-Netanyahu parties theoretically hold a majority of 67 seats. However, turning this advantage into a political coalition is quite difficult. While Eisenkot and his allies refuse to form a national unity government with Netanyahu, they also oppose including Arab parties in the government. So far, they have also failed to convince any party from Netanyahu's bloc to join their side.

Avigdor Liberman stands at the center of this political deadlock. His strong opposition to any government that depends on the support of Arab parties shows how difficult it is for Eisenkot's bloc to form a coalition with them, even though they share the same stance against Netanyahu. This situation has pushed Eisenkot, who is trying to turn opposition to Netanyahu into a concrete political victory by forming a government, to seek an agreement with the ultra-Orthodox Haredi parties.

However, the opposition made ending military service exemptions for the Haredim one of the main issues of its election campaign. Therefore, making concessions on this issue would create a serious political contradiction, and no agreement has been reached so far. Moreover, it will not be easy for the Haredi parties to abandon their long-standing alliance with Netanyahu. As a result, Eisenkot's efforts to form a government face not only a mathematical problem but also a serious ideological and political deadlock.

No hope for change

The election results show that two different tendencies exist together in Israeli society: the desire to move away from Netanyahu's leadership and the willingness to continue the security policies established during his rule. In other words, a significant part of Israeli voters wants a government that will follow security policies similar to Netanyahu's, but without Netanyahu and his far-right allies.

Eisenkot's rise is also a result of this tendency. The alternative represented by the former chief of staff is not based on a fundamental change in Israel's policy toward Palestine. Instead, it promises to manage Israel's security-centered strategy more institutionally and predictably.

In fact, Eisenkot also opposes the establishment of a Palestinian state and supports eliminating Hamas's military and political capabilities. Therefore, the main difference between Eisenkot and Netanyahu is not about Israel's regional objectives, but rather about which political leaders and governing approach should be responsible for achieving them.

On the other hand, the high turnout among Arab voters shows that opposition to the current government among Israel's Palestinian citizens has turned into strong political mobilization. Nevertheless, the exclusion of Arab parties demonstrates the structural problem that goes beyond Netanyahu himself.

What about Palestine, region

The elections are not expected to bring a major change for Palestinians. If Netanyahu remains in power, Israel's current security approach in Gaza will continue, while a possible government led by Eisenkot will also adopt the elimination of Hamas as one of its main objectives. Therefore, in both scenarios, it seems unlikely that military pressure on Gaza will end or that a comprehensive political process toward the establishment of an independent Palestinian state will begin.

However, some differences may emerge in the West Bank, depending on the composition of the new government. While Netanyahu's far-right allies openly support the expansion of settlements and annexation policies, a government led by Eisenkot may adopt a more controlled approach that considers international pressure. Nevertheless, political figures such as Bennett and Liberman make it difficult for such a change to turn into a policy that recognizes Palestinian sovereignty.

At the regional level, Israeli attacks on Syria are also expected to continue. The objectives of limiting Syria's military capabilities, surpassing Türkiye's influence in the region, and maintaining Israel's expansionism are not limited to Netanyahu's policies. It is also connected to the broader strategic approach of Israel's security institutions.

US elections, Iran war

The timing of political uncertainty in Israel is particularly important because of the U.S. congressional midterm elections. The Trump administration's policy toward Iran may be influenced by both the domestic political balance in the United States and the government formation crisis in Israel.

For Trump, the continuation of the conflict with Iran has increased criticism over energy prices, the U.S. economy, and the costs of the war. For this reason, before the elections, he tried to avoid another major military operation while keeping the possibility of a diplomatic solution on the agenda. However, with the midterm elections now over, the military option against Iran will definitely be reconsidered.

For Netanyahu, the period following the U.S. elections may offer an important window of opportunity. If efforts to form a government in Israel fail, the political calendars of the two countries may overlap in a way that could increase the possibility of a new military escalation against Iran.

An Iranian man drives past a billboard featuring images of U.S. President Donald Trump, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, U.S. Vice President JD Vance (R) and U.S. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff, Tehran, Iran, Nov. 3, 2026. (EPA Photo)

Prospect for early elections

In Israel, the process of assigning the task of forming a government, holding coalition negotiations and giving alternative candidates a chance can take weeks or even months. If these efforts fail, the decision to hold another early election and the election process itself could extend the political uncertainty to around six months.

During this period, Netanyahu's position as the head of a caretaker government may provide him with a vital opportunity to strengthen his political leverage again. In particular, a new wave of attacks against Iran could shift the focus of Israeli domestic politics back to national security. Such an operation could offer Netanyahu two political advantages. First, it could push the government formation crisis into the background and bring security issues back to the center of the political agenda. Second, Netanyahu could use possible military gains against Iran to strengthen his political argument that his leadership is necessary for Israel's security.

However, it is not certain that a new war would bring Netanyahu an electoral victory. Iranian retaliation, economic costs, or the failure of a military operation could instead weaken public support for his leadership. Moreover, if Trump prefers a diplomatic agreement with Iran, Netanyahu may not be able to secure the level of American support he wants.

The main opportunity for Netanyahu therefore lies not in military escalation itself, but in the political consequences it could produce. An operation that is seen as successful could change the balance of power in Netanyahu's favor in another early election, something the current election results have failed to achieve.

In conclusion, the Israeli elections have neither ended Netanyahu's rule nor given Eisenkot the parliamentary majority needed to take over the government. The commitments and red lines of the different political blocs have deepened the government formation crisis, making another early election a serious possibility. Under these circumstances, instead of immediately paying the political price of losing his parliamentary majority, Netanyahu may try to use the time provided by a caretaker government to remain in power and strengthen his position.

Considering the possibility that a new war with Iran could reshape Israeli politics, the answer to the question of who will govern Israel should be sought not only in coalition negotiations in the Knesset, but also in developments between Washington and Tehran.