The preliminary results of Israel's elections have delivered what many had quietly expected: A political deadlock that resolves nothing, satisfies no one, and leaves the entire region suspended in the same tension that preceded the vote. With roughly 54 seats for Benjamin Netanyahu's bloc and 47-49 for the opposition led by Gadi Eisenkot, neither side has secured the 61-seat majority required to form a government. The Arab parties, meanwhile, achieved a historic high with 17-18 seats, emerging as the largest bloc capable of tipping the balance – a result that is both a rebuke to Netanyahu's racist campaigning and a reminder of how structurally excluded Palestinian citizens remain from the Israeli political game.

What makes this outcome particularly revealing is that, for Netanyahu, it is not a defeat but likely a strategic reprieve. He did not expect a majority; he hoped to remain the dominant figure in Israeli politics regardless of whether he forms the next government or leads a strong opposition. The numbers give him exactly that. Likud remains the largest single party, and Netanyahu has already claimed that the "Zionist majority" must unite behind him, explicitly ruling out any government reliant on Arab parties. This idea is also shared by some members within Netanyahu's opposition bloc.

Netanyahu may succeed in peeling away defectors from the opposition bloc – a strong scenario given that the bloc is a mosaic stretching from the left to the right. Naftali Bennett, whose "Together" party has been floated as a potential partner, is one possibility. Or, in the worst case for him, Netanyahu may settle into a combative opposition role, making his presence continue to shape Israeli politics for the foreseeable future.

This is precisely why the election solves nothing. The deadlock is not a temporary glitch but a structural feature of a political system that has spent years cannibalizing itself. Israel has held five elections in less than four years between 2019 and 2022, and the underlying fractures – over Netanyahu's legal troubles, the role of the ultra-Orthodox, the Arab minority, and the endless war on Gaza and Iran – remain unresolved.

Israeli President Isaac Herzog has signaled he will push for a unity government between Likud and Yashar, but Eisenkot's entire campaign was built on replacing Netanyahu, not partnering with him. The opposition may try to form a minority government with external Arab support, but Eisenkot has publicly committed to a "Zionist government," cutting off that path before it begins.

For the region, the implications are too grim. Netanyahu understands that maintaining a state of emergency serves his political survival. As he himself has made clear, the confrontation with Iran is his defining project, and he will continue to stoke the fires abroad – whether in Gaza, Lebanon, or Iran – because a permanent crisis is the most reliable guarantor of his political survival, including the scenario of going for another round of elections that prolongs the crisis and keeps him in power until at least March 2027. The elections has not constrained him; it has freed him to escalate, because he no longer needs to worry about the electoral cost of a widening war. The deadlock inside produces escalation abroad, and the region will pay the price.

In the end, the Israeli elections have confirmed what was already evident: the system cannot resolve its contradictions through the ballot box. The Arab parties have more seats than ever, yet they remain untouchable in any governing coalition. Netanyahu is weakened but indispensable to his bloc. The opposition has momentum but no path to power. And the wars continue, because the man who benefits most from them has just been handed scenarios of his political survival. The tension will not ease; it will only deepen, because nothing in this result offers a way out.

The Trump factor

U.S. President Donald Trump's endorsement of Netanyahu was not a moral gesture but a strategic investment – and it is already paying dividends. On the eve of the election, Netanyahu broadcast a phone call in which Trump urged Israelis to "vote for Bibi Netanyahu" and declared, "we have to finish the job that we started" in Iran. Trump later claimed credit for Netanyahu's stronger-than-expected showing, telling reporters the endorsement "helped him a lot." This was not passive support, but an active intervention in a foreign election, designed to keep the leader most committed to Trump's Iran agenda in power.

The post-election evidence confirms the Trump factor is not merely rhetorical. According to Israeli media, close figures to Trump held private discussions with Israeli officials about a Netanyahu-Eisenkot unity government – one in which Netanyahu would remain prime minister for up to two years before handing power to his rival. A Likud official framed the logic bluntly: "What Trump wants is a stable and reliable Israeli government that can be formed as soon as possible." The proposal would let Netanyahu shed his far-right partners – Smotrich and Ben-Gvir and present a more moderate face – while still keeping him in office and preserving the Iran war project.

This confirms the article's central argument. The Israeli elections resolved nothing because the decisive factor was never the Israeli voter – it was the American president, who had already decided that Netanyahu was the asset he needed and offered solutions for his survival. This American factor is not marginal, especially amid Israel's growing international isolation following its genocidal war on Gaza. It cannot be ignored or bypassed by any candidate.

All in all, this deadlock in the Knesset is real, and it means that tension will continue, the wars will continue, and the region will remain under tension as in the pre-elections period, because the man who benefits most from such a deadlock has already been guaranteed the political survival that keeps him present in every possible scenario in the near future.