Central Asia has long been defined as one of the "quiet but critical” areas of global politics. However, the last few years have clearly demonstrated that this region can no longer remain silent. On the contrary, it has become one of the most refined and multilayered arenas of great power competition. The successive summits held by the U.S., the EU, China, Russia, the Gulf states and South Korea demonstrate that Central Asia represents more than just resource wealth. With its geo-economic position and strategic autonomy, it has become one of the key arenas in the global power struggle.

In this context, the first Central Asia-Japan Leaders' Summit held in Tokyo in December 2025, although presented on the surface as a technical cooperation meeting, carries the significance of a much more comprehensive transformation when read in depth. The Tokyo Declaration, adopted by Japan together with the five Central Asian countries, goes beyond investment and trade, clearly setting out the role Japan wishes to play in the new power architecture in Eurasia.

What is Japan aiming for?

Japan's interest in Central Asia is not new. Launched in 2004, the "Central Asia plus Japan Dialogue” has progressed over many years with a focus on technical cooperation, capacity building and infrastructure financing. Throughout this process, Tokyo has embraced neither Moscow's security-focused approach nor Beijing's aggressive economic expansion. Instead, it has pursued a relatively low-risk engagement model centered on concepts such as "quality infrastructure,” human resources and institutional resilience.

However, it is now apparent that this approach has reached its limits. The increasing fragility of global supply chains, intensifying competition over critical minerals, and the profound shift in Eurasian balances due to the Russia-Ukraine war have forced Japan to make clearer choices. The elevation of the Tokyo summit to the level of heads of state indicates a deliberate and strategic timing choice rather than a coincidence in this context.

The three key themes highlighted in the Tokyo Declaration (green transformation, connectivity and human resources) demonstrate that Japan does not view Central Asia merely as a source of raw materials. However, this does not mean that the economic security dimension has been pushed into the background. On the contrary, Japan's quest to diversify its supply sources for rare earth elements, uranium and critical minerals makes Central Asia an indispensable partner.

Support for the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route in particular demonstrates that Japan's approach to Eurasian logistics is not limited to commercial concerns but is also shaped by geopolitical balances. This route, which bypasses Russia, both enhances supply security for Tokyo and provides an alternative to the China-centred Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Japan's investment in this route without directly framing it as "opposition” reflects a conscious diplomatic choice.

Another noteworthy element is the subtle way in which the security discourse has been brought to the fore. The prominence given at the summit to the stability of Afghanistan, the fight against terrorism and border security indicates that Japan views Central Asia as more than just an economic hinterland, but as a key element of regional stability. Conversely, the Central Asian countries' statements of support for nuclear disarmament on the Korean Peninsula represent a symbolic as well as strategic gain for Tokyo.

Central Asia’s approach

Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Tokyo summit concerns how Central Asian countries position themselves in this process. From the perspective of the regional capitals, deepening relations with Japan does not signify a search for an alternative to China or a break with Russia. On the contrary, this opening is a natural extension of the multi-vector balancing policy that Central Asia has long sought to establish.

In recent years, Central Asian countries have experienced that acting as a bloc rather than engaging in bilateral relations with major powers increases their bargaining power. Summits held with the U.S., the EU and China have expanded both the visibility and sphere of influence of this collective approach. The new format established at the leadership level with Japan is also a product of the same logic.

At this point, the perception Japan has created in Central Asia is of critical importance. Tokyo is seen as an actor that does not impose military bases, security pacts or political conditions. This offers the countries in the region a lower-cost area of cooperation, both in their domestic public spheres and in the eyes of Moscow and Beijing. Although Japanese investments are more limited than Chinese financing, they offer a different value proposition in terms of technology transfer, sustainability and long-term planning.

In particular, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan's relations with Japan provide concrete examples of this balancing act. Agreements signed in the fields of energy, digitalization, transport and green transformation reflect Central Asia's desire to move up the global value chain. For Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, Japan stands out as a complementary partner in terms of infrastructure modernisation and human capital development.

However, the limits of this process are also clear. Central Asian countries do not aim to replace China or Russia with Japan. On the contrary, Tokyo's presence acts as a balancing lever in relations with these two major players. Every new partnership established with Japan reinforces the message that Central Asia is not dependent on a single center.

Therefore, it would be misleading to interpret the Tokyo summit as the beginning of a new bloc formation in Eurasia. It would be more accurate to view this step as part of efforts to strengthen Central Asia's strategic autonomy.