On the morning of Feb. 28, 2026, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was killed at his compound in Tehran in a joint Israeli-American military operation. The change in Iran's Supreme Leadership since the 1979 Revolution has now begun, not in peacetime, but in the middle of an active war. Khamenei’s assassination has set in motion a process that will fundamentally shape Iran’s political future. Yet, to understand how this process may unfold, one must first properly grasp who Khamenei was and the place the office of Supreme Leader occupies within Iran’s state architecture.

Who was Khamenei?

Ali Khamenei was born in 1939 in Mashhad. Before the Revolution, he joined the struggle against the Shah’s regime, was imprisoned multiple times, and sent into internal exile. Between 1981 and 1989, he served as president of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Following the first Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s death in 1989, Khamenei, who was initially dismissed as "weak and uncharismatic,” was selected as Supreme Leader by the Assembly of Experts.

At the time, he did not hold the rank of "marja al-taqlid," a title given to the highest-ranking cleric within Twelver Shiism. The constitutional requirements had been relaxed to accommodate his appointment. This initial weakness is a critical starting point for understanding how he constructed his authority over the subsequent 36 years.

Weight of office

The political structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran is built upon the doctrine of "Velayat-e Faqih" (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist) as formulated by Khomeini. According to this doctrine, during the Occultation of the 12th Imam, the governance of the Muslim community is entrusted to a "just and learned jurist.”

The supreme leader is therefore not merely a political figure but a religious authority. Article 110 of the Constitution vests in the Leader the supreme command of the armed forces, the power to appoint the head of the judiciary, the authority to declare war and peace, and the prerogative to determine the state’s general policies.

In other words, the Supreme Leader is the ultimate arbiter who exercises control over every dimension of the Iranian state.

Building his authority

When Khamenei assumed office, he operated under the enormous shadow Khomeini had left behind, with a limited sphere of legitimacy. Yet over the course of decades, he systematically consolidated his power through several key mechanisms.

First, he transformed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) into a power center directly subordinate to himself. Over the years, the IRGC evolved from a purely military organization into the most dominant actor across the economic, intelligence and political spheres of the state. Khamenei personally appointed IRGC commanders and positioned the organization as a counterweight to elected institutions, including the presidency.

Second, he leveraged his control over the Guardian Council to steer the electoral process. Through this body, which determines who may stand as a candidate in elections, he systematically purged reformist and oppositional voices. The disqualification of former President Hassan Rouhani from the 2024 Assembly of Experts election was among the most recent examples.

Third, the regional "Axis of Resistance” strategy became Khamenei’s most consequential policy. Through proxy structures such as Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis and Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces, he extended Iran’s regional influence far beyond its borders. This strategy simultaneously served as the principal pillar of his domestic justification: positioning Iran as the "guardian of the Muslim world” continuously reproduced the regime’s raison d’être.

Creating martyr

The narrative prevailing in Western capitals, "Khamenei is dead, Iranians are celebrating,” reflects only a fragment of reality. Reading Iranian society as a monolithic "anti-regime mass” is a fundamental analytical error that the West has committed time and again in this part of the world. Even at the height of the 2022 Mahsa Amini protests, a significant portion of society remained loyal to the regime. For the Basij (paramilitary militia within the IRGC) members, seminary students, revolutionary families and the rural conservative base, Khamenei was not a dictator but a leader they regarded as legitimate and a religious authority they recognized.

To this picture, one must now add the deepest layer of Shia theology. At the heart of Shia belief lies the Karbala paradigm: Imam Hussein, "ma’sum and mazlum" (innocent and oppressed), was martyred by the "tyrant” Yazid. This narrative has functioned as the core code of Shia collective memory for 1,400 years. In the Shia tradition, 11 of the 12 Imams are regarded as "oppressed,” "innocent” and "martyrs.”

The fact that Khamenei was killed by the enemy, and during the holy month of Ramadan, no less, maps directly onto this ancient paradigm. The regime’s propaganda apparatus need not invent anything to construct this narrative: the material has been furnished ready-made by history itself.

A historical parallel makes this risk concrete. Former Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh, overthrown in 1953 with a CIA and MI6-backed coup, was a secular-nationalist figure with no ideological affinity to Khamenei. Yet, the very fact of his removal through foreign intervention transformed him into an enduring reservoir of "grievance capital” in Iran’s collective memory. The 1953 coup was resurrected 26 years later as one of the legitimating sources of the 1979 Revolution.

What the United States did in 2026, directly assassinating Iran’s Supreme Leader through a military operation, may well become the reference point for political movements we cannot yet foresee, decades from now. Mosaddegh was a secular nationalist; Khamenei was a theocratic leader. But this time, the martyrdom narrative will draw from a source far deeper than secular nationalism, from Shia theology itself.

Washington may believe that by eliminating Khamenei, it has cleared the path for regime change. But the outcome carries the potential to be the exact opposite: a dead Khamenei may prove a far more powerful symbol than a living one. For he is no longer merely an aging and embattled leader. In the eyes of his followers, he has been transformed into a leader martyred by "the imperialist enemy” during Ramadan.

Constitution vs. reality on ground

Article 111 of the Constitution is unambiguous: upon the death of the supreme leader, the Assembly of Experts must convene immediately to select a successor. Until a new Leader is chosen, an Interim Leadership Council, comprising the president, the head of the Judiciary, and a member of the Guardian Council designated by the Expediency Council, assumes the leader’s duties.

On March 1, this council was duly formed: President Masoud Pezeshkian, Chief Justice Gholam-Hossein Mohseni-Eje’i and Guardian Council member Ayatollah Alireza Arafi were appointed as its members.

Yet, there is a severe gap between the constitutional framework and the situation on the ground. Even the physical convening of the 88-member Assembly of Experts poses a security risk: President Trump has openly declared that the bombardment will continue "throughout the week or as long as necessary.” Under these conditions, whether the transition can proceed according to constitutional timetables remains deeply uncertain.

The IRGC’s chain of command has also suffered devastating losses. Numerous senior commanders, including IRGC Commander-in-Chief Pakpour and Defense Minister Nasirzadeh, were killed in the strikes. This de facto power vacuum is a variable that will directly shape the selection of the next Supreme Leader.

Potential candidates

Several names have emerged in the succession contest. Mojtaba Khamenei, 56, Khamenei’s second son, maintains strong ties to both the IRGC and the Basij. He is assessed to have survived the strikes. However, a father-to-son succession directly contradicts the anti-monarchical founding principle of the 1979 Revolution. He holds no official state position, and his clerical credentials remain contested.

Alireza Arafi, 67, having been appointed to the Interim Leadership Council, is now de facto one of three figures governing the country. He serves as deputy chairperson of the Assembly of Experts, is a member of the Guardian Council, and heads Iran’s seminary system. A bureaucrat who had earned Khamenei’s trust, he nonetheless lacks organic ties to the IRGC. He fits the profile of a "consensus candidate.”

Hassan Khomeini, grandson of the Revolution’s founder, Ayatollah Khomeini, possesses considerable symbolic legitimacy. Yet, his ties to the security apparatus are virtually nonexistent. His candidacy for the Assembly of Experts was blocked in 2016. He remains a figure marginalized by the regime’s inner core.

Alongside these figures, Ali Larijani has emerged as the de facto crisis manager. As secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, he is directing the war effort and stands as the most senior civilian official to have survived the strikes. In this volatile environment, Larijani’s true role is that of the ultimate "kingmaker.” Much like Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who orchestrated the 1989 transition and secured Khamenei’s rise to power, Larijani is poised to manage the current crisis and shape the post-Khamenei era.

Instead of conclusion

Iran faces the most profound existential test since 1979. It is evident that these events will engender transformations in the country’s power dynamics and political paradigm. Yet, to expect a government fully aligned with Israel or the U.S. is equally implausible.

Since the Qajar dynasty, every wound inflicted upon Iran’s national pride has, over the course of historical processes, manifested as a distinct political movement. The Constitutional Revolution of 1906, the popular movement led by Mohammad Mosaddegh, and the 1979 Islamic Revolution, though different in their ideological forms, were all, at their core, nourished by the reflex to restore this wounded national dignity.

This is, of course, a country whose nuclear program has been destroyed and air defenses have been neutralized. Its proxy network has been dismantled, and the supreme leader has now been killed. The transition may evolve in several different directions. What will determine which scenario materializes is not the decisions of the Assembly of Experts, but rather the posture of the IRGC and the trajectory of the war.

But beyond all these short-term calculations, one question will prove decisive in the medium and long term: did the U.S. liberate Iran by killing Khamenei, or did it gift the Shia collective memory a new and extraordinarily potent martyr? History’s answer may turn out to be very different from what Washington expects.