In recent years, relations between Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Egypt have steadily improved. This trilateral engagement has, especially after the outbreak of the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran in late February 2026, expanded into a broader framework that also includes Pakistan. The scaling up of ministerial-level consultations and the platform between the four countries has reshaped the security architecture of the region.

The driver behind this realignment has been the shared exposure of Ankara, Riyadh, Cairo and Islamabad to a regional order that none of them can control on their own. This became evident after the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, first by Iran and later by a U.S. naval blockade. The penetration of American and Israeli attacks into what Gulf capitals had long considered a Washington-secured neighborhood has prompted Riyadh to reconsider its reliance on U.S. security guarantees. Saudi Arabia’s mutual defense pact with Pakistan, signed in September, had already signaled a search for alternatives.

Any formal joint defense commitments between these four states are still absent, and none has offered the others anything resembling collective defense. However, the frequency of their diplomatic engagements has begun to outweigh the informality of the framework itself, giving it an institutional weight that few observers anticipated. Emboldened by their shared exposure during the February war, the four countries have, over the past several months, made serious efforts to consolidate a joint consultative mechanism. They met three times between March 19 and April 18 alone, first in Riyadh, then in Pakistan, and later on the sidelines of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum.

What is interesting is that this quad has emerged while pointedly excluding the United Arab Emirates, historically Riyadh’s closest Gulf partner. Particularly in the aftermath of Abu Dhabi’s withdrawal from OPEC and its broader strategic drift away from Saudi and wider Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) positions, the UAE’s exclusion from a formation built around Gulf leadership becomes evident. This suggests that Riyadh is willing to recompose its regional alliances around states that share its threat perception rather than those that merely share its geography and history.

Recent developments have added clarity as to what this axis is trying to achieve. It is now more evident that Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Pakistan, by broadening the circle of states they consult before acting, are seeking to reduce their dependence on a Washington-centered order that, in their view, has repeatedly failed to prevent regional escalation.

Old disputes, new project

The convergence between Türkiye, Saudi Arabia and Egypt has been unfolding, particularly after Ankara’s decade-long rift with Cairo over political disagreements began to ease. This rapprochement first took shape through a military cooperation agreement in February and was later reinforced by a $350 million Turkish arms deal with Cairo’s defense ministry. These developments have, in turn, shifted their focus toward shared concerns in Gaza, Sudan, Libya and the Horn of Africa.

Gaza may be the most visible driver of this cooperation, but it is not the only one. Alongside Türkiye’s mediation role with Egypt, Qatar and the United States, Ankara has taken several steps that underscore its growing role in Gaza’s reconstruction, including offering troops to any international stabilization force, should one be established. The latest of these efforts came when Ankara reiterated its readiness to contribute to reconstruction "as soon as conditions allow," a position echoed by Riyadh and Cairo alike.

The quad’s stark rejection of an Israeli-imposed order in the Middle East, along with its coordination on Gaza, Iran and Sudan, is reshaping the long-standing assumption that American guarantees alone can continue to structure Middle Eastern security.

The U.S.-Israeli conflict with Iran targeted Iranian military infrastructure and, through Tehran’s retaliation, exposed Gulf economic interests themselves. This underscored that the region’s vulnerability to military confrontation will persist until a genuinely regional security framework can be established.

However, despite the rapprochement, a genuinely institutionalized platform will likely remain a distant objective for now. Rather than being founded on any formal treaty, the quad seeks to consolidate a platform of states that share threat perceptions without adhering to a single overarching ideology. As a result, the formation is likely to remain a consultative arrangement among states that seek a Middle East shaped, adjusted, and defined primarily by regional powers.