Aselsan is helping Türkiye turn technological independence into strategic power, proving that credible deterrence begins with the freedom to act without permission
A state that fights with borrowed technological infrastructure risks placing its strategic autonomy on loan. It may own the platform and command the soldiers, yet still depend on someone else’s permission to sustain operations or adapt to a new threat. Türkiye learned the consequences of this dependence during the Cold War. The war in Ukraine is revealing how the same vulnerability is being reproduced through software, data and artificial intelligence.
Much has changed in the international system associated with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. One foundational reality, however, endures: autonomy cannot be taken for granted. Sovereignty establishes a state’s authority, but exercising that authority requires capabilities that must be built and defended. Protecting this capacity remains central to the state’s raison d’etre. Today, the struggle increasingly concerns who controls the technologies through which sovereign decisions become possible.
Türkiye’s experience offers a historical warning. During the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the withdrawal of American Jupiter missiles stationed on Turkish territory became part of the confidential understanding between Washington and Moscow. The missiles were removed in 1963. The episode exposed the limits of influence that could accompany dependence on an ally’s strategic infrastructure. Türkiye hosted a capability whose future was bound up with a bargain between the superpowers.
The consequences became more direct after the 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation. The U.S. arms embargo, which took effect in February 1975, demonstrated that access to military supplies could become conditional precisely when national security decisions diverged from an ally’s preferences. Türkiye’s membership in NATO did not remove that vulnerability. The resulting drive for domestic capabilities helped give rise to Aselsan in 1975, with military communications at the heart of its founding mission.
Fragmented deterrence
Türkiye's experiences remain relevant because the mechanisms of dependence have expanded. An embargo can interrupt deliveries of equipment and spare parts. Restrictions on software updates, satellite connectivity or access to computing infrastructure can constrain systems already in service. A country may possess sophisticated weapons while lacking the technical authority to modify them. When operational needs change, that gap becomes a strategic liability.
The changing character of warfare makes the tempo of adaptation a central element of deterrence. This is the capacity to recognize a new threat, learn from operational experience and deploy an effective response before an adversary can consolidate its advantage. A sophisticated platform may lose much of its deterrent value if its weaknesses can be exploited faster than they can be corrected. Credibility therefore depends on a state’s demonstrated ability to keep its capabilities effective as the threat evolves.
This helps explain what I describe as fragmented deterrence. Nuclear deterrence can constrain escalation at the strategic level while leaving room for coercion through cyber operations, attacks on critical infrastructure and the manipulation of information. Success at one level does not automatically provide protection at another. An adversary may avoid a direct military confrontation yet exploit vulnerabilities where attribution is difficult, and the prospect of a response remains uncertain. Deterrence must consequently be sustained across domains with different vulnerabilities and thresholds.
Connecting fragments
The tempo of adaptation connects these fragments. The ability to detect an intrusion, restore disrupted services and revise defenses can reduce an adversary’s expectation of lasting gains. Combined with credible consequences for aggression, this capacity strengthens deterrence by making coercion less likely to succeed. Technological autonomy supports that credibility: a state able to modify and sustain its own systems can respond without waiting for an external supplier’s permission. Dependence can impose delays precisely when the ability to adapt is most consequential.
Sustaining this adaptive capacity changes what states must acquire and protect. A platform’s performance on delivery is only a starting point. Its continuing value depends on whether operators can identify weaknesses, engineers can revise the system and industry can supply the improved version quickly enough. Procurement arrangements that require lengthy external approval for each modification risk leaving forces behind the threat. Domestic production must therefore be accompanied by the authority and expertise to change what has been produced.
AI makes this question more consequential. Its military significance extends across the analysis of sensor data, logistical planning and support for targeting decisions. These applications depend on computing capacity, reliable data and models that operators can evaluate. Dependence at those levels can restrict a state’s ability to understand how a system reaches its recommendations, correct its errors, or keep it functioning when access is disrupted. Digital autonomy requires meaningful control over this infrastructure, alongside accountable human judgment.
Aselsan's response
The capabilities presented by Aselsan at Euronaval 2026 offer concrete examples of Türkiye’s response. Deployable Gökdeniz and containerized Göksur configurations are designed to extend air defense to platforms and locations requiring flexible protection. Gökdeniz’s configuration can be installed on commercial ships and tankers, bringing an established military capability into the protection of maritime commerce. The strategic value lies partly in adapting existing engineering knowledge to a changing operational need.
The new Smash 30 similarly combines AI-assisted detection and tracking with capabilities intended to address emerging aerial threats as well as surface threats. Mercan 100, a submarine optronic mast system, illustrates the connection between adaptation and independence even more directly. Aselsan’s chief executive, Ahmet Akyol, has explained that restrictions on submarine periscopes prompted work with the Turkish Armed Forces to develop a domestic alternative, subsequently enhanced with AI-supported capabilities. Control over a critical sensor gives Türkiye greater scope to sustain and improve the platform that depends on it.
There is also an international dimension. Aselsan’s announcement on Nov. 3 of a $1.1 billion (TL 55.49 billion) air defense export contract demonstrates the commercial scale these capabilities can reach. Yet the enduring strategic return depends on timely delivery, reliable support and continued development. For Türkiye, a stronger defense industry expands its capacity to act and its value as a partner. For customers, the quality of the relationship will depend on whether cooperation strengthens their ability to maintain and adapt the systems they acquire.
What's next?
The next task is to carry this approach deeper into the technological foundations of defense. National platforms require sustained investment in sensors, secure software and the computing infrastructure behind increasingly intelligent systems. Procurement should support regular upgrades and close contact between users and engineers. Universities and industry must develop the expertise to inspect and improve critical technologies. Where foreign inputs remain necessary, diversified supply and credible alternatives can reduce the power of any single restriction.
The strategic significance of Aselsan’s achievements and the wider progress of the Turkish defense industry lies in the capacity to sustain the tempo of adaptation. The ability to translate operational experience into improved systems, revise technologies as threats evolve and maintain production under pressure strengthens the credibility of deterrence. An adversary must reckon with a defense capability that can respond to its countermeasures and remain effective over time. National control over critical technologies supports this capacity by reducing the delays and restrictions associated with external dependence.
Türkiye’s experience demonstrates how sustained investment in engineering and industrial capacity can turn this principle into a foundation of strategic autonomy. Through the ability to design, produce, maintain and improve its own defense systems, Türkiye expands the freedom to implement national security decisions while strengthening its contribution to international partnerships. Aselsan’s progress gives concrete expression to this relationship between technological competence, adaptation and deterrence. A defense industry capable of sustaining national choices under pressure provides the material basis for rejecting autonomy on loan. Sovereign decisions acquire lasting credibility when a state possesses the capabilities to carry them through.