Shortly after taking power on Dec. 8, 2024, Ahmed al-Shara’s government in Damascus called for the integration of the YPG, the Syrian branch of the PKK terrorist organization, which controls vast territories east of the Euphrates. Unifying Syria’s dual military and administrative structures was a clear necessity for the country’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. This call initially gained traction on March 10, 2025, when both sides signed an eight-point integration agreement.

However, since then, very little has changed beyond a few symbolic gestures. Instead of taking structural steps toward unity, the YPG has employed stalling tactics, making maximalist demands to keep Damascus at bay. Although Dec. 31, 2025, was set as the deadline for the agreement's implementation, the new year has not started as hoped. Not only did the YPG fail to take the expected steps, but it also incited unrest in Aleppo’s Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafieh neighborhoods. Most alarmingly, it began engaging in armed clashes with Damascus through armed groups operating under its umbrella, such as the so-called Afrin Liberation Forces. As a result, Syria has entered 2026 under the shadow of a new wave of chaos.

The Damascus government’s growing acceptance on the global stage, particularly by the U.S. and other Western nations, has driven the YPG toward a more aggressive stance. For years, the YPG relied on its narrative as Washington’s primary local ally in Syria. However, as the new administration in Damascus rapidly integrated into the international system, that narrative essentially collapsed.

Finding itself without its usual Western support, the YPG leadership resorted to an old tactic: threatening to release Daesh prisoners. When these threats failed to gain enough traction, the group turned to Israel. Yet, rhetorical support from Tel Aviv proved insufficient, as the underlying objective was to use Israel as leverage over Washington. To the YPG’s frustration, however, the United States has so far remained largely neutral, limiting its response to calls for restraint.

The YPG now stands at a crossroads with two options. The first is to honor the March 10 agreement unconditionally, disband its armed units and integrate into the central government. The second is to escalate the conflict to demonstrate its strength and compel renegotiation of the agreement’s terms. While its rhetoric points toward integration, its actions on the ground suggest it has chosen the latter. But where exactly will this second path lead the YPG?

From integration to confrontation

The YPG’s attempts to destabilize Aleppo and corner the Damascus government could trigger a domino effect that marks the beginning of the end for the group. The YPG believed that by fueling tensions west of the Euphrates, it could more easily secure its hold over territories to the east. Essentially, it viewed the Western Front as a stage for a show of force. However, this strategy began to collapse from day one.

First, the Syrian army made significant gains in Aleppo, demonstrating its overwhelming military superiority. Meanwhile, to the east of the Euphrates, the YPG's authority is starting to fracture. Arab tribes in Deir ez-Zor, in particular, are increasingly restless under YPG rule. Their strengthening ties with Damascus are the clearest sign that the YPG’s presence in the region is unsustainable.

Since Deir ez-Zor is almost entirely Arab, these tribes prefer to align with the central government, which they regard as their own, rather than remain under SDF control. A major turning point came in July 2025, when Arab tribes called for unity following massacres against Bedouin Arabs by Druze factions supported by Tel Aviv. This event significantly bolstered Arab identity within Syria. As a result, the Arab population is now rallying around the internationally recognized government in Damascus, choosing national unity over a nonstate actor they view as an outsider.

Cost of choosing escalation

The YPG’s continued escalation of instability in Syria carries risks far beyond losing control in Deir ez-Zor. Türkiye, which views border security as a nonnegotiable "red line” and has never hesitated to launch operations against either Daesh or the YPG, could put a new offensive on its agenda at any moment. Such a move could push the YPG’s fragile presence in Hasakah and Raqqa to the brink of total collapse.

Furthermore, a new Turkish intervention might not be as localized as previous ones. Ankara and Damascus, which are already cooperating on several fronts, may move toward translating this cooperation into more coordinated action against the YPG. Under these circumstances, a comprehensive joint military operation is feasible.

The YPG is far from being a true representative of the region's Kurdish population; instead, it is an organization that does not hesitate to use them as an instrument for its own ambitions. Opposition to the YPG is no longer limited to the Arab tribes; it is also growing among Kurds. As previously stated, this widespread backlash could signal the beginning of the end for the group. If the YPG is genuinely committed to the interests of the Kurdish people, as it claims to be, it must stop escalating tensions, lay down its arms immediately, and unconditionally fulfill the terms of the March 10 agreement. As a result, Syria can no longer afford to be a playground for such nonstate actors. Ultimately, restoring Syria’s territorial integrity is not only a national priority but also the essential foundation for stability across the entire region.