The war in Ukraine has become a strong driver of rapid military innovation, particularly in the field of unmanned systems. Uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) dominate headlines and attract most public attention, yet another class of autonomous systems, uncrewed surface vehicles (USVs), has long begun to reshape naval warfare.

Among these, Ukraine’s Magura series has emerged as a defining symbol of maritime innovation. The recent discovery of a Magura V5 off the coast of Trabzon, Türkiye, provides a timely opportunity to assess the platform’s origins, capabilities and impact on the war, as well as its broader implications for future military trends.

Concept, capability

The Magura is one of several USVs operated by Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence (GUR), alongside systems such as Sea Baby, Sea Wolf, Mamai and Katran. Designed primarily for kamikaze-style strikes, these vessels can carry large explosive payloads and are intended to destroy high-value targets, including Russian warships, landing ships and intelligence vessels. Ukraine has also used them to attack critical infrastructure such as the Kerch Bridge and coastal energy facilities in Crimea.

The Magura’s effectiveness should be understood within Ukraine’s broader sea denial strategy. Lacking a conventional navy capable of matching Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, the country has turned to low-cost, expendable and increasingly sophisticated unmanned platforms to degrade Russian freedom of movement at sea. In the meantime, the attacks on Russian ports and energy facilities, most notably the February 2025 strike on Tuapse, which targeted oil terminals and refineries, illustrate how Ukraine is using these platforms to extend the war’s reach deep into Russia’s logistical and industrial base. Although not every attack succeeded – some failed due to technical faults before engagement or Russian countermeasures – the cumulative operational effect has been significant.

Ukraine’s experimentation with USVs began early in the conflict. In October 2022, Ukrainian naval drones launched a coordinated strike against the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol. The attack damaged the frigate Admiral Makarov, the fleet’s new flagship, following the sinking of the Moskva and the minesweeper Ivan Golubets. Russia described the incident as the most serious assault on its fleet since the start of the invasion.

This success prompted Ukraine to institutionalize its efforts. In August 2023, Kyiv established the 385th Unmanned Surface Vehicles Brigade under its navy, the world’s first dedicated USV unit. Both the GUR and the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) have played central roles in developing, testing, and deploying these platforms, highlighting the integration of secrecy, innovation, and operational capability in wartime adaptation.

Technical evolution, adaptation

The Magura series has undergone substantial technological evolution since its introduction. The latest variants, including the V5 and V7, reportedly have an operational range of up to 800 kilometers (497 miles) and can carry several 100 kilograms (220.46 pounds) of explosives. More remarkably, Ukraine has modified certain versions to carry surface-to-air missiles (SAM), a unique adaptation for a naval drone.

One of the most notable innovations involves integrating legacy air-to-air missiles. Ukrainian engineers repurposed the Russian R-73 (NATO codename: AA-11 Archer) missile, originally designed for fighter aircraft, as an air-to-air missile. In December 2024, a Magura V5 reportedly used this configuration to shoot down a Russian Mi-8 helicopter over the Black Sea, the first instance of a USV destroying an aircraft.

Subsequent variants, such as the Magura V7, are reportedly capable of launching AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles since January of this year and deploying first-person-view (FPV) drones from the sea. In May, the chief of Ukraine's Defense Intelligence, Kyrylo Budanov, stated that Magura V7s fired AIM-9 missiles, shooting down two Russian Su-30 fighter aircraft in the Black Sea.

The Magura V5 found off Türkiye’s coast in 2025 did not appear to carry missile armament but was reportedly laden with explosives. This suggests it was intended for a conventional kamikaze strike against Russian naval or energy targets. Regardless of the specific mission, its presence so far from Ukrainian waters demonstrates the platform’s extended reach and endurance.

Operational impact

The introduction of USVs, such as the Magura, has produced a measurable shift in the balance of naval power in the Black Sea. Small, fast and difficult to detect, these platforms have forced Russia to adapt its operations dramatically. The freedom of maneuver of the Black Sea Fleet has been sharply curtailed, with many vessels relocated to the relative safety of ports in the eastern Black Sea.

Furthermore, this operational constraint has weakened Russia’s attempted naval blockade of Ukraine and undermined its ability to project power from the sea. The psychological and symbolic impact of the successes of unmanned systems should not be underestimated, as such achievements boost army morale in the face of insufficient military equipment and increasingly severe manpower shortages.

Trends in maritime autonomy

The success of Ukraine’s USVs has already inspired a new wave of development, both domestically and internationally. The next frontier appears to be the underwater domain. Ukraine has begun testing autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs), such as Marichka and Toloka, which can perform reconnaissance, mine-laying, or loitering torpedo missions.

The logical progression of these trends points toward loitering torpedoes, submersible systems capable of waiting for extended periods before autonomously striking a target, much like aerial loitering munitions. Such technologies would further complicate traditional naval defense strategies.

As these systems proliferate, the demand for advanced maritime patrol and detection assets will increase. Detecting and neutralizing small, low-signature USVs and AUVs will require new combinations of sensors, satellite imagery and autonomous counter-systems. The line between offense and defense at sea is thus becoming increasingly blurred and autonomous maritime counter-autonomy is emerging as a new field of competition.

Beyond Ukraine, navies around the world are closely observing these developments. The Magura’s success will likely influence future naval procurement and doctrine, particularly among smaller and midsized powers that lack large fleets but seek credible deterrence through asymmetric means. A logical conclusion is that sea denial is becoming stronger, and sea control is becoming increasingly difficult to achieve in today’s naval space.