In the midst of the American-Israeli war against Iran and U.S. President Donald Trump’s public disappointment with NATO members to such an extent that he will "consider" withdrawing from NATO, the future of the alliance was put into question.

Though not as pronounced as in current politics, American leaders’ complaints about Europeans not doing their share of security development are not something new. John F. Kennedy, the 35th president of the United States, was already speaking in 1963 about European countries in terms of how, despite their economic growth and increasing capacities, they were not willing to finance and invest in their own security, leaving this responsibility entirely to the U.S. The Europeans never took this criticism seriously and did not attempt to strengthen their security and defense infrastructure, nor did they want to give up the flexibility that American military protection provides them.

Not when Russian President Vladimir Putin publicly confronted and threatened Europeans in his 2007 speech at the Munich Security Conference, not when Russia gradually began to emerge as a threat by attacking countries in the European Union’s neighborhood, such as Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014, which ended with the annexation of Crimea, and not when Trump had already shown his scepticism toward the transatlantic alliance during his first term.

However, the Russian invasion of Ukraine was the most serious wake-up call for the Europeans in their history of security perceptions. The Russian leaders repeated several times in their speeches that it was not only Ukraine that they were fighting against, but also the whole European civilization. This, combined with the fact that Russia is a nuclear state with heavy conventional weapons and a source of Europe’s energy requirements, showed Europeans that their security is no longer an issue to be taken for granted.

Their vulnerability became even more serious when Trump’s second administration began in January 2025. Since taking office, he has not only implemented his America First policy but has also advanced his scepticism about NATO and European dependence on U.S. military support.

This time, Europeans took it seriously. The NATO summit held in The Hague in June 2025 was groundbreaking in many respects. The NATO allies demonstrated their determination by committing to invest 5% of their gross domestic product (GDP) annually in defense by 2035, a target already advocated by Trump. Of this 5% target, allies pledged to allocate at least 3.5% of GDP annually to core defense requirements, in line with the agreed NATO capability targets, while 1.5% of GDP would be directed toward protecting critical infrastructure, defending networks, ensuring civil preparedness, and strengthening innovation and the defense industry.

The promises were made at the Hague summit, but geopolitical tensions, a fragile security environment, and U.S. scepticism toward NATO persisted.

Before Ankara summit

So, what has become more necessary now at the NATO summit in Ankara in July 2026 is to implement the promises made in The Hague and to show the world, with figures, that allies have stepped up concretely in their defense policies. But before we attempt to speculate on whether this will happen in Ankara, we must underline the challenges that plague NATO, which could cast doubt on its future.

EU countries still have weak military infrastructure, especially in air defense, and will take years to match American capabilities in defense, logistics and intelligence.

Differing threat perceptions and resulting mistrust may hinder alliance unity, as seen before regarding Türkiye’s role. Although Türkiye has always emphasized the priority it places on fighting terrorism, these concerns were not always taken seriously by its allies, as seen in American support for the YPG in Syria and the embargoes imposed on Türkiye by several allies.

U.S.-Germany rift

The rift and mistrust among allies deepened further during the Iran crisis. In addition to Trump’s public criticisms of the Italian and Spanish governments’ reluctance to allow the use of American bases in the Iran war, his latest actions regarding Germany revealed just how serious the crisis among allies could become.

After German Chancellor Friedrich Merz publicly criticized the American position in the Iran war, using the term "humiliation" to describe the current stance, Trump reacted by announcing that he would withdraw 5,000 American soldiers stationed in Germany. The U.S. has a total of 36,400 soldiers in Germany, so many would remain, but the president revealed that "he might consider withdrawing even more." The military alliance between the U.S. and Germany, established after World War II, is extensive, and Germany hosts the largest American military presence in Europe.

Ramstein Air Base is the headquarters for U.S. air forces in Europe and Africa and a major logistics and airlift hub for operations across Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. Spangdahlem Air Base is also a key NATO air defense and strike operations base, home to fighter jets. In addition, the U.S. has an army garrison in Baden-Württemberg, which hosts the U.S. European and Africa Commands. The headquarters of U.S. Army Europe and Africa is in Wiesbaden, and Landstuhl is home to the largest American military hospital outside the U.S.

All these bases and facilities serve as central hubs for NATO operations, logistics, training and rapid deployment, making them crucial for the success of the U.S. operations. Therefore, reducing the number of forces would signal a genuine crisis and mistrust among the allies, making it difficult for the alliance to strengthen itself.

Problems, solutions

It is a fact that the allies have shown their political will and determination to contribute more to the NATO budget, invest and produce more. However, it will not lead to significant change if they continue moving at different speeds, strengthening their defense capabilities nationally instead of cooperating and integrating to build a strong European pillar within NATO.

With Trump’s rhetoric, fragmentation among the allies is here to stay for a long time. But NATO is a strong alliance with a history of solving crises and adapting to different circumstances, and I believe this experience will prevail in the future.

The EU countries should continue to be part of NATO, but in a stronger position, taking advantage of NATO instruments accumulated over the years, such as joint procurement, intelligence, logistics and command, rather than creating a more militarily independent EU or trying to replace NATO’s Article 5 with the EU’s Article 42.7. This would not only be duplicative, but it would also harm the image of NATO’s unity and solidarity, which we want to emphasize.

Türkiye is a very important ally in NATO, and its geopolitical location at the crossroads of highly conflictual areas has made its importance even more pronounced. It has demonstrated its value and reliability to the allies on many occasions by playing a balanced role in the Russia-Ukraine war, participating actively in several NATO missions, and helping bridge positions in various regions, such as the Balkans and Afghanistan.

Moreover, after being removed from the F-35 program and facing embargoes from several allies due to differing threat perceptions and unilateral moves, such as the purchase of the S-400, Türkiye has invested heavily in its defense infrastructure. According to the 2026 report of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Türkiye ranked 11th among the world’s largest arms exporters during the 2021-2025 period.

In today’s increasingly insecure world, a militarily stronger EU within NATO is necessary, and Türkiye’s role in strengthening both European security and NATO solidarity is more important than ever. The Ankara Summit will be a key platform to highlight this.