Last month, a giant billboard in Tel Aviv proclaimed, "It’s time for a new Middle East." Yet behind the optimism lies a hard-nosed power play between Washington and Tel Aviv.

There is again a possibility of expanding the Abraham Accords in the Middle East post-Israel-Iran war. After the conclusion of the 12-day war between Israel and Iran, the U.S. and Israel hastily voiced optimism about the expansion of the Abraham Accords framework with the possible inclusion of Syria, Saudi Arabia, Oman and Lebanon.

First, the U.S.-imposed pause in direct hostilities between Israel and Iran reset the regional balance. Next, U.S. and Israeli leaders seized that window to animate normalization talks. Finally, they turned to institutional and diplomatic levers to lock in anti-Tehran alignment.

Central to this approach is the formalization of anti-Iran alignment through the very act of recognizing and legitimizing Israel: By promoting Israeli normalization as a normative benchmark, Washington and Tel Aviv seek to embed opposition to Iran within a broader, enduring regional order.

Embracing the idea again?

The swift U.S. strike on Iran’s nuclear sites – following Israel’s own operations – has dramatically weakened Tehran’s military strategy and underscored American military dominance. This reset in the balance of power gives the U.S. and Israel fresh diplomatic capital to press for broader Arab-Israeli normalization while Iran is on the back foot.

With Trump back in the White House, there is a concerted effort to translate "military victories” into a lasting political order. U.S. policymakers see an expanded Abraham Accords framework as the backbone of a new regional security arrangement – uniting Israel, Gulf states and other regional partners under American oversight to deter any future Iranian aggression.

However, garnering Arab popular support may not be easy. In the March 2024 Arab Barometer survey, 98% of Saudis expressed negative views toward extending normalization to their country, with only 2% in favor — figures nearly mirrored in Lebanon, and starkly contrasting Oman’s 39% support and 61% opposition.

Concurrently, intensified Houthi attacks in the Red Sea have forced hundreds of ships to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope, adding days to transit times and billions of dollars in extra fuel, insurance and shipping costs per voyage, further complicating Gulf states’ security calculus for closer ties with Israel.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia remains the most consequential potential signer, yet formal accession in the near term still seems unlikely. Riyadh has repeatedly conditioned normalization on "credible progress toward a Palestinian state” as outlined in the Arab Peace Initiative, explicitly insisting on agreed parameters for a two-state solution and robust U.S. security guarantees before any public signing ceremony.

Moreover, Saudi decision-makers continue to weigh relations with Iran, where both lines of communication and strategic competition remain active, which makes an abrupt shift toward Israel politically and regionally perilous. The main hurdles for the Saudis are Palestinian precondition (a clear, enforceable road map to statehood), U.S. defense assurances acceptable to Riyadh, and managing Riyadh’s delicate balance with Tehran and domestic-religious establishment sensibilities.

Syria

Syria arguably presents the most immediate prospect among the four. Behind-the-scenes contacts, reportedly mediated by U.S., Egyptian and Jordanian envoys, have focused on sequencing normalization with partial Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights and phased economic reconstruction aid.

Interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s public openness to indirect talks, paired with Washington’s own strategic interest in diluting Iran’s Syrian foothold, has given momentum to these discussions. Main hurdles for the Syrians are the status of the Golan Heights and territorial sovereignty, Damascus’ position in the face of Tehran and Hezbollah.

Oman

Oman has long served as a discreet interlocutor rather than an upfront normalization candidate. Muscat’s historic neutrality, maintaining cordial ties with Iran, the U.S. and Israel, means that while Oman could, in principle, upgrade its Israeli liaison office to an embassy, public accession to the Accords would risk alienating key partners in Tehran and within its conservative domestic polity.

Also, the stakes Oman has in the war in Yemen, especially the influence over the Houthis, could invite further backlash, as the Houthis are the ones who have been striking Israel for the last 2.5 years. In that respect, the main hurdles for Oman are preserving equilibrium in Iran relations, limited domestic popular mandate for normalization, and the absence of strong economic inducements comparable to those offered to Gulf neighbors like the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain.

Lebanon

Lebanon stands at the lowest probability for accession. The country’s political institutions remain deeply fractured, and Hezbollah, by definition, vociferously opposes any rapprochement with Israel on ideological and strategic grounds. Even a pro-Western government would struggle to navigate the domestic backlash and security risks of formal ties.

While Hezbollah’s material power may have diminished post-October 2023, its entrenched presence across politics, the bureaucracy, and even segments of the military endures, allowing the group to act with strategic restraint while maintaining decisive influence. This structural entrenchment reinforces its veto power over foreign-policy decisions, compounded by the fragility of governing coalitions and the unresolved disputes over maritime and border demarcations with Israel.

Will Abraham Accords expand?

In the evolving landscape, the pace and scope of the Abraham Accords expansion will ultimately hinge on each state’s ability to reconcile strategic imperatives with entrenched political and societal constraints.

While Syria’s tentative rapprochement and Saudi Arabia’s cautious diplomacy signal a potential shift, Oman’s strategic neutrality and Lebanon’s domestic fragilities underscore the limits of regional consensus. Achieving a durable normalization framework thus requires not only high-level agreements but also tangible progress on Palestinian self-determination, robust security guarantees, and inclusive domestic buy-in across the Arab world.

But, if Riyadh, Damascus and Muscat soon join Abu Dhabi and Manama under the Abraham banner, we must ask: What price will Palestinians, and the regional order, truly pay for this new "peace"?