The release of the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy (NSS) has clearly laid out U.S. President Donald Trump's worldview and what "America First” means in foreign policy. From a foreign policy perspective, this latest document signals a paradigm shift, doing more than outlining foreign policy priorities. It establishes a new strategic focus centred on the Western Hemisphere and a "Trump Corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine. The post-Cold War pursuit of "permanent American domination of the entire world" is labelled a "fundamentally undesirable and impossible goal" in our time. When viewed through the lens of domestic politics, in a decisive turn inward that echoes the struggles of 1787, Washington has declared an end to the confederate approach favored by finance capital. Instead, the new doctrine embraces the founding fathers of the U.S., Alexander Hamilton’s legacy: a centralized, unitary state powered by industrial policy as the backbone of national security.

If there is one principle this report is brutally honest about, it is that U.S. engagement is now strictly conditional on national interest. Accordingly, Trump has placed Europe and Transatlantic relations squarely in the crosshairs. By relegating Europe to the periphery of global geopolitics, Trump has designated Europe as the entity to pay the price in the struggle for hegemony. Moreover, as evidenced in the passage below, the liberal worldview and transatlantic security umbrella that acted as the binding force of the Transatlantic alliance since 1945 has finally run its course.

"Over the long term, it is more than plausible that, within a few decades at the latest, certain NATO members will become majority non-European. As such, it is an open question whether they will view their place in the world, or their alliance with the U.S., in the same way as those who signed the NATO charter.”

By advocating for the restoration of Europe’s civilizational self-confidence and Western identity, Trump is, ironically, proposing a familiar path to European policymakers: "Make Europe Great Again." Europe, according to the document, is described, in a somewhat demeaning tone, as an insecure actor unable to stand on its own feet. This definition finds its true context within the dynamics of the Ukraine-Russia-Europe triangle.

US absence in Indo-Pacific

As the U.S. pivots to strengthening its home front and decoupling from Europe, its Indo-Pacific strategy stands out as particularly clear and compelling. The report is conspicuously silent on critical regional elements such as Southeast Asia, Aukus, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), North Korea, South Asia, the Quad and the Pacific Islands. In the context of Trump’s Indo-Pacific policy, it may seem rational to disengage from and shed the burdens of loose groupings like the QUAD and AUKUS, which have not and likely will not, evolve into formal institutions. However, the lack of emphasis on ASEAN could predictably drive regional nations further into China’s orbit. Such an approach is completely at odds with the recently stated U.S. objective of maintaining a presence "in every corner of the Indo-Pacific" and cooperating on strategy with regional partners like ASEAN.

It is also evident that Trump has revised the containment strategy and the emphasis on the "China threat" from his first term, adopting a stance more attuned to geopolitical realities, while refraining from antagonistic rhetoric. Therefore, China is no longer defined as the "primary threat," "most consequential challenge," or "revisionist actor." By acknowledging that opening U.S. markets to China, encouraging American businesses to invest there, and outsourcing manufacturing were strategic mistakes that failed to integrate China into the U.S.-led international order, Trump now aims to confront China directly in this domain and reduce its growing influence.

Another noteworthy point is that compared to the 2017 strategy, the new document significantly reduces India’s strategic importance. Previously, Washington treated India as a major global power. Now, the focus has shifted to a transactional approach, aiming to use commercial relations to get New Delhi involved in Indo-Pacific security.

Regarding Taiwan, its dominance in semiconductor production and its strategic location, anchoring the Second Island Chain and bisecting Northeast and Southeast Asia, are identified as critical interests for the U.S. and the U.S. declares that it does not support any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.

The new NSS is more than just a routine list of foreign policy goals. Instead of proposing a new vision, it reads like a manifesto declaring the demise of Pax-Americana. The message given by the U.S. is simple. We are absent where our national interests are absent. We are present only when our interests are directly at stake. Consequently, our allies must step up and spend, and more importantly, do much more for collective defense.

Based on the document’s structure and emphasis, the top U.S. priorities can be characterized as a hierarchy ranging from homeland security and borders to a restoration of the Monroe Doctrine in the Western Hemisphere, followed by economic reindustrialization, and finally, China and the Indo-Pacific. The NSS serves primarily as a statement of intent. The principles presented in the strategy are not new; the president and his closest advisers have voiced them before. However, how much of it translates into reality remains contingent on future developments and Trump’s survival in the domestic political arena.